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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV -006-324
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF AND IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

________~R=e~sp~o=n=de=n~t___________)
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this her List of Exhibits in Support of Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief and In Opposition to Motion for Summary Dismissal:
FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
Exhibit Number
1. Affidavit of Mark Rader, Co-Counsel for Bob Pangburn
2. Affidavit of Patrick Dunn, Investigator for Defense
3. Suspended Status of Attorney Bobby Eugene Pangburn (Idaho Bar Association)
4. Disciplinary Order Idaho Supreme Court Bobby E. Pangburn
5. Written Statement by Mathew Johnson & Cell Phone Minutes Log
6. Idaho State Police Report 12117/2003
7. Transcript of Interview with Mathew Johnson 10/6/2003
8. Transcript ofInterview with Mathew Johnson 10/6/2003
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

1

9. Transcript of Interview with Mel Speegle 10/9/2003
10. Transcript ofInterview with Mathew Johnson 10/6/2003
11. Transcript of Interview with Mathew Johnson 10/6/2003
12. Transcript ofInterview with Consuelo Cedeno & Jane Lopez 9112/2003
13. Blaine County Sheriffs Report ofInterview with Bruno Santos 9/2/2003
14. Transcript of Interview with Bruno Santos 9/3/2003
15. Affidavit and Resume of Robert J. Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert
16. Voluntary Written Statement of Terri Sanders 9/9/2003
17. Report of Police Officer Ed Fuller of Second Interview with Terri Sanders 10112/200.3
18. Voluntary Written Statement of Stephanie Hoffman 9/15/2003
19. Summary of Statements by Neighbors of Alan and Diane Johnson
20. Transcript ofInterview with Linda O'Conner 10116/2003
21. Scientific Journal Article: Parricide: A Comparative Study of Matricide versus Patricide
22. Affidavit of Dr. Richard Worst, Forensic Psychiatrist
23. Press and Journal Articles relating to Theories of Why Children Kill Parents
24. CNN Transcripts of Nancy Grace Television Programs with Bobby Pangburn
25. Letter dated 9/2/03 from Doug Nelson regarding Representation of Sarah Johnson
26. Supreme Court ofIdaho Opinion: State vs. Johnson 188 P.3d 912
27. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Latent Section Case Notes
28. External and Internal Chain of Custody form
29. Affidavit of Robert J. Kerchusky in Support of Newly Discovered Evidence
30. Order Relating to Newly Discovered Evidence

LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

2

31. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report - Fingerprints
32. Blaine County Sheriff's Report 2/3/2009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher
Kevin Hill
SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
Exhibit Number
33. Affidavit of Steven Dana Pankey
34. Letter from Steven Dana Pankey to the Honorable Barry Wood
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Exhibit Number
35. Photograph of Diagram of Glen Aspen Drive
36. Photograph of Murder Weapon at Scene
37. Photograph of Trash Can Johnson Residence
38. Photograph of Removed Rifle Scope on Guest Bed Johnson Residence
39. Photograph of Winchester Super X Rifle Cartridges
40. Transcript from Grand Jury Proceedings
41. Supplemental Report Blaine County Sheriff's Office Interview with Dell Speegle
9/3/2003
42. Transcript ofInterview with Mel Speegle 10/9/2003
43. Blaine County Sheriff's Report 2/3/2009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher
Kevin Hill
44. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report - Fingerprints
45. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report - Fingerprints
46. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report - Fingerprints

LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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47. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis Report - Fingerprints
48. Blaine County Sheriffs Supplemental Report 11/2/2009 Regarding Christopher Kevin
Hill Missing Statement
49. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Notes Regarding Hill Investigation
50. Audio Recording of Interview with Mel Speegle 211 0/2009
51. Audio Recording of Interview with Christopher Kevin Hill 2/12/2009
52. Blaine County Sheriffs Supplemental Report 4/312009 regarding Major Case Prints for
Christopher Kevin Hill
53. Blaine County Sheriffs Supplemental Report 7114/2009 Regarding Hill Fingerprinting
54. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Criminalistic Analysis report - Fingerprints
55. Transcript of Robert J. Kerchusky Deposition 8/27/2009
56. National Academy of Science Journal Article Badly Fragmented Forensic Science
Systems Needs Overhaul: Evidence To Support Reliability Of Many Techniques Is Lacking
57. Laboratory Report Forensic Identification Orchard Cellmark Company 5113/2004
60. Un-numbered Exhibit. Volumes 1 - 9 Transcript on Appeal
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF
Exhibit Number
58. Mark Rader Deposition Transcript (with Deposition Exhibits 1,2 and 3)
59. Patrick Dunn Deposition Transcript
60. Orchid Cellmark Fed Ex Receipt with Hand Written Notation
61. Bruno Santos Interview Transcript September 3,2003
62. Police Report of Carlos Ayala Interview
63. Bruno Santos - Nikki Settle Transcript of Taped Telephone Call
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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64. Affidavit of Christopher P. Simms, Attorney at Law
65. Bob Pangburn Deposition Transcript

EY AT LAW

R STOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/7l4I2c;t
2010, a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5" day of
and correct copy of the foregoing LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting
Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise,
Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number
208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy
for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin
Falls, Idah<>~n303-0126.
/US Mail

---

- - - Hand Deliver
_ _ _ Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
LIST OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
AND IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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MAR. 5.2010

1:43PM
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HO AiiY GENERAL-SPU

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Idaho Attorney General

FILED ~~ / ~7rjJP
GAR 05 2fIII -.~

STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Chief. Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division

Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
COurt Blaine County, Idaho

JESSICA M. LORELLO IS8 #6554
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051
Deputies Attorney General and
Special Prosecuting Attorneys
P.O. Box 83720
Boise. Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 332-3096
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIiE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNiY OF BLAINE
)

SARAH JOHNSON

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV-06-324
MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

COMES NOW the State of Idaho. by and through its counsel acting as
Special Prosecuting Attorneys for Blaine County. and hereby submits this brief in
opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition (Hereinafter "Motion").
In her Motion Johnson asks for judgment on all her claims (save one which is
waived).

In her Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's Motion for

Summary Disposition (hereinafter "Memorandum"). however, she addresses only
the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence
related specifically to fingerprint evidence. The state will rely upon the briefing
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOrlON FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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P. 3

submitted in its own motion for summary dismissal in relation to Johnson's unThe state submits the following in relation to the issues

briefed claims.

addressed In Johnson's Memorandum.

I.
Johnson Has Falled To Show That She Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of
Law On Her Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

A.

Introduction
Johnson argues that she has demonstrated that her counsel was

ineffective for failing to present at trial certain testimony from Johnson's trial
fingerprint expert, Robert Kerchusky, that he was willing to offer. (Memorandum,
pp. 11-13.)

Review of the evidence presented and relied on by Johnson,

however, shows that she has not made even a prima facie showing of ineffective
assistance of counsel, much less a shC?wing that would entitle her to judgment on
summary proceedings.

B.

Johnson Has Failed As A Matter Of Law To Show Deficient Performance
As A Matter Of L§!6'
The first prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is deficient

performance.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To

establish deficient performance, the petitioner must demonstrate that her
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986). A claim of
J

deficient performance "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "Because of the distorting
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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effects of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged
conduct, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Davis v. State, 116 Idaho

401.406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689~90).

A reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the

alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes "trial counsel was competent and
that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho
772,791-92,948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997).
What evidence or testimony an attorney decides should be presented to
the jury to best support a defense theory Is a tactical decision that ordinarily will
not be second-guessed on review. Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho

720, 725, 932

P.2d 348 (1997). Tactical decisions of counsel are presumed competent, which
presumption is overcome only upon showing an objective shortcoming such as
failure to investigate or ignorance of the law. State v. Kraft, 96 Idaho 901, 905,
539 P.2d 254, 258 (1975).
Despite this well~established law that counsel is presumed to have been
effective and that petitioner has the burden of proving a subjective shortcoming
through admissible evidence, Johnson asks this Court to simply presume
deficient performance. She first phrases the question as follows: "How is it that
trial counsel could forget to elicit opinion testimony on such an important topiC?
Only ill preparedness can answer that question." (Memorandum, pp. 9-10.)

By

her framing of the question Johnson is simply asking this Court to assume that

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
3
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counsel was not prepared.

p, 5

Such an assumption is exactly contrary to the

applicable legal standards, however.
Johnson continues, again asking this Court to presume incompetence
instead of comp'etence: uWhat possible trial strategy could counsel have been
applying to make an informed decision not to elicit such critical evidence?"
(Memorandum. p. 11.) A rhetorical question is not evidence, much less proof.
liThe constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not
the key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a long series of
examples of how the case might have been tried better." Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho

77,80, 844 P.2d 706,709 (1992). That Johnson or her post-conviction counsel
belieVes that the testimony of her fingerprint expert could have been better
presented is not a legally sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Because there is no evidence that the tactical decisions associated with
presenting Kerchusky's testimony were based on any objective deficiency,
Johnson has failed to prove her claim of deficient performance.

C.

Johnson Has Failed To Prove Her Claim Of Deficient Performance As A
Matter Of Fact
Johnson has also failed to present evidence sufficient to prove her claims.

In relation to the fingerprint evidence, Johnson first claims that trial counsel's
performance was deficient in failing to conduct, or compel the state to conduct,
further investigation into the identity of whoever had left unidentified fingerprints
on Items related to the murder weapon and scene.

(Petition,

'1l

18(i)-(iii).)

Johnson next claims that her trial counsel's performance was deficient in failing

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

4

MAR, 5,2010

1:44PM

4HO ATTY GENERAL-SPU

NO,474-P, 6

to elicit certain testimony from the defense fingerprint expert, Robert Kerchusky.
(Petition,

W 18(vi)-(viit).1)

The specific allegations of detleient performance

related to the fingerprint evidence are unsupported by evidence to prove the
claim, as set forth below. Thus, Johnson is not entitled to summary judgment in
her favor.
1.

Failure To Take Steps To Identify The Source Of Prints

Johnson tlrst alleges that it would, have been possible to conduct a more
thorough search for unidentified fingerprints in this case in fingerprint databases
than the search conducted by the police prior to trial. (Petition, ~ 18(i), ~ 18(v).)
Likewise, trial counsel elected not to pursue further investigation by the defense
expert of fingerprint evidence at the scene or where possible fingerprints might
be found. (Petition, ~ 18(iii).) Rather than ask for a continuance to conduct a
more thorough search of fingerprint databases or ask the defense expert to do a
more thorough investigation, counsel elected instead to present the theory that
the police search and investigation were inadequate. (Petition,

'U (18(;i): Affidavit

of Mark Rader, p. 4.)
The decision to pursue the defense theory that the police search was
"horribly inadequate" (Affidavit of Mark Rader. p. 4) instead of seeking a
continuance to try to get the police to perform a more thorough investigation or
1 Johnson has withdrawn the allegation that Kerchusky was not asked about
possible fingerprints on a trashcan lid (Petition, ,-r 18(iv») because, despite
Kerchusky's sworn affidavit stating he had not been asked about this at trial, in
fact he was so asked. (Compare Kerchusky affidavit, p. 2 with Trial Tr., vol. VII,
p. 5124, Ls. 6-23.) This obviously false statement under oath is reason to believe
that other parts of Kerchusky's testimony may lack credibility. Of course his
credibility is something that would have to be determined at a hearing on the
merits.

MEMOMNDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

5

MAR, 5,2010

1:44PM

NO, 474

HO ATTY GENERAL-SPU

D

I,

perform a more thorough investigation by t~eir own expert was clearly a tactical
decision. Johnson has failed to present any evidence whatsoever that this was
an unreasonable tactical decision I much less that

it was a decision based upon

inadequate preparation or any other objective shortcoming.

Certainly the

defense that the police investigation was inadequate would have been severely
undermined if the defense had compelled or conducted further investigation that
merely uncovered more incriminating evidence. It was perfectly reasonable to
decide to present the defense already available Instead of take the far riskier
course of filling in possible gaps in the pOlice investigation.
2.

Failure To Elicit Testimony That Prints On The Rifle. Scope, Box Of
Ammunition, and Doorknobs Were Or Would Be "Fresh"

Johnson next claims that trial coun~el was deficient for not eliciting expert
testimony regarding aspects of the fingerprint evidence adduced at trial. These
claims fail because they are contradicted by the record. Trial Counsel generally
eiicited testimony about how long a fingerprint will last on a particular surface and
what sort of factors should be conSidered. (Trial Tr., vol. VII, p. 5064, L 19 - p.
5076, L 9.)

In addition, trial counsel elicited testimony about the very issues

Johnson currently claims he did not.
First, Johnson claims that trial counsel failed to elicit testimony that a palm
print on the rifle itself "was a fresh print."

(Petition,

1l

18(vi).)

Review of the

testimony at trial, however, shows that trial counsel in fact elicited testimony from
Kerchusky at trial that the palm print was likely of recent origin because fingerprints
tend to fade over time. (Trial Tr., vol. VII, p. 5069 L. 11 - p. 5070, L. 18 (palm print
on gun likely to evaporate rather quickly); p. 5075, L. 15 - p. 5078. L. 9 (palm print
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETrTIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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on rifle likely from last person to load gun); p. 5128, L 18 - p. 5129, L. 4 (in his
experience a print on a gun would n'ot last more than a year).)

This was in

response to testimony from the state's expert that she could not date the print on
the gun. (Trial Tr., vol. V, p. 3028, Ls. 2-17.) Johnson has simply presented no
evidence of actually deficient performance, much less of objectively deficient
performance as opposed to tactical decision-making.
Johnson next alieges that trial counsel was deficient for failing to elicit
Kerchusky's opinion that the fingerprints on the scope and the box of ammunition
left in Mel Speegle's room matched, and were of recent origin. (Petition,

11 18(vii),2)

The record, however, shows that testimony that the prints on an insert in the
ammunition box and the scope matched and was likely of recent origin was in fact
elicited. {Trial Tr., vol. VII, p. 5074, L 10 - 5075, L 14; p. 5083, L.1 - p. 5084, L. 9;
p. 5090 L 18 - p. 5092, L. 19; p. 5126, L. 25 - p. 5128, L. 17.) In addition,
Kerchusky was cross-examined extensively on the topic.

(Trial Tr., vol. VII, p.

5105, L. 9-p. 5113, L. 25; p. 5115, L.i6-p. 5116, L 18.)
Finally, Johnson alleges that trial

~bUl,sel failed to elicit testimony regarding

whether fingerprints on doorknobs would indicate the last person to use that
doorknob. (Petition,

11 18(viii).)

Again, review of the trial transcript shows that such

testimony was elicited. (Trial Tr., vol. VIl, p. 5064, L. 19 - p. 5067, L. 3; p. 5108, L.

10-p. 5109, L,17.)
Johnson also alleges that trial counsel failed to "highlight" or "address" the fact
that prints On the scope and box of ammunition did not match Johnson or other
identified persons associated with the case. (Petition, 1f 18(vil).) The state's
expert specifically testified to this, however. (Trial Tr., vol. V, p. 3042, L. 1 - p.
3053, L. 11.) Johnson has failed to prove that his counsel was deficient for
falling to present evidence already presented by the state in its case-In-chief.

2
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The record in this case demonstrates that all of the topics Johnson believes
her counsel should have addressed with Kerchusky were in fact addressed at trial.
That Johnson currently believes that these topics should have been approached
differently and that the approach she currently prefers is superior to that taken by
trial counsel is not actual evidence of deficient performance. More importantly, that
the approach taken by trial counsel was the result of an objective shortcoming is
completely unsupported by evidence in the record .

. D.

Johnson Has Failed To Present Any Actual Evidence Of Prejudice, But
Instead Relies On Bare Assertions And Mere Speculation
To establish prejudice, Johnson must show a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been
different.

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988);

Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999); Roman v.
State, 12.5 Idaho 644,849, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). At the evidentiary
hearing Johnson must carry the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that she was prejudiced by her attorney's deficient performance. See
I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. state, 111 Idaho 430, 436,725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986).
Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make
out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at
649, 873 P.2d at 903. Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given to the testimony are matiers within the discretion of the trial court. Rueth v.
State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982).
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Johnson supports her claim of prejudice with nothing other than bare
assertions and speculation. She first alleges, "But for Trial Counsel's failures as
articulated above, all useable prints would have been properly submitted to relevant
identifying systems such that the person who actually handled the murder weapon
and ammunition found at the scene. and who removed the scope of the murder
weapon, would likely have been identified. (See Affidavit of Robert Kerchusky.)"
Petition,

'fi 18(ii).

"But for this omission or tanure of Trial Counsel [to get more prints

run through the fingerprint databases} a reasonable probability exists that Petitioner
would have been found not guilty," (Petition,,-r 18(v),)

Despite the reference to

KerchuskYs affidavit, there is no evidence whatsoever that these allegations are
true.
On the contra!),. the trial record shows that at least three of the prints later
identified as belonging to Christopher Hill were in fact checked against the relevant
fingerprint databases and were not identified. (Trial Tr., vol. V, p. 3041, L. 21 - p.

3046, L 10; p. 3051, L. 10 - p. 3053, L 11; vol. VII, p. 5081, L. 23 - p. 5084. L. 22.)
Johnson presents no evidence whatsoever about why Hill was not identified before
trial based on three of his fingerprints being run through the automated databases,
and only speculates that if his attorneys would have pursued It they would have had
more success than the Idaho State lab. In short, there is no evidence in this record
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suggesting it would have even been pos~ible to identify Hili as the source of any of
the fingerprints before the trial. 3
Johnson next alleges that the claimed failures to elicit testimony on certain
points from the defense fingerprint expert create a "reasonable probability that
Petitioner would have been found not guilty," (Petition, 1T 18(vl); see also

m:r 18(vii)

and (viii).) This claim is merely a bare assertion and speculation that Johnson was
prejudiced. As noted above, all of the topiCS Johnson alleges should have been
covered were, in fact, covered. That Johnson wishes that they had been covered in
more detail or in a different fashion does not show that the trial would have any
probability of coming out differently.

D.

Johnson Has Failed To Prove Prejudice Because She Has Failed To Show
That The Trial Would Have Been Conducted Differentl'¥: In Any Meaningful
Way But For The Alleged Deficient Performan~
To show prejudice a petn:ioner must prove there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been
different. Strickland v. WaShington, 466 U.S. 668, 687--88 (1984); LaBelle

v. State,

130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1997). Here there is no evidence
that but for the alleged deficiency of trial counsel's perfoliTlance the trial would likely
have come out differently.
At trial the primary defense pursued by trial counsel was that the police had
done an inadequate investigation and that the evidence they gathered failed to

3 In fact, the fingerprints identified in the database search were fingerprints of Hill
taken on March 1,2007. (See Discovery Documents 51PC and 54PC, attached.)
There is no evidence Hill's prints were in the database before or during the 2003
trial in the underlying criminal case.
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show Johnson was the killer. (Trial Tr., p. 4603, Ls. 4 - p. 4611 L. 1 (opening
f

argument).) As it had In relation to all the physical evidence presented at trial, the
defense contended the fingerprint evidence was inconsistent with Johnson's guilt,
taking the tactical position that the police investigation regarding the fingerprint
evidence had been inadequate and falled'to
. . exclude the unknown person who left
prints on the rifle, the scope and the ammunition box as the killer.

(06124/09

Pangburn Depo.; p. 106, L. 24 - p. 107, L. 18.)
In post-conviction, Johnson's theory is that counsel should have pursued
investigation she believes the police inadequately conducted, learned that
Christopher Hill was the source of some of the fingerprints found during the
investigation of the murders, and extracted different testimony from the defense
expert regarding fingerprints. However, what is totally lacking in this case is how

any of this evidence that supposedly would have been presented but for counsel's
deficient performance would have changed how the jury perceived this case at a/l.
The

Jury in this case was

..

,

presented with evidence that an unknown person

left finger or palm prints on the rifle, the scope, and an insert in an ammunition box.
They were presented with evidence that fingerprints on such things generally do not
last long, and would be rubbed off by someone again touching those items in those
places. They ultimately concluded that this evidence did not create reasonable
doubt.
The way that the trial would look different if Johnson had actually
demonstrated deficient performance of counsel was that the jury would have been
informed that the prints in fact belonged to Christopher Hill, a friend of Mel Speegle
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with no known connection to the Johnsons, and that he had touched the rifle and
scope while either moving it to Speegle's house or when sighting it In at a rifle
range. This evidence does not make an acquittal more likely. On the contrary, it
makes an acquittal less likely.
Johnson argues, "To be confident Sarah committed this crime one would
have to believe she had the physical strength and skill, and the emotional fortitude
to shoot her sleeping mother, point blank, hand crank [sic] and palm the round,
reload [sic] and then face her father down; all without getting a drop of blood on her,
in a room otherwise dripping and humid with gore." (Memorandum. p. 13.) To the
extent Johnson's factual assertions are accurate,4 the jury in fact did decide that
none of Johnson's present argument created a reasonable doubt. That Christopher
Hili was the source of previously unidentified fingerprints has nothing whatsoever to
do with the argument Johnson Is currently providing to claim prejudice. Johnson's
argument regarding prejudice fails because it is not causally connected to the
deficient perlormance she claims.
Johnson has falled to demonstrate that that she is entitled to relief, much
less that she is entitled to relief without even a hearing.

As detailed elsewhere the state presented evidence that Johnson had worn her
bathrobe backward during the commission of the crime and then deposited it in a
trash can along with the gloves she wore. The evidence included that the inside of
the r?be had paint chips matching th~se on the shirt Johnson was wearing that
mornIng and that blood and tissue from her parents was on the outside of the robe.
11
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II.
Johnson Has Failed To Show That She Is Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of
Law On Her Claims Of Newly Discovered Evidence
A petitioner may obtain a new trial "rwJhen new evidence is discovered
material to the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(7). To obtain a new trial on
the basis of newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must prove: (1) that the
newly discovered evidence was unknown to him at the time of trial; (2) that the
evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) that the evidence will
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that the failure to learn of the evidence was
due to no lack of diligence on the part

of the defendant.

Grube v. State, 134 Idaho

24,30,995 P.2d 794,800 (2000); State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,691,551 P.2d
972, 978 (1976).
The state concedes that the first and fourth elements are met here. The
evidence that Christopher Hili is the source of fingerprints on items associated with
the murders and his subsequent statement are newly discovered 5 and the failure to
learn this was not due to a lack of diligence by the defense. (The state notes that
Johnson has alleged the mutually exclusive theory that defense counsel could and
should have learned of this evidence in his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Of these two mutually exclusive theories alleged by Johnson, the only one
with evidentiary support, as shown above, is that it was not possible to learn that
Hili was the source of the fingerprints because the state's expert learned of Hill by

The state does not concede that there is any additional evidence that could be
considered newly discovered, and it is important to remember exactly what
evidence is newly discovered for the analysis'herein.

5
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doing exactly what she had done before trial: she re-ran the same print samples
through the fingerprint databases.)

The two elements Johnson has failed to prove (or even support by evidence)
is that the new evidence is material and would probably produce an acquittal. As
stated in the memorandum supporting the state's motion for summary judgment
and above, leaming that the previously unknown source of the prints is Hill
undermines the defense. At trial the defense could (and did) claim that the state
could not establish whose fingerprints were on those items or when they were
made. Now we now exactly who made the' prints (a person with no connection to
the case or the victims whatsoever and no motive or opportunity to commit the
crimes) and when (years before the crimes occurred when he helped move the rifle
and other things into Mel Speegle's home and when he sited in the rifle). Suoh
knowledge merely impeaches Kerchusky's view that the prints were of recent origin
and greatly reduces the value of the print evidence to the defense.
Counsel for Johnson argues that this evidence was material and would likely
have produced an acquittal through innuendo and hypothetical questions. First, he
cites Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 30, 995 P2d 794. 800 (2000), and claims this
Court should reach the "same conclusion." (Memorandum. p. 14.) The state notes
that the conclusion in Grube was denial

of post-conviction relief.

Grube, 134 Idaho

at31, 995 P.2d at 801.
Counsel then states, "Curiously, it appears the same lead investigator, Scott
Birch, was involved, as lead investigator, in both cases." (Memorandum, p. 14.
This is a blatantly false (and grammatically Odd) statement.

Scott Birch is an
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investigator with the office of the attorney general. (Trial Tr., vol. VI, p. 4061, Ls. 1-

10.) In Grube Mr. Birch was not the "lead investigator, n but assisted the prosecutor
to prepare for trial by interviewing witnesses disclosed by the defense and then
following up on those statements. See generally, Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995
P.2d 794 (2000).

The prosecutor failed to tum over Mr. Birch's reports to the

defense, leading to the post-conviction claim of withholding exculpato!)' evidence
(later deemed cumulative). Id. In the present case Mr. Birch's role was likewise to
assist the prosecutors with trial preparation. (Trial Tr., vol.

VJ, p. 4061, Ls. 14-18,)

His only testimony in the case was about the physical layout of the Johnson home
and surroundings, including lighting, based on observation long after the primary
investigation. (Trial Tr., p. 4061, L. 1 - p. 4070, L. 25.) Counsel's claim that Mr.
Birch was the «lead investigator" in either case is speoious. He can not in good faith
claim that Mr. Birch had anything whatsoever to do with the newly discovered
fingerprint evidence in this case. Counsel is making a clearly ridiculous attempt to
slander Mr. Birch and the office of the attorney general currently handHng this case.
Counsel continues the Innuendo in his attempt to slander when he states,
"Here, we have clearly false and misleading testimony regarding latent fingerprints
offered at grand jury, then again during trial, late disolosure of critical evidence,
failure by the State to diligently use its best investigative tools, and now discovery of
new fingerprint evidence.

n

(Memorandum, p. 14.) All of these claims (except the

discovery of new evidence claim) are without evidentiary support, as shown by the
state's motion to dismiss and as set forth above.

Even if they were debatable,

these claims are irrelevant to the issue of whether Johnson is entitled to a new trial.
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Clearly counsel would rather attempt to besmirch the conduct of state agents than
discuss the relevant law and evidence.
When he finally gets around to discussing the issue of newly discovered
evidence, counsel does not discuss the newly discovered evidence, but instead
asks a series of Irrelevant hypothetical questions. (Memorandum, p. 15.)
Why are Hill's prints on the scope in a pattern indicating removal of
the scope from the rifle, not mere handling of the scope? How could
Hill's prints still be on the tools of murder [sic] many years later, after
being handled while moving them, and then handled by Speegle in
the weeks prior to the murder? Wouldn't Hill's prints have dissipated
or been lost due to intermediate handling? If indeed Speegle handled
the murder weapon in weeks prior to the shootings why aren't his
prints on the gun?
(Memorandum, p. 15.) The problem with this argument by hypothetical is that all of
these questions and the evidence both raising and answering them were presented
at trial. The only new evidence is that the fingerprints that were of unknown origin

at the time of trial are now known to have been made by Christopher Hili, who
states he probably made them when sighting in the rifle and was camping some
distance from the murder scene on the morning in question .. Put another way, if we
substitute the information known at trial for the new evidence included in the
hypothetical questions we get the following questions that were actually asked and
answered at trial:
Why are [an unknown person'sl prints on the scope in a pattern
indicating removal of the scope from the rifle, not mere handling of
the scope? How could ran unknown person'sJ prints still be on the
tools of murder [sic] many years later, after being handled while
moving them, and then handled by Speegle in the weeks prior to the
murder? WOUldn't [the unknown person's] prints have dissipated or
been lost due to intermediate handling? If indeed Speegle handled
the murder weapon in weeks prior to the shootings why aren't his
prints on the gun?
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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The newly discovered evidence simply does not support the defense.

It

introduces no questions that were not already answered by the jury's verdict. The
jury found Johnson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt even knowing that there were
fingerprints from an unknown person on the scope, the insert in the ammunition
box, and the stock of the rifle. The jurors were presented evidence that such prints
were, in the defense's opinion, of recent origin.

The jury already necessarily

rejected the theory that the person who left those prints was likely the murderer. In
short, the fingerprint evidence did not create reasonable doubt in the trial, and there
is no reason to believe that knowing who made the prints is more likely to lead to an
acquittal.
CONCLU~ION

Johnson's motion fails to establish that she would be entitled to summary
disposition in her favor as a matter of law, even assuming there were no material
Issues of fact.

In the alternative, Johnson has failed to present evidence

establishing that there are no material issues of fact by which she could prevail
on her claims.
DATED this 5th day of March, 2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH JOHNSON

)

)
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)
)

)
Respondent.

)

Case No. CV..o6-324

REPLY IN. SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENT'S
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

OF PETITIONER'S SECOND
AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICITON RELIEF

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through its counsel acting as Special
Prosecuting Attorneys for Blaine County, and hereby submits this reply brief in support
of the state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's ("Johnson") petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(c),
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The State Is Entitled To Summa['l Dismissal Of All The Claims In Johnson's Petition
A.

Claim One - "PetItioner Is Innocent"

1.

Claim One Is Untimely

In this case, judgment was entered on June 30. 2005, and, as previously noted,
Johnson failed to file a timely appeal. Johnson's actual innocence claim did not appear
in her original petition; rather, she first alleged her claim of actual innocence In her first
amended petition, which was not filed until March 16, 2009, nearly four years after
judgment was entered. Johnson nevertheless contends her "actual innocence" claim is
timely because her first amended petition was filed "within the statutory deadline of one
year from the determination of the appeal." (Petitioner's Memorandum Response to
Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal ("Response"), p.5.)1 While this argument
may make sense as applied to causes of action that arOSe out of the appeal itself, it
would be inappropriate for the statute of limitations to bar claims that arose only after
the statute had run, and Johnson has not explained why the granting of partial summary
Judgment in her favor to reinstate her appellate rights waived or tolled the applicable
statute of limitations. Indeed, there is no reason why Johnson did not bring the claims
that were known or should have been known in the original petition or In an amended
petition brought within one year of the judgment becoming final. In short, Johnson has
failed to show why reinstatement of appellate rights in this or any case has the

1 Johnson also implies that the state previously lost the statute of limitation argument in
an "unsuccessful Motion to Strike." (Response, pA.) This is incorrect. The state
previously raised the timeliness of the claims raised in Johnson's amended petitions
but, after the Court expressed a preference for permitting the amendments and
addressing all defenses at one time, the state withdrew its objections to the
amendments without prejudice to raising the defense in its motion for summary
dismissal. (See state's Withdrawal of Obj~ctions to First Amended Petition filed June

10,2009.)
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automatic effect of restarting an already running or expired statute of limitation. As
such, any claim that was not raised in Johnson's origin a! petition but could have been,
does not relate back to her original petition, or does not arise from the appeal (e,g.,
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel), is untimely and should be dismissed on this
basis. Because Claim One could have been raised in Johnson's original petition, does
not relate back to her ong inal petition, and is completely unrelated to any alleged error
occurring in relation to her appeal, the claim should be dismissed as untimely.

2.

Claim One Fails To State A Cause Of Action

Even if this Court concludes Johnson's first claim is not untimely, it should be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Johnson in no way refutes this assertion
in her Response. The state, therefore, relies on the argument made in its Memorandum
in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Second
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief C'Memorandum',). for the reasons Claim
One should be dismissed on this basis. (Memorandum, pp.12-13.)

B.

Claim Two - "Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Try. Convict And Sentence
P~titioner"

1.

Claim Two Is Untimely

Johnson asserts Claim Two is timely for the same reasons Claim One is timely.
For the reasons set forth in Section A.1, Claim Two is also untimely and should be
dismissed on this basis.

2.

Claim Two Fails As A Matter Of Law

Even if not dismissed as untimely, Johnson's second claim should be dismissed
because the claim fails as a matter of law. Pursuant to I.C. § 20-509(1)1 Johnson was
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not entitled to a waiver hearing because she committed an offense that automatically
waived her into adult court. In arguing otherwise, Johnson asserts:
The State quotes I.e. Section 20-509(1) but omits the conflicting
provision of I.C. 20·508 which on its face, affords all juveniles the right to
full investigation, a hearing and the dIscretion of a magistrate to waive
jurisdiction under the juvenile corrections act over the juvenile and order
the juvenile be held for adult criminal proceedings when a juvenile is
alleged to have committed any of the crimes enumerated in section 20509.
(Response, p.6.)
Johnson)s interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Juvenile
Corrections Act is incorrect.

Basic rules of statutory construction require a court,

"rw]hen analyzing the language and application of a statute," to "give the words their
plain, usual. and ordinary meaning, and [toJ give effect to the statute's every word and
clause." State v. Maynard, 139 Idaho 117, 12Q, 73 P.3d 731, 734 (Ct. App. 2003) (Citing
State v. Swader. 137 Idaho 733, 738, 52 P.3d 878, 883 (Ct.App.2002»). The plain
language of I.C. § 20-505 states, "the court shall have exclusive, Original jurisdiction
over any juvenile" in the types of cases enumerated therein. Subsection (4) of that
same provision states, "This chapter shall not apply to the violent juvenile offender, as
defined in this chapter." LC. § 20-505(5). Violent juvenile offenders are defined as
those juveniles, "age fourteen (14) years to age eighteen (18) years" who are "alleged to
have committed" certain violent crimes, including "Im]urder of any degree."
509(1)(a).

I.e. § 20-

Idaho Code § 20-508(1){b) provides that a "court may waive jurisdiction

under the juvenile corrections act over the juvenile and order that the juvenile be held
for adult criminal proceedings when," the '1uvenile Is alleged to have committed an act
other than those enumerated in section 20-509, Idaho Code." (Emphasis added.) The
reason the court cannot "waive jurisdiction" over juveniles "alleged to have committed
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an act" enumerated in I.C. § 20-509 is because the court has no jurisdiction over such
juveniles. As explained in §tate y. Anderson, 108 Idaho 454,458,700 P.2d 76,80 (Ct.
App. 1985), which interpreted the same provisions of the Juvenile Corrections Act
previously codified under Title 16, the waiver requirements for juveniles are "operative
only when the juvenile court has jurisdiction to proceed and, because section 16-1806A
[now I.C. § 20-509], excludes certain crimes ab initio from Juvenile court jurisdiction," the
waiver provisions of the act do not apply. See In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 248, 207 P.3d
974, 979 (2009) (recognizing "[a]n adult court may, however, obtain criminal jurisdiction
over a juvenile when the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction under the JCA or enters an
order waiving such jurisdiction. I.C. §§ 18-216(1), 20-508 & 20-509"). In addition, the
Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged the automatic waiver provisions of I.C. § 20-509 in
State v. Bymight, 132 Idaho 654,978 P.2d 214 (1999).
The lack of juvenile jurisdiction is also apparent in the very statute upon Which
Johnson relies -

I.e. § 20-508.

The very first words In that section (after the title) are,

"After the filing of a petition and after full investigation and hearing, the court may
waive jurisdiction ... ."

I.C. § 20-508(1) (emphasis added).

Thus, a prerequisite to

waiver of jurisdiction under the act is that jurisdiction under the act was invoked by the
filing of a petition.

Because

I.e.

§ 20~509 specifically provides that someone in

Johnson's position (over fourteen and having committed a homicide) "shall be charged,
arrested, and proceeded against by complaint, indictment or information as an adult,"
I.C. § 20·509(1), the state did not, and in fact was statutorily precluded from, filing a
petition. The Juvenile Corrections Act, therefore, did not apply to Johnson's case.
Although Johnson cites Bumight, she does not cite it for the proposition that
certain crimes are automatically waived pursuant to

I.e.

§ 20-509. (Response, p.7.)
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Rather, she states: "In Bumight. the Court very clearly held that a juvenile's failure to
challenge jurisdiction acts as a waiver." (Response, p.7.) The Court in Burnight did
indeed hold as much, and such holding is fatal to Johnson's substantive claim that the
court lacked jurisdiction to try her.

Johnson nevertheless attempts to avoid the

consequences of the Court's holding in Burnight by emphasizing that she has also
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise the jurisdictional claim prior
to trial. (Response, p.7.) While such an ineffective assistance of counsel claim could
defeat that portion of Bumight that holds a challenge to juvenile jurisdiction is waived if
not raised before the trial court, it does not defeat that portion of Burnight which
expressly acknowledges certain crimes are automatically waived, or the plain language
of the Juvenile Corrections Act. In other words, because there was never any Juvenile
jurisdiction over Johnson's case, which could have been waived, Johnson's olaim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the court's jurisdiction fails as a matter of

Johnson also relies on State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 80 P.3d 1083 (2003), and
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), (Response, p.?) However, neither of
these cases support her jurisdictional argument. Kavaiecz did not involve any crime
automatically waived under I.e. § 20-509; it involved an allegation of lewd conduct. 139
Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. Moreover, the Court in Kavajecz adhered to Its holding
in Bumight "that a juvenile defendant who fails to challenge a district court's jurisdiction
over him prior to trial waives this right on appeal." .ht. at 485, 80 P.3d at 1086.
Kavajecz, therefore, affords no support for either of Johnson's jurisdidional claims. The
same is true for Kent. Kent, by its own terms, applies only when the defendant is
statutorily entitled to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court absent an affirmative
waiver. The Supreme Court concluded that before this statutory right was removed,
Kent was entitled to counsel and a hearing. liL. at 557. Because, unlike in Kent, there is
no statutory right in Idaho to juvenile jurisdiction In certain cases involving violent
offenses, such as murder, Kent is inapplicable.
2
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Because Johnson's jurisdictional argument fails as a matter of law regardless of
whether it is a substantive claim or an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Claim
Two should be dismissed.
C.

Claim Three -lVJolation Of Petitioner's Right To Due Process Of Law"
Johnson has conceded she is not entitled to relief on her claims based on judicial

bias (Response, pp.3-27); therefore, no further argument need be presented, and the
state is entitled to summary dismissal of the judicial bias allegations contained in Claim
Three.
Johnson's third claim a1s.0 Includes an allegation that the district court erred in
imposing a I'constitutlonal [sic] impermissible limitatio'n" on her right to cross-examine
Bruno Santos. (Petition, p.6, '14.) Johnson maintains she is entitled to relief on this
portion of Claim Three. Johnson is Incorrect.

1.

Johnson's Confrontation Clause Claim Is Untimely

Like Johnson's first two claims, Johnson's confrontation claim waS not raised
until Johnson filed her amended petition.

For the reasons set forth in Section A.1.

Johnson has failed to establish this portion of Claim Three is timely; the claim should
therefore be dismissed for failing to comply with the one-year statute of limitation.

2.

Johnson's Confrontation Clause Claim Is Barred By I.C. § 19-4901 (b)

In addition to being untimely, as asserted in the State's Memorandum, Johnson's
confrontation clause claim is barred by Le. § 19-4901(b) because Johnson could have
raised it on direct appeal and she has failed to show "that the asserted basis for relief
raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt" or that the claim
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"could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier."
(Memorandum, pp.21-22.) In her Response, Johnson acknowledges "a plain reading of
the statute and the lion's share of the case law supports the State's position," but
contends there are "two exceptions" to this "blanket prohibition," which she claims were
articulated in Beam v. State, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), and Hoffman v.
State, 125 Idaho 188, 868 P.2d 516 (1994).
Johnson argues that, in Beam, the Court "drew a distinction between factual
material issues,

and

purely legal issues," and "proceeded to consider the

constitutionality of I.C. [§] 19-2719."

(Response, p p.8 9.)
w

There are at least mo

reasons why this argument fails to establish the bar in I.C. § 19-4901 (b) does not apply
to Johnson's confrontation clause claim.

First, why any "distinction between factual

materials issues, and purely legal issues," renders Johnson's confrontation clause claim
one that could not have been raised on direct appeal is a mystery because an alleged
confrontation clause violation is not "purely [a] legal issue[ ]," as is the constitutionality of
a statute, which was tne issue the Court addressed in Beam. Second, the Court In
Beam could not have declined to consider the constitutionality of I.e. § 19-2719 based
upon

I.e. §

19-4901(b). Idaho Code § 19-2719 sets forth "special appellate and post

conviction procedure rules for capital cases, n including the requirement that a postconviction petition be filed within 42 days "of the filing of the judgment imposing the
punishment of death." Beam, 115 Idaho at 211, 766 P.2d at 681. The constitutionality
of this requirement could necessarily only be litigated in relation to Beam's postconviction petition, not in relation to his prior appeal. Beam does not, therefore, support
Jonnson's argument.
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Hoffman also does not support Johnson's claim that she is entitled to an
I'exception" to the requirements of

I.e. § 19-4901(b).

As Johnson correctly notes, the

Court in Hoffm~n stated: "The [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act], is available 'to
cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial which affect either the jurisdiction of the
court or the validity of the judgment. even though these errors could have been raised
on dlreot appeal.'"

125 Idaho at 190, 868 P.2d at 518 (citations omitted).

What

Johnson fails to do is quote the very next sentenoe in Hoffman, Which reads, liThe
[Uniform Post-Conviotion Procedure Act], however, oannot be otherwise used as a
substitute for an appeal, and any issue which could have been, but was not, raised on
dlreot appeal is forfeited and cannot be considered in a post-conviction proceeding." Id.
(citations omitted). The Court, applying these standards to Hoffman's case, agreed with
the district court's conclusion "that both the challenge to the inadvertent prior conviction
testimony and the allegation of failure to disclose witnesses prior to trial oould have
been raised on direot appeal," and affirmed summary dismissal of these claims on this
basis.

kL. at 190-191,868 P.2d at 518-519.
Although Johnson doe.s not explain how her oonfrontation olause claim falls

within the "exception" noted in Hoffman (or, for that matter, in Beam), to the extent she
is suggesting the claim is the type of error that "affect[s] either the jurisdiotion of the
court or the validity of the judgment" against her, she is incorrect. Like the claims in
Hoffman, Johnson's confrontation olause claim is a claim that oould have been raised
on direct appeal.
barred by

Becau.se Johnson failed to raise the claim on direct appeal, it is

I.e. § 194901(b) and should be dismissed on this basis.

Johnson also argues that, "[i]n any event, this issue is also framed as an
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim," the "substantive merits of [which] were
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argued with supporting citation in Petitioners Memorandum of Law in Support of First
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed March 17, 2009." (Response, p.9.)
Johnson fails to identify on what pages of her memorandum she believes she 1ramed"
this issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel (id.), nor can the state find such an
argument in her memorandum under the section entitled "Violation of Confrontation
Clause" (id. at pp.6-11), or in the section entitled "Ineffective Assistance of Counsel" (id.
at pp .11-18).

While there is an assertion that counsel was ineffective for falling to

adequately cross-examine certain witnesses (id. at pp.17-18), this is hardly the
equivalent of a confrontation clause claim.

Moreover, all claims must be raised in

Johnson's petition, not In her supporting memoranda.
Because Johnson's confrontation clause claim is untimely and barred by I.C. §
19-4901(b). It must be dismissed.

D.

Claim Four- "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel"
1. Failyre To Move For A Continuance. Object To The Re-Enactment By State,
Or Adequately Investigate Scientific Basis For Proffered Coconut Experiment
Johnson contends counsel were deficient for failing to request a continuance

after discovering that the comforter on the bed where Diane was murdered was not
collected as evidence.

(Petition. pp.7~8~ ~ 15.a.) According to Johnson, she was

prejudiced by counsels' failure to do so because It left counsel "inadequately prepared
to cross-examine the State's witnesses about the alleged comforter" and U(s]pecifically,
whether a hole on the comforter was a bullet hole and whether a sheet and or comforter
covered the head of Diane Johnson thereby effecting blood spatter." (Petition, p.8, 1T
15.a; see also Petition, p.9,

11

15_d (alleging counsel were ineffective in "failing to

provide expert testimony as to comforters").) Johnson also alleges counsel should have
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also requested a continuance in order to provide more time to prepare sO they could
"discredit" the statels expert forensic witness, Rod Englert.

(Petition, p.S,

'U

is.b.)

Johnson further alleges trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the reenactment proffered by Mr. Englert as without adequate foundation and as invading the
province of the jury (id.), and for failing to "present adequate support" for their coconut
experiment (Petition, p.S, ~ 15.c).
The state moved for summary dismissal of these claims because Johnson failed
to allege exactly how counsel could have been more prepared to cross-examine the
state's witnesses had they obtained a continuance, failed to allege how Mr. Englert's reenactment or opinion was improper, failed to allege precisely what counsel could have
done differently vis-a-vis the coconut experiment, and failed to establish a prfma facie
case of prejudice as a result of counsels' failure to request a continuance.
(Memorandum, pp.24-29.)
In response, Johnson argues counsel "could have" (1) "properly researched and
found the exact same type of sheet and comforter with which to conduct the
experiment;" (2) "constructed a proper setting that accurately replicated the conditions
at the scene;" and (3) j'fjled a motion in limine to gauge the Court's receptiveness to
admission of alternative tests."

(Response, p.10.)

Johnson further argues, "[I]f

admissible tests had formulated [SIC], then the cross examination of the State's
witnesses, would obviously have been different."

(Response, pp.10-11.)

These

allegations still fail to establish a prima facie case that counsel were ineffective for
failing to seek a continuance.
The possibility that counsel may have been able to find "the exact same type of
sheet and comforter" with which to "construct[ ] a proper setting that accurately
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Indeed, to this date,

Johnson has failed to provide any evidence that the "exact same type of sheet and
comforter" could have been purchased for use in such an experiment.

As for the

assertion that counsel were ineffective for failing to object to Mr. Englert's re-enactment
or to his opinion, Johnson has still failed to identify how the foundation was inadequate
or how Mr. Englert's opinion impermissibly invaded the province of the jury. Instead,
she focuses on the possibility that trial counsel could have done more in relation to their
own coconut experiment.

(Response, pp.10-12.)

Any alleged inadequacies on

counsels' part in relation to conducting a different experiment do not establish

a prima

facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation Mr. Englert's re-enactment or

opinion.
With regard to the alleged deficiencies in relation to the coconut experiment,
Johnson's Response fails to describe what counsel should or could have done.
Instead, Johnson quotes the following exchange from the deposition of Mr. Rader:
Q_
The record reveals that that evidence [defense crime
reconstruction scientific experiment evidence] was in fact - the objection
was the motion in limine was sustained and that it was kept out. Do you
know now, as you're sitting here, the proper foundation for admission of
scientific evidence in a court of Jaw in a criminal matter in the state of
Idaho?

A.

Yes.

And the question I've got to you [sic] is, what, if any, legal
research did you do at that time in preparation for admission of those
tests? And we will do it one at a time. The test No.1 being the coconut
blood spatter test.
Q.

A.

I didn't do any legal research

Q.

Okay. And why didn't you?

on the grounds for foundation.
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I thought I knew them.

(Response, pp.11-12 (quoting Tr., Deposition of Mark S. Rader, dated June 5, 2009,
p.123, L17-p.124, L.12).)
Exactly why Johnson believes this deposition testimony reveals counsel was
deficient is unclear. In fact, if anything, it indicates counsel knows how to lay foundation
for scientific evidence. Even if it does not indicate such an ability, it certainly does not
provide any explanation of what counsel could have done differently In terms of laying
foundation for the coconut experiment.
Johnson's claims of prejudice are equally as speculative as her claims of
deficient performance - a point she acknowledges in admitting she cannot explain
"[eJxactly how" any of the things counsel "could have" done would have made a
difference.
Johnson's reliance on Mr. Rader'S willingness to concede his own ineffectiveness
and apparently Mr. Pangburn's as well also fails to establish either deficient
performance or prejudice. See Edwards v. LaMarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9 th Cir.
2007) (the court is "not obligated to accept a self-proclaimed assertion by trial counsel

of inadequate performance"); Walls v. Bowersox, 151 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 1998)
("admissions of inadequate performance by trial lawyers are not decisive in ineffective
assistance claims"). Indeed, not even Mr. Rader could articulate precisely how he or
Mr. Pangburn were defiCient, much less how Johnson was prejudiced as a result, he
just "agreed" that he should have moved for a continuance. (See Response, p.11.)
Absent admissible evidence supporting her allegations, Johnson's claims must
be dismissed. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272,61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002)
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Because Johnson's allegations are bare and conclusory and

unsubstantiated by any evidence, she is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing and
summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. state. 124 Idaho 588, 592, 861 P.2d 1253.
1257 (Ct. App. 1993); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156. 159.715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct.
App.1986).

2.

Failure To Adequately Cross-Examine

Johnson alleges counsel failed to adequately cross-examine a number of
witnesses, "includ[ing] but . . . not limited to Matt Johnson, Alan & Julia Dupuis, EMT
Schell Eliison, Sherrlf [sic] Walt Femling, Detective Steve Harkin [sic1, Bruno Santos,
Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez (aka Juan Gonzales)[,] Jane Lopez,
Becky Lopez and Carlos Ayala, and also include officers Raul Ornelas, and stu
Robinson."

(Petition, p.9, ~ 16.) The state moved for summary dismissal of these

claims, asserting Johnson failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact that counsel
was ineffective in relation to any of these witnesses. (Memorandum, pp.3043.) The
state also noted Johnson failed to allege any specific deficiencies or prejudice in relation
to Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Schell Eliison, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Becky Lopez,
or Carlos Ayala. (Memorandum, p.30.)
In her Response, Johnson "claims a cumulative negative impact of counsel's
deficient performance," and represented she would clrespond[ ] specifically as to each
witness." (Response, p.13.) Johnson's Response, however, still fails to describe any
specific deficiencies as to Alan or Julia Dupuis, Schell Elisson, Glenda Osuno. Luis
Ramirez, Becky Lopez, or Carlos Ayala. Thus, even assuming it would be appropriate
for Johnson to include such allegations in her response to the state's motion rather than
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in her petition, there Is still no genuine issue of material fact that counsel was ineffective
in relation to any of these witnesses. Likewise, there is still no genuine issue of material
fact that counsel were ineffective in relation to their strategic decisions regarding crossexamination of Detective Harkins, Officer Ornelas, Sheriff Femling, Officer Kirtley,
Officer Robinson, Matt Johnson, Jane Lopez, Conseulo Cedeno! or Bruno Santos.

a, D'etective Steve Harkins
Johnson contends counsel was ineffective in "failing to adequately crossexamine" Detective Steve Harkins about his testimony that he "had personally spoken
with Bruno Santos over 100 times within the last year."

(Petition, p.10, 1116.a.i.)

According to Johnson, "police reports and supplements do not support this bald
assertion" and counsel should have attempted to impeach Detective Harkins on this
point. (Id.) In her Response, Johnson contends that "[w]hen an Incredible claim, such
as the large number of personal contacts with a suspect/state's cooperating witness is
made, it must be questioned" and, according to Johnson, if it had been questioned
"Harkins either could not have substantiated the claim, or would have had to explain the
nature of s.uch a large number of contacts." (Response, p.14.) If Johnson would read
the trial transcript, she would discover that Detective Harkins did explain the "large
number of contacts" he had with Bruno.
In resp.onse to a question by Mr. Pangburn about how many "caUs or interviews"
he had with Bruno, Detective Harkins responded: "I don't know if I can give you an
exact number.

I talked to him a number of times.

Numerous interviews. Weekly

contacts, sometimes two or three times a week. We made contact over the phone, met
in person. I didn't document every contact I had with him," (Tr., Vol. IV, p.2192, Ls.1-
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6.} Mr. Pangburn then asked how many reports Detective Harkins wrote in reference to
Bruno, and Detective Harkins answered, liMy best estimate, ten, maybe." (Tr., Vol. IV,
p.2192, Ls.7-15.) Detective Harkins further explained, in response to Mr. Pangburn's
questions, that the reason he kept in touoh with Bruno was due to an agreement with
Homeland Security, who had given Bruno temporary immigration status, whloh involved
certain requirements with which Bruno had to comply.

(Tr., Vol. IV, p.2192, L16 -

17

p.2193, L.20.) Detective Harkins kept an "eye on Bruno to make sure he was following
those requirements.

(Id.)

Johnson's claim that Detective Harkins "could not have

sUbstantiated" the number of times he contacted Bruno and her assertion that counsel
failed to have Detective Harkins "explain the nature of such a large number of contacts"
are belied by the record.
Johnson's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to make "hints" to
Detective Harkins that Santos had a "deal" with the prosecution and may have
"'possibly" "committed the crimes, rather than Petitioner," are also belied by the record.
Mr. Pangburn specifically elicited testimony from Detective Harkins regarding Bruno's
arrest for drug possession and inquired as to Bruno's involvement with drug dealing,
gangs, and the possibility that he or his associates were involved in the murders. (See
generally Tr., Vol. IV, pp.2192-2211.) Johnson's assertion that counsel did not inquire
into these areas is false.
Because Johnson has failed to allege a prima facie case that counsel was
ineffective in cross-examining Detective Harkins, this olaim should be dismissed.
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Officer Raut Ornelas

Johnson alleged in her Petition that counsel was Ineffective for "fafl[ing] to point
out the [sic] Tim Richards, the neighbor who first responded to the scene had walked
the very area of the back yard later observed by Ornelas," and "failed to highlight the

fact that Ornelas concluded that the footprints were made by more than one person,
thereby pointing blame from Petitioner alone and onto unidentified murderers." (Id.) In
seeking summary dismissal, the state asserted it was not deficient for counsel to fait to
"paint aut" during Officer Ornelas' testimony that "Tim Richards ... walked the very area
of the back yard later observed by Ornelas" during Officer Ornelas' cross-examination,
when this information was already in evidence. (Memorandum, p.32.) The state further
asserted, "There is no requirement that counsel revisit the testimony of other witnesses
during the cross-examination of any witness who testifies on a related matter." (Jd.) In
Response to this assertion, Johnson states: "True enough, but most competent lawyers
would." (Response, p.14.) Not only does the state disagree with this statement, the
statement ignores the standards applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
As explained by the Ninth Circuit, "The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers
would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We
ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the
circumstances, as defense counsel acted at triaL"

Coleman

v. Calderon, 150 F.3d

1105,1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev/don other grounds, Calderon V. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141
(1998).
Furthermore, Johnson's Response fails to provide any basis for finding prejudice
in relation to the allegedly inadequate cross-examination of Officer Ornelas. Because
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b. SherjffWalt Femling
Johnson alleges counsel "fail[ed] to adequately cross-examine the Blaine County
Sheriff who made a statement during the early stages of the investigation to the effect
that it was vital that police find a suspect
Sun Valley area .... " (Petition, p.10,

in order to prevent a negative perception of the

11 16.a.iii.)

According to Johnson, this statement

was "vital" to her defense because, she contends, "it showed that law enforcement
personnel were more interested in placing a suspect into custody than to find the
perpetrator of the crimes,"

(Petition, p.11,

11

16.a.iIl.)

In her Response, Johnson

contends the statements made by Sheriff Femling "were inadvertently recorded by
Officer Kirtley" but "Pangburn failed to offer the tape into evidence" after his Investigator,
Patrick Dunn, enhanced the audio. (Response, p.15.) Johnson then asks two rhetorical
questions:

(1) "[W]hy would any competent lawyer in possession of information

concerning that type of statement, not use rt?"; and (2) "Could it be that Mr. Pangburn
had not familiarized himself with the enhanced quality of the tape, as stated by Dunn?"
Johnson's rhetorical questions completely fail to establish a prima facie claim that
counsel was deficient or that she was prejudiced as a result. Indeed, Johnson has yet
to provide any admissible evidence of the actual contents of the statements. Moreover,
there is no basis from which to conclude that Johnson would not have been convicted
had counsel introduced evidence, assuming it exists, that Sheriff Femling believed,
based upon the evidence at the crime scene, that Johnson should be focused on as a
suspect
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Because Johnson has failed to allege a prima facie case that counsel was
ineffective in cross-examining Sheriff Femling, this claim should be dismissed.

c. Matt Johnson
Johnson agrees counsel made a "strategic decision not to point the finger at Matt
Johnson" and concedes the state Is entitled to summary dismissal of this claim.
(Response, pp.17, 27.) No further response is therefore required.

d. Conseulo Cedeno
Johnson alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine ConseuJo
Cedeno, Bruno's mother, regardIng inconsistencies between her pre-trial statements
and her testimony at trial.

(Petition, p.12, ~ 16.a.v.)

Specifically, before trial Ms.

Cedeno Indicated her belief that Santos had not driven the car the morning of the
murders because there was dew on the windshield. (Ex. 12.) At trial, however, Ms.
Cedeno testified that she could not tell whether the car had been driven and said she
did not "pay attention" to "things like that." (Tr., Vol. IV, p.2775, L.19- p.2776, L.S.) As
explained in the state's Memorandum, trial counsel's decision not to cross-examine Ms.
Cedeno was not only objectively reasonable, it was wise strategy because the defense
would have no incentive to try and remind Ms. Cedeno that she had previously provided
information indicating Bruno did not drive the car.

To do so would have only

strengthened Bruno's alibi.
In Response, Johnson contends the "State's argument somehow presumes that
both statements were innocent, but the testimony at trial was more favorable than the
inconsistent pre-trial statement." (Response, p.1S.) To the extent the state's argument
"presumes" Ms. Cedeno's trial testimony was "more favorable than the inconsistent preREPLY IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF
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triar statement," that is because it is more favorable in terms of whether Bruno had an
alibi.
Johnson also argues that the "entire point" of highlighting the inconsistency
"would be to draw into question Ms. Cedeno's veracity, and that of her son."
(Response, p.18.) Impeaching Ms. Cedeno on whether or not she knew if Bruno had
driven the car, however, would not have made a difference in Johnson's trial.
Because Johnson has fai/ed to allege a prima facie case that counsel was
ineffective in failing to cross-examine Conseulo Cedeno, this claim should be dismissed.

f.

Jane Lopez

Johnson alleges, "a discrepancy existed, between Jane Lopez's trial testimony
and proof to the contrary found in phone records, indicating Bruno Santos was not at his
mother's house. Trial Counsel was made aware of this discrepancy, yet, Trial Counsel
failed to utilize the records On cross-examination." (Petition, p.12, "16.a.v.) The state
sought dismissal of this claim because it is bare and conclusory as to deficient
performance and fails to allege any prejudice. More specifically, as noted in the state's
Memorandum, Johnson failed to identify or provide what phone records are inconsistent
with Ms. Lopez's testimony or explain how they disprove Bruno was not home at the
time of the murders. Instead, the only "evidence" Johnson offers

in support of this claim

is a usee" oitation to Mr. Dunn's affidavit (Ex. 2), with no page reference. (Petition, p.12,
~

16.a.v.) However, the only portion of Mr. Dunn's affidavit that refers to Ms. Lopez (Ex.

2. p.6,

~

13) is just as bare and conelusory as the allegations in Johnson's petition.

In Response, Johnson seems to acknowledge the absence of evidence in
support of this claim, and contends: "If the Court finds an issue of material facts [sic] on
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this basis, and allows an order of discovery said phone records will be gathered and
presented as evidence.1t (Response, p.17.) What Johnson mayor may not be able to
produce at an evidentiary hearing does not excuse her from the requirement that she
produce sufficient evidence to entitle her to a hearing In the first instance. Because
Johnson has failed to satisfy this requirement, her claim that oounsel was ineffective in
failing to cross-examine Jane Lopez, should be dismissed.

g.

Bruno Santos

In her Petition, Johnson asserted counsel was ineffective for failing to crossexamine Bruno regarding his "dealing drugs)" his "gang connections," and that he had
"oommltted the crime of statutory rape, thereby giving Santos a motive for killing to

avoid a potentlallfte sentence." (Petition, p.13,

~ 16.d.) The state moved for summary

dismissal of this claim because Johnson has failed to establish that oounsel's decision
not to cross-examine Bruno was objectively unreasonable or based upon inadequate
preparation. (Memorandum. pAO.)
In Response, Johnson states: "To provide further background and foundation,
many of the allegations against Mr. Santos are self professed. Trial counsel had access
to a host of interview transcripts containing statements of Bruno Santos and various
companions." (Response, p.18.) Johnson then goes on to list a number of topics she
apparently believes counsel should have cross-examined Bruno on, including not only
those topics contained in her Petition (drugs, gangs, and sex), but also on (1) the fact
that Bruno had been to the Johnson's residence; (2) his car "could have been in area
fsic] night of murders [sic];" (3) uBruno was out night [sic] before murders with people
whose names who [sic] couldn't or woufdn't reveal;" (4) "Bruno initially denied Alan
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Johnson told him to stay away from Sarah;'} (5) "Bruno admitted owning guns, traded for
weed;" (6) "Bruno wanted to kill Alan Johnson;" (1) "Bruno offered to buy high school girl
plane ticket [sic] to Mexico;" and (8) Bruno "insinuate[d]" he "may have done it."
(Response, pp.18~19.)
As an Initial matter, the state has no idea what Johnson means when she says,
"many of the allegations against Mr. Santos, are self professed." (Response, p.18.)
The state is, therefore, at a loss as to how to respond to this assertion, particularly as it
relates to whether Johnson has alleged a prima faoie case that counsel was ineffective
for falling to cross-examine Bruno.
With respect to Johnson's numerous allegations regarding specific topics she
contends counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire into, to the extent the topics were
not included in her Petition, she cannot now allege them as claims of Ineffectiveness.
Even if she could, Johnson has failed to establish a prima faoie case that counsel was
ineffective for failing to inquire into those topics. For example, Johnson's claim that
"Bruno's car could have been in area [sic] night of murders [sicl" is based on an
intelView of Bruno where Detective Harkins asked, "What if , told you someone said that
they seen your vehicle in the area that morning?" (Response, p.19 (citing Exhibit 61,
p.2873).)

Detective Harkins' question, clearly designed to see if Bruno would

incriminate himself. is hardly evidence that anyone actually said they saw Bruno's car
in the area that night. Moreover, Bruno denied that it was. (Id.)
Johnson's claim that Bruno "wanted to kill Alan Johnson" is also unsupported by
the "evidence" she cites - Exhibit 63, p.2716. (Response, p.19.) A re-view of page 2716
of Exhibit 63 reveals no such threat. Johnson's assertion that Bruno insinuated he "may
have done if' is also unsupported by the "evidenoe" she cites - Exhibit 63. p.2736. In
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fact, on pages 2736 of Exhibit 63, Bruno says Johnson "always say [sic] she want to kill
her parents, because they [sic] always fighting for the money or whatever." In addition,
on pages 2726-2727 of that same exhibit, Bruno specifically denies kUling the Johnsons.
Regardless of what Johnson believes counsel should have asked Bruno on
cross-examination, and regardless of whether counsel should have asked Bruno any
questions, Johnson has failed to allege a prima facie case that she was prejudiced as a
result. Johnson's claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine Bruno
Santos should therefore be dismissed.

h.

Stu Robinson

Johnson next alleges: 'Trial Counsel was, or should have been aware of Officer
Stu Robinson's Grand Jury testimony asserted [sic) that no latent prints were found at
the crime scene/' and that such testimony ''was inaccurate and false" because "the
record reveals that thirty nine (39) latent prints were found at the scene .... " (Petition,
p.13, ~ 16.b.) Because Johnson failed to provide a citation to the grand jury transcript
wherein Officer Robinson allegedly made this statement, the state, in seeking summary
dismissal speculated that Johnson was referring to that portion of Officer Robinson's
testimony when he was asked, "Now based on your, I guess, investigation and as part
of your case review, as far as you know, did any identifiable prints come back on the
gun, the scope or the casings?" and answered, "They could not locate any prints that
could be identified," (Grand Jury Tr., p.189, Ls.17-22.) Assuming this was the basis of
Johnson's claim, the sated asserted. this is clearly not a statement that Uno prints were
found" - it is only a statement that no prints could be identified. (Memorandum, pp.40-

41.)

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF
PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 23

MAR, 19,2010 4:05PM

AHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU

NO, 545

p, 25

In Response, Johnson cites to the following question and answer (still with no
citation to where it can be found in the transcript):
Now, let me ask you this. Would that surprise you given the fact
that you found this latex and leather glove?
Q.

A.
No. And, in fact it wouldn't surprise me. In the hundreds of cases
I've investigated fingerprints are not that commonly found.
(Response, pp .15-16.)
Johnson then argues: "In fact more than thirty latent prints were lifted from the
scene.

The point of raising this issue with Officer Robinson would have been to

question his veracity, and handling of the evidence generally." (Response, p.16.) The
state cannot ascertain precisely what "issue" Johnson believes counsel should have
raised relative to Officer Robinson's testimony that "fingerprints are not that commonly
found" in the cases he investigates. Fingerprints were clearly found in this case, and
extensive evidence was presented on this point.
As for Johnson's claims regarding the comforter and the alleged failure of
counsel to cross-examine Officer Robinson on this point, the state has two responses.
First, it is clear from the record that the comforter from the Johnsons' bed was not
collected. The only comforter collected, which is the comforter listed in the evidence
logs, is the comforter from Mel Speegle's bed. Second, contrary to Johnson's claim,
counsel did examine Officer Robinson regarding the failure to collect the comforter.
(Tr., Vol. VII, p.4680, L.20 - p.4681 , l.9, p.4683, Ls.10-2S.)

Johnson has failed to allege any genuine issue of material fact that counsel was
deficient in his cross-examination of Officer Robinson or that she was prejudiced as a
result. This claim should therefore be dismissed.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF
PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ~ 24

MAR, 19,2010 4:06PM

i.

DAHO ATTY GENERAL-SPU

p, 26

NO, 545

Officer Ross Kirtley

Johnson alleges counsel was ineffective in "falling to present evidence of an
audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross Kirtley, , , which clearly proved
the theory that police focused on [her], to the exclusion of all other possible suspects
and theories, because she was the easiest target." (Petition, p.13,

1f 16.c.)

The state

sought summary dismissal of this claim because it is bare and conclusory and Johnson
has failed to offer any admissible evidence in support of her assertions.

Her only

"evidence" is another "see" reference to Mr. Dunn's affidavit with no citation to any
particular page. (Petition, p.13,

1f 16.c.)

Mr. Dunn's affidavit. in turn, contains hearsay

about what he claims various officers said on the alleged tape. (Ex. 2, pA,

1f 10.)

In her

Response, Johnson complains she "has been left without the necessary resources to
obtain an actual copy of the recording" and that she "believe[s] a copy Is In the
possession of the State and Patrick Dunn." (Response, p.15.) Johnson further states
that "[i]f afforded a hearing on this issue, and an order of discovery, the actual recording
can be submitted into evidence." (Response, p.15.)
The state presumes) by her Response, that Johnson believes in order to obtain a
copy of the recording she needs an "order of discovery." Why Johnson needs this Court
to order the investigator from her criminal trial to provide her with information from his
investigation is unclear. if Johnsen would like Mr. Dunn to give her the tape, she should
ask him for it.

If, for some unknown reason, he thinks he cannot disclose it to her

without a court order, Johnson should move the Court for such an order.

In the

meantime, she is not entitled to' an evidentiary hearing based upon evidence she
"believe[s]" she might be able to produce and that might say something she thinks could
be useful.
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Because Johnson has failed to allege a prima facie case that counsel was
ineffective in cross-examining Officer Kirtley, this claim should be summarily dismissed.

3.

Failure To Call Witnesses

There is no genuine issue of material fact that counsel was deficient for failing to
call her neighbors Terri Sanders, Stephanie Hoffman, Rick Olsen, or Linda O'Connor's
thirteen (13) year old son, as witnesses because none of them had any meaningful
testimony to offer. In her Response, Johnson states: "No strategic logic was presented
by trial counsel for this failure to call witnesses." (Response, p.19.) Counsel was not,
however. required to provide a "strategic logiC" for failing to call these witnesses.
Rather, it is presumed the decision is tactical and strategic and it is Johnson's burden to
establish the declston was objectively unreasonable.

Johnson has failed to do so.

Rather. she appears to contend that because counsel did not remember these
witnesses at the time of his deposition, more than four years after the trial. his decision
could not have been strategic. (Response, p.20.) Such an assertion is patently absurd,
particularly as it pertains to the witnesses at issue.
Because Johnson has failed to raise a genuine Issue of material fact that counsel
was ineffective for failing to call a variety of neighbors who had nothing to contribute to
her defense, this claim should be dismissed.

E.

Claim Five - "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel In Dealing With Fingerprint
Evidence Issues"
Johnson has "concede[d] that trial counsel Pangburn provided deposition

testimony to the effect that having unidentified prints can be a helpful thing to the
defense," and that ''trial counsel and their fingerprint expert Kerchusky, were unable to
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identify exactly what fingerprint evidence was disclosed on the eve of trial, that would
have made a specific difference in the expert opinion to be rendered." (Response,
p.20.) Thus. Johnson has "abandoned her allegation of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel for failure to inquire about lack of police testing for latent prints on the trash can
lid," and is only pursuing "fingerprint evidence issues . . . relative to ineffective
assistance of counsel . . . in failing to specifically inquire of his fingerprint expert an
opinion regarding the 'freshness' of latent prints found on the tools of murder."
(Response, p.20.) With respect to this claim, the state asserted in its Memorandum
that, contrary to Johnson's assertions, counsel did in fact elicit expert opinion testimony
regarding the "freshness" of the prints.

(Memorandum, pp.45-46.)

Johnson

acknowledges this testimony but contends the ureferenced testimony is by way of
foundation only."

(Response, p.20.)

A review of the relevant portions of Mr.

Kerchusky's testimony reveals this claim is without merit. For the reasons set forth in
the state's Memorandum (Memorandum, pp.44-46), the state is entitled to summary
dismissal of this claim.
F.

Claim Six - "Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To Lay A Proper
Foundation For Psycological [sic] Opinion Evidence"
Johnson's Response does not address this claim; therefore no further argument

is necessary. For the reasons set forth in the state's Memorandum, this claim should be
dismissed.

G.

Claim Seven - "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel In Dealing With Aiding
And Abetting Theory Of Guilt"
In her Response, Johnson addresses this claim simply by arguing that, during his

deposition, Mr. Pangburn "recognized this concern prior to the time instructions were
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actually given," but did not "explain how he defended against this theory of guilt other
than to object to the instruction." (Response, p.23.) Whether Johnson believes Mr.
Pangburn provided an explanation of "how he defended against this theory of guilt" is
irrelevant to whether Johnson has alleged a prima facie case of deficient performance
or prejudice.

For the reasons set forth in the state's Memorandum (Memorandum,

pp.47--49), Johnson has failed to do so and the state is entitled to summary dismissal of
this claim.

H.

Claim Eight - "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel In Investigating The
Allegation Of Deputy Coroner Steven Pankey"
In her eighth claim, Johnson asserts trial counsel were ineffective "In fafling to

investigate and follow up on a phone call received from Steven Pankey informing trial
counsel that he had important information." (Petition. p.20, 122.) For the reasons set
forth in the state's Memorandum (Memorandum, p.49), and Section A.1. supra, this
claim should be dismissed as untimely. Alternatively, the claim should be dismissed
because Johnson has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that counsel was
ineffective in relation to Mr. Pankey. Johnson's Response falls to establish otherwise,
but merely repeats what she has already al/eged, which. as asserted in the state's
Memorandum is insufficient to entitle her to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Claim
Eight should therefore be dismissed.

I.

Claim Nine - "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel In Failure To Utilize
Readily Available Psychiatric Evidence"
In claim nine, Johnson alleges trial counsel were ineffective "in failing to pursue

and present a defense that included expert psychiatric testimony which would have
informed the jury that a double patricide-matricide, is an incredibly rare phenomena"
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and even Urarer still with a girl of tender years, such as the Petitioner, who has not been
physically and/or sexually abused, is not schizophrenic and/or intoxicated . . . . "
(Petition, pp.20·Z1, ~ 23.) According to Johnson, such testimony would have Ucreat[edJ
reasonable doubt, and a substantial likelihood of a verdict of not guilty." (Petition, p.21,
~

23.) For the reasons set forth in the state's Memorandum (Memorandum, p.52) and

section A 1, supra, this claim should be dismissed as untimely.
Alternatively, Johnson has failed to establish counsel was deficient for "failing to
pursue and present a defense" that it would be rare for someone like her to kill both her
parents or that she was prejudiced by counsel's failure to pursue such a defense. In her
Response, Johnson acknowledges that "[p]erhaps" this evidence "would not have been
admnted at trial," but counsel should have "proffered the proposed testimony with an
offer of proof anyway.

(Response, p.24.)

Johnson cannot meet her burden of

establishing a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present
evidence that mayor may not have been admissible. See Schoger

v. State, _

P.3d

_ , 2010 WL 337688 "'8 (2010) C"[T]his Court will g.enerally not find deficient
performance where counsel fails to argue a novel theory in an undeveloped area of
law.")
Because Johnson's ninth claim is untimely and because, even if timely, she has
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that counsel was ineffective for failing to
pursue a defense based upon Dr, Worst's opinions, this claim should be dismissed
without a hearing.
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Claim Ten - "Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Due To Violations Of Rules
Of Professional Conduct"
Johnson's Response does not address this claim; therefore no further argument

is necessary. For the reasons set forth in the state's Memorandum, this claim should be
dismissed.

K.

Claim Eleven - I'lneffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel"
In her eleventh claim, Johnson alleges appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to (1) raise "an allegation of error by the trial court in denying the Motion to
Suppress Statement Against Interest made subsequent to retainer of counsel. Doug
Nelson, and Nelson's issuance of a fcease and desist' questioning letter" (Petition, p.22,
~

25); and (2) "argue insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury

instruction" (Petition, p.22,

1l 26.)

In her Response, Johnson contends these claims

should not be dismissed because post-conviction counsel has reviewed appellate
counsel's "entire tile, including legal research and analysis thereof," and found
"[vlirtually no analysis of the relative strength of the issues for presentation to the
Supreme Court."

(Response, p.Z5.)

Post--conviction counsel's review of appellate

counsel's file and his opinion on what issues should have been raised fails to establish
appellate counsel, who is highly experienced in criminal appellate practice. was
deficient for failing to agree with his assessment. Moreover, for the reasons set forth in
the state's Memorandum, Johnson has also failed to establish a prima facie case of
prejudice relating to appellate counsel's performance. (Memorandum, pp.56-58.) This
claim should therefore be dismissed.
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Claim Twelve - "Newly Discovered Evidence"
The only "newly discovered evidence" claim addressed in Johnson's Response is

based upon Mr. Pankey's assertion that he heard Sheriff Femling say, "Well, I guess
f've got to move evidence to make a case." (Response, pp.26~27.) Johnson's only
contention related to this claim, other than noting that Mr. Pankey Was not 'Iinterviewed
by police," is that the state's assertion that Sheriff Femling's comment was "perfectly
innoouous," does not "pass[ ] the straight face test." (Response, p.27.) Obviously the
state disagrees. No further argument is necessary in relation to this olaim and, for the
reasons set forth in the state's Memorandum this claim should be dismissed.

M.

Conclusion
Because all of Johnson's allegations fall as a matter of law, are untimely, and/or

are bare and conclusory and unsubstantiated by any fact, she is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing and this Court should summarily dismiss her Petition.

CONCLUSION
Johnson's Petition falls to raise any genuine issue of material fact that would
entitle her to an evidentiary hearing.

The state is therefore entitled to summary

dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(c).
DATED this 19th day of March, 2010,

CA M. LORELLO
Attorney General
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Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County. Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH mDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-006-324
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

__________~R=e=sp~o=n=d=e=nt~-----------)
COMES NOW Petitioner and files this, her MEMORANDUM REPLY TO
RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL and in support thereof states as follows:

INTRODUCTION
Petitioner filed her Motion for Summary Disposition and memorandum in support
thereof on February 8, 2010.

Likewise, Respondent filed its Motion for Summary

Dismissal and memorandum in support thereof, on or about February 8, 2010. Thereafter,
on or about March 5, 2010, the parties submitted memorandums of law responding to
said motions for summary disposition. The instant memorandum is to be the final written
briefing on the issues presented for summary disposition. In the course of briefing, the
issues for consideration have been narrowed.
Petitioner has relinquished her claims for relief asserted in her Second Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, contained in the following paragraphs; 12 & 12.(a),
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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[Violation of Petitioner's Right to due Process of Law Relating to Judicial Bias & related
claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Move for Disqualification for
Cause], 16.a.iv., [Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Adequately CrossExamine Matt Johnson], and 18.i, 18ii, 18iii, I8iv, I8.v, & I8.viii, 27, 28, 28.a. [All
allegations relating to Fingerprint Evidence except Failure of Counsel to elicit from
Defense Fingerprint Expert Opinion Testimony that Latent Prints Found On the Tools of
Murder Were Fresh Prints]

Petitioner will also now concede her claim asserted in

paragraph 19 of the Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. [Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in failing to lay a proper foundation for admission of
psychological Opinion Testimony] Similarly, the claims asserted in paragraphs 20, 21
and 25 of the Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief are now being
abandoned. [Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in Dealing with Aiding and Abetting
Theory of Guilt]
Issues remaining for the Court's consideration are those asserted in the
Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contained in paragraphs
11, 11 (a), [Lack of Jurisdiction and Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel associated
therewith], 13, [Violation of Right to Due Process of Law due to Court's impermissible
limitation on right to cross-examine witness], 14, IS.a., IS.b., IS.c., IS.d., I6.a.i., I6.a.ii.,
I6.a.iii., I6.a.v., 16.a.vi., 16.b., 16.c.,I6.d., 17,24, [Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
cumulatively due to lack of preparation supported by specific instances of failure to
adequately cross-examine witnesses· and/or call witnesses], I8.vi, I8.vii, [Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel due to failure to elicit expert opinion testimony regarding the
freshness of latent prints found on the murder weapon, ammunition, and scope removed

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN
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2 I~

from the murder weapon], 22, [Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in failing to Investigate
allegation of Deputy Coroner Steven Pankey], 23, [Ineffective Assistance of Trial
Counsel in Failure to Utilize Readily Available Psychiatric Evidence], 26, [Ineffective
Assistance of Appellate Counsel in Failing to raise and challenge sufficiency of evidence
to support Aiding and Abetting Instruction], 29 and 30. [Newly Discovered Evidence]

ARGUMENT
As to each of the issues remaining for the Court's consideration, there exists a
material issue of fact, such that Petitioner is entitled to evidentiary hearing, or
alternatively Petitioner has produced sufficient evidence for this Court to grant the relief
requested, either in the form of a new trial, or a new direct appeal. All of the issues have
been fully briefed and argued in Petitioner's initial Memorandum of Law in Support of
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Petitioner's Memorandum Response to
Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition. This reply brief will be limited to direct
review of, and counter-arguments to, the argument made by the State in its Memorandum
in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN FAILING TO ADDUCE
EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY REGARDING FRESHNESS OF PRINTS

The State repeats the well known standard that a court will not second guess the
tactical decisions of trial counsel, and asserts the presumption of competence.
Unquestionably, these are accurate statements of established principles of law. Likewise,
the exception to the general rule is recognized and even cited by the State; that the
presumption is overcome by a showing the " ... decisions are made upon the basis of
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of
objective evaluation. Inadequate preparation prior to trial may be sufficient to show
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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deprivation of the right to effective assistance of Counsel" Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho
139, 139 PJd 741 at 747-48. (internal citations omitted) The State proceeds to argue that
Petitioner is simply asking this Court to assume counsel was not prepared. (Memorandum
in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Dismissal pp. 4-5)
However, this argument overlooks the ample evidence submitted to this court
proving trial counsel was indeed unprepared, had not completely investigated the facts,
and was ignorant of the law. (Dunn & Rader Affidavits Exhibits 1 & 2; Dunn Deposition
Transcript Exhibit 59 pp. 8,10,11,16,18,23,26,27,28,29,30,33; Rader Deposition
pp. 117, 118, 119, 121, 124, 133, 135, 136) It is in fact the State that is presuming trial
counsel somehow made a tactical decision to not ask his expert to testify specifically
regarding his opinion as to the freshness of prints found on the tools of murder.
Petitioner has overcome the presumption with affirmative evidence of an objective
deficiency. The State has failed to respond.
In addition to the flawed argument that Petitioner has not proven this claim as a
matter of law, the State disputes she has established the claim as a matter of fact. The
State maintains the claim is contradicted by the record. This assertion is simply not true.
In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal, and again in its
Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Dismissal, the State
cites to trial transcript pages 5069-5070, (palm print on gun likely to evaporate rather
quickly) 5075-5078, (palm print on rifle likely from last person to load gun) 5083-5084,
5090-5092, (same) and 5128-5129. (in his experience a print on a gun would not last
more than a year) Furthermore, the State, in arguing trial counsel did in fact elicit expert
testimony regarding freshness of latent prints found on the scope and ammunition,
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together with packaging, cites the following trial transcript pages; 5074, L. 10-5075 L.
14; 5083, L. 1 - 5084 L. 9; 5090 L.18 - 5092 L. 19; 5126 L. 25 - 5218 L. 17. Finally, the
State claims Fingerprint Expert Kerchusky was cross-examined extensively on the topic,
citing Trial Tr., p. 5105, L. 9 - 5113, L. 25; p.5115, L. 16 - 5116, L. 18.
A close reading of the transcript clearly reveals Kerchusky was never asked, and
never offered his opinion whether the latent prints found on the scope, the ammunition, or
the murder weapon were fresh.

It is difficult to see how the cited testimony could

possibly be construed as such an opinion, even in the context of zealous advocacy.
Reviewing the testimony in chronological order, beginning with pages 5069-5070;
plainly, the exchange addressed generally, the concept of how long prints may last on a
non-porous surface, like a gun, not the specific issues concerning the actual facts in this
case: pp. 5074-5075; again, plainly, the exchange addressed generally, the concept of
how long prints may last on a porous surface, like a box, not the specific issues
concerning the actual facts in this case: pp. 5075-5078; it is difficult to glean how the
State can argue the discourse contained in this portion of Kerchusky's testimony
expresses the opinion "palm print on rifle likely from last person to load gun."
(Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal p. 45) The
cited testimony simply does not even come close to the topic, much less express the
opinion stated by Respondent: pp. 5083-5084; again, it is dubious to even assert the
testimonial exchange contained here could be argued to stand for the proposition" ... the
prints on the insert in the ammunition box and the scope matched and was likely of
recent origin was in fact elicited," (Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion
for Summary Dismissal p. 7; emphasis added): 5090-5092; Obviously, the testimony on
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the cited pages is the latent print found on the scope and the latent print on the
ammunition insert matched, and just as obviously, contrary to the State's assertion, no
opinion is rendered regarding the freshness of the prints: pp. 5126-5128; Here, Mr.
Kerchusky offers a general opinion that an expert cannot tell precisely how old a
fingerprint is or give an exact age, but never even touches on an opinion whether the
latent prints left on the tools of murder in this case are fresh, and upon what facts in this
case, he might base such an opinion.
A close review of the cited cross-examination testimony reveals similar
contradictory conclusions: pp. 5105 - 5113; Mr. Whatcott, questioning Kerchusky for the
State, skillfully avoided asking any questions pertaining to an opinion on the facts of this
case, concerning the tools of murder. Why would he, after the topic was forgotten or
otherwise omitted on direct exam? Undoubtedly, the general topic of whether a latent
print could be dated or aged, was discussed.

Included in this portion of cross-

examination was heated criticism of Kerchusky' s opinion that the latent prints found on
the scope were probably left by the same person. An opinion we now know to be
supported by the newly discovered evidence, Christopher Hill in fact left fingerprints on
the scope when he removed it from the murder weapon: pp. 5115 - 5116; this final
citation to cross-examination testimony does not address aging of prints in any way.
In summary, it is difficult to discern why the State would make the argument that
Kerchusky gave an expert opinion, based on the facts of this case, concerning the
freshness of prints on the tools of murder. Such an opinion is simply absent from the
record. Trial Counsel Pangburn, when interrogated on the subject, testified generally "we
did a good job of dealing with the state's witnesses on fingerprint evidence with regard to
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fingerprint evidence" (Petitioner's Exhibit 65 Pangburn Depo. Tr. p. 27) ¥lhen asked to
describe the fingerprint evidence issues, Pangburn failed to even mention freshness of
prints as a concern. (Pangburn Depo. Tr. p. 27-32) Whereas the Defense fingerprint
expert recognized this issue as critical to the point he requested Pangburn recall him to
testify specifically on the issue of freshness. (Petitioner's Exhibit 55; Kerchusky Depo.
Tr. pp. 54-55)
NEWL Y DISCOVERED FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE

The State responds to Petitioner's claim of entitlement to a new trial based on
newly discovered fingerprint evidence, by arguing the evidence is immaterial and not
likely to produce an acquittal.
EVIDENCE IS MATERIAL

Material Evidence is defined as evidence which has an effective influence or
bearing on the question in issue. (Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition) Discovering
that Christopher Kevin Hill, who lacks an alibi, is the person who left fresh fingerprints
on the tools of murder, is clearly material and not merely cumulative evidence. The State
criticizes Petitioner's argument as founded on innuendo and lacking evidentiary support.
First, it should be noted, the State could have learned it was Hill who had left these prints
during its investigation, if indeed the investigation had been complete. Hill could and
should have been interviewed, and elimination prints gathered. The Defense could not
have accomplished this routine investigative task. Once Hill's identity was discovered in
early 2009 he was interviewed. Hill told police his prints must be on the murder weapon
because he had taken it to the shooting range and attempted to sight it sometime in 2000
or 2001. This story was never investigated or confirmed in any way by police. This
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statement is in conflict with that of Speegle; indicating Hill had merely assisted him in
moving things into the apartment in 2002, and apparently knew nothing of Hill allegedly
taking and shooting Speegle's rifle. (Petitioner'S Exhibits 32,50 & 51)
Fingerprint expert Kerchusky would testify that any latent prints left more than
one year would either have dissipated or become etched prints, yet the prints in question
were fresh, not etched into the soft metal. A complete recitation of the related facts and
circumstances are listed in Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's
Motion for Summary Disposition pp. 5-9, and need not be repeated here. Clearly, there is
evidentiary support for the argument had Hill's identity been known to the jury; that
information placed in context of other known facts, including, the inconsistent statements
by both Speegle and Hill regarding handling of the weapon and ammunition, the lack of
alibi and incomplete investigation by police, the financial condition of Hill, and the
expert opinion testimony on the age or freshness of prints; all would have influence and
bearing on the question at issue and raise reasonable doubt that Petitioner murdered her
parents.
The analysis of prejudice is the same for both the ineffective assistance of counsel
issue, and the newly discovered evidence issue. Therefore, argument relating to these
issues will be presented together.
PREJUDICE

The State concludes Petitioner has failed to show prejudice as result of trial
counsel's deficient performance, "but instead relies on bare assertions and mere
speculation." (Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary
Dismissal p. 8)

Stated in plain language, the second prong of the analysis for an
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether the results would likely be different but
for counsel's errors. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 139 P.3d 741, 747-48. The State
argues there is no evidence the trial would likely come out differently. This argument
ignores common sense, and the deposition testimony of Bob Kerchusky.
The relevant facts known at the time of trial, but not necessarily presented to the
jury, were as follows: the murder weapon was last handled by Mel Speegle within weeks
of the crimes (Trial Tr. p. 2704); the scope was on the rifle when Speegle looked at it
several within weeks before the crime (Trial Tr. p. 2706); the murder weapon and
ammunition would have last been touched approximately one year before when he, or
possibly others helped him move things into the garage apartment (Trial Tr. p. 27072721); the ammunition was packaged up in a box left in the closet of the garage
apartment, as it had been since being moved in (Trial Tr. p. 2710); Speegle had never
removed the scope and it was on when he handled the gun prior to labor Day Weekend
(Trial Tr. p. 2706); after the murder, the scope was found on the bed in the garage
apartment removed from the murder weapon (Plaintiffs Exhibit 38, crime scene photo of
scope on bed); latent unidentified prints were found on the scope, the ammunition and
ammunition packaging, have now been linked to Christopher Kevin Hill (Exhibits 43, 44,
45, 46 & 47); Mel Speegle's fingerprints are not found on the murder weapon
(Petitioner'sExhibit 31); latent prints found on scope and .264 shell were not "etched"
prints, but fresh prints (Petitioner's Exhibit 55); the police did not interview Christopher
Kevin Hill or gather his fingerprints as "elimination prints" as part of their pre-trial
investigation.
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Fingerprint expert Kerchusky believes, has stated and would, if the case were
retried, testify as follows: an accurate determination can be made whether a latent print is
fresh; latent prints cannot generally remain on a nonporous surface for more than a year;
the quality of a latent print quickly deteriorates over time; handling of objects can both
leave fresh prints and wipe away older prints; the quality of the latent prints lifted from
the tools of murder in this case were excellent; the latent prints found on the gun, the
scope, the inserts, and the bullets were all crucial pieces of evidence and that they were
fresh prints, left by Christopher Kevin Hill; the latent prints found on the scope were left
when and by the person who removed the scope; the latent prints found on the scope
would not have been left by a person sighting the rifle; the quality of the latent left by
Hill on the murder weapon was too high to be a year or more old; Christopher Hill's
thumbprint found on an unspent .264 brass cased round was of excellent quality, and
would have been an etched print if it had been there more than a few months because of
the soft metal. (See Kerchusky Deposition testimony, Petitioner's Exhibit 55)
Counsel for the State dismisses Petitioner's argument by hypothetical questions as
all asked and answered for the jury at trial, but fails to cite to the transcript to support this
criticism.

In fact those questions were not addressed at trial, nor of course was Hill's

identity then known. The answers to the questions would be presented by a defense
fingerprint expert at a new trial in a manner similar to that referenced above. It cannot be
sincerely argued in an objective sense that this evidence and testimony would certainly
produce an acquittal. However, if this evidence and testimony were presented toa jury,
together with the competing circumstantial evidence case again presented against
Petitioner, it is certainly possible an acquittal could result, and it is not unreasonable to
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conclude, probably would result.

If in fact the case were retried, by prepared and

competent counsel, and Bruno Santos were thoroughly cross-examined; the State's
witnesses were all confronted and interrogated in detail; all witnesses called and all
scientific expert testimony and testing admitted; it can be stated with confidence that
Sarah Johnson would probably not be convicted of murdering her parents.

CONCLUSION
No material issue of fact remains for the Court's determination, and Petitioner is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Abundant evidence has been submitted to

support the fact that lead trial counsel was unprepared for trial and unfamiliar with the
evidentiary details such that reasoned strategic decisions on crucial matters could not be
made. Failing to solicit an opinion on this decisive topic from a respected expert, eager
and ready to share his decades of experience with the jury, cannot be dismissed as an
acceptable tactical decision. Given the totality of the circumstances and evidence before
this court, Sarah Johnson, a sixteen year girl at the time of the crimes, should be granted a
new, fair trial, represented by competent counsel presenting all of the evidence now
known.
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C RISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

/1

day of March 2010, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting
Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise,
Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 208.736.4155,
PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

_ _/ : _
US Mail

- - - Hand Deliver
_ _ _ Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155
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FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
DISTRICT COURT

SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
VS.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)

u
CV 2009'-000324

COURT MINUTES

)
)
)
)

Hearing Type: Motion for Summary Disposition
Date: April 30, 2010
Time: 10:00 am
Courtroom: 1
Judge: Honorable G. Richard Bevan
Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey
Court Clerk: Shelley Bartlett
Counsel for Petitioner: Christopher Simms
Counsel for Respondent: Jessica Lorello
10:00 Court called the case and asked for introductions of counsel. Court
confirmed with counsel that all documents have been received.
10:07 Court reviewed the claims that were dismissed by stipulation.
10: 10 Mr. Simms gave argument.
10:45 Ms. Lorello gave argument.
11 :04 Court inquired of Ms. Lorello about the time line for the untimely matters.
11 :07 Mr. Simms gave rebuttal argument. Mr. Simms withdrew the claim that
Terry Sanders did not testify.
11: 15 Ms. Lorello gave rebuttal argument.
11 :19 Mr. Simms gave final comment.
11 :20 Court took a brief recess.

11 :47 Court is back in session.
11 :48 Court gave the following findings: Ms. Lorello to prepare the order.
- State's claim of untimeliness: Statute of limitations as to claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,
and 10 are denied. Claims 8 and 12 are taken under advisement.
- As to Lack of Jurisdiction argument: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is
granted.
- As to Violation of Due Process: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is
granted.
-

As to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Both motions are denied and
proceed to an evidentiary hearing, but for:
As to Paragraph 15B: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is granted as to
failure to object to Rod Anglert. Other claims remain for evidentiary.
As to Paragraph 16: All motions are denied and court will require evidentiary.
As to Paragraph 17: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is granted as to
this paragraph.
As to Paragraph 24: State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is granted as to
this paragraph.
As to Paragraph 18 (vi and vii): Both motions are denied and court will
require an evidentiary.
Paragraphs 22 and 23 and 26: Matters taken under advisement

- Statute of Limitations for Pankey and new evidence issue: Under
advisement

12:01 Clerk will send out standard scheduling order for civil cases. The hearing
will heard here in Twin Falls. Days to be set out past September.

FrLED
M:~'lfM
,..
MAY 19 2010 C<j
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT~onF~~::':':'::':::::;:'::::'~~THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Sarah M. Johnson,

)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)

State of Idaho,

v
Case No. CV-200J'-000324

ORDER FORSCHEDUUNG
CONFERENCE AND ORDER
RE: MOTION PRACTICE

)
Res~ondent.

)

PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 16(b) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the abovecaptioned case is scheduled for a scheduling conference to commence on July 19,
2010 at 4:00 pm at the Theron Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, Twin
Falls, Idaho.
The purpose of the conference will be to enter a scheduling order regarding the
deadlines contained in the attached schedule. Counsel must be the handling attorney,
or be fully familiar with the case, and have authority to bind his/her client and law firm on
all matters set forth in I.R.C.P. 16(a) and 16(b).
In lieu of this scheduling conference, all parties may stipulate to deadlines and
other information required in the enclosed Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning.
This stipulation must be completed as written and not modified in any way. It must be
signed by all parties, and filed with the court at least three (3) days before the
scheduling conference.

The hearing will not be vacated until:

1) the attached

stipulation is received by the court; and 2) counsel contact the court's clerk at the
number set forth below.
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following shall apply to motions filed in this
case.
1.

SCHEDULING AND HEARINGS. The Court holds its regular civil law and

motion calendar every other Monday (or Tuesday following holidays) at 9:00 a.m.
Absent an order shortening time, all motion practice other than motions for summary
judgment will be governed by I.R.C.P. 7 (effective July 1, 2004).

As a matter of

courtesy, counsel are expected to contact the Court's Deputy Clerk in Twin Falls, Sharie
Cooper (phone 208-736-4162) to schedule hearings, and to confirm the availability of
opposing counsel for proposed hearing dates. As an accommodation to out-of-town
counsel and parties, hearings on any pretrial motion (except pre-trial conferences,
motions for summary judgment or hearings at which testimony is to be offered) may be
conducted by telephone conference call pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(4).

Counsel

requesting a hearing by conference call will be responsible for arranging for placement
of the call, and the cost thereof. Arrangements for telephone conference of any hearing
must be pre-arranged by the Wednesday preceding the date of the hearing.
2.

MOTIONS GENERALLY (applies to every motion).
a. One additional copy marked or stamped IfJudge's Copy" of the
motion and of all moving or opposing papers (including affidavits,
and briefs) must be submitted to the judge's chambers when such
documents are filed or lodged with the clerk of the court. If a party
relies upon any case decided by an appellate court outside of Idaho, a
copy of such case must be attached to the copy of the brief submitted to
the judge's chambers.

b. The amount of time each side will be allotted for oral argument on a
motion will be set by the court.
c. If a notice of hearing is not filed within fourteen (14) days after the
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND
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motion is filed, the motion will be deemed withdrawn.
3.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

a.
NO HEARING ON ANY SUMMARY JUDGMENT WILL BE
PERMITTED IN THE 60-DAY PERIOD PRIOR TO TRIAL,
REGARDLESS OF WHEN THE MOTION IS FILED.
b. The party moving for summary judgment shall prepare as separate
documents: (1) motion, (2) legal memorandum containing a written
statement of reasons in support of the motion, and (3) a concise statement
of the material facts. (4) a notice of hearing with date and time blank to be
set by the Court. Each statement of a fact shall include a reference to the
particular place in the record which supports that fact. The legal
memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the
elements of any claim or defense relevant to the motion.
c. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall prepare as
separate documents:
(a) legal memorandum containing a written
statement of reasons in opposition to the motion, and (b) a concise
statement of the facts which are genuine issues of material fact and/or
which are material facts omitted from the moving party's statement of
facts. Each statement of a fact shall include a reference to the particular
place in the record which supports that fact. The legal memorandum shall
include a statement, supported by authority, of the elements of any claim
or defense relevant to the motion.
d. The schedule for service of briefs and affidavits set forth in Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(c) is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
i. The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at
least thirty-five (35) days before the time fixed for the hearing.
ii.
If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the
party must do so at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date of
the hearing. The adverse party shall also serve an answering brief
at least 21 days prior to the date of the hearing.
iii. The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief not less
than 14 days before the date of the hearing.
e.
OBJECTIONS/MOTIONS TO STRIKE: Any party objecting to an
opposing party's affidavits MUST file a written objection and motion to
strike and have the matter noticed for hearing, in order to preserve the
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND
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objection and to give the court and the parties sufficient notice regarding
Oral objections regarding any affidavit WILL NOT be
the same.
considered, and the right referenced in Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning
Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1992) to
make oral objections at summary judgment is hereby specifically
PROHIBITED. I,R.C.P. (16)(b); Gem State Insurance Co. v. Hutchison,
_ _ Idaho
,2007 Slip. Op. 130.
f. The hearing on a motion for summary judgment will be set AFTER the
moving party has submitted the motion, legal memorandum and statement
of facts along with Judge's copies of said documents. The hearing date
can then be obtained from the judge's court clerk. This pertains to all
motions for summary judgment, and motions for partial summary
judgment.
f. Each party will be allotted thirty (30) minutes for oral argument.
4.

JUDICIAL NOTICE: If either party requests the Court to take judicial

notice of any documents not in the file at issue, Counsel shall provide, under separate
cover, all such documents for the Court's review.

o this

I'J- day of

G. Richard Bevan
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned certifies that on the
~
day of May, 2010, she caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDE'RFOtscHEDULING CONFERENCE AND
ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE to be served upon the following persons in the
following manner:

q

Deputy Clerk for Blai e Co

Petitioner's Counsel:
Christopher Simms
Attorney At Law
191 Sun Valley Rd, Ste 209
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

Mailed /

Courthouse Mailbox_ _

Faxed _ _

Respondent's Counsel:
Jessica Lorello
Idaho Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Mailed

~Courthouse Mailbox._ _
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Sarah M. Johnson,
Petitioner,
vs.
State of Idaho,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-000324
STIPULATION FOR
SCHEDULING AND PLANNING

)

Respondent.
The above parties hereby stipulate to the following scheduling deadlines:
A.

EXPERT WITNESSES

(Plaintiff's experts)

1.
days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each person plaintiff
intends to call as an expert witness at trial and state the subject matter on which the
witness is expected to testify.
2.
days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose all information required by
Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses.
3.
days before trial, defendant shall complete any depositions of the
plaintiff's initial expert witnesses.
(Defendant's experts)

4.
days before trial, defendant shall disclose each person defendant
intends to call as an expert witness at trial and state the subject matter on which the
witness is expected to testify.
5.
days before trial, defendant shall disclose all information required
by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses.
6.
days before trial, plaintiff shall complete any depositions of the
defendant's expert witnesses.
(Plaintiff's rebuttal experts)

7.
days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each person plaintiff
intends to call as an expert witness at trial to rebut new information or issues disclosed
or raised by the defendant.
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND
ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE
-6

8.
days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose all information required
by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the rebuttal expert
witnesses.
9.
days before trial, defendant shall complete any depositions of
the plaintiff's rebuttal expert witnesses.
B.

LAY WITNESSES

1.
days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each person plaintiff
intends to call as a lay witness at trial (excluding impeachment witnesses).
2.
days before trial, defendant shall disclose each person
defendant intends to call as a lay witness at trial (excluding impeachment witnesses).
3.
days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each lay witness
(excluding impeachment witnesses) plaintiff intends to call at trial to rebut new
information or issues disclosed or raised by the defendant.
4. _ _ _ _ days before trial, all parties shall complete any depositions of lay
witnesses.
C.

DEADLINES FOR INITIATING DISCOVERY

1.
days before trial is the last day for serving interrogatories,
requests for production, requests to permit entry upon land or other property, and
requests for admission.
2. _ _ _ _ days before trial is the last day for filing motions for a physical or
mental examination.
D.

DEADLINE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY

1.
days before trial, all parties must serve any supplemental
response to discovery required by Rule 26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
E.

STIPULATION TO ALTER DISCOVERY DEADLINES

1. The parties may alter any discovery deadline by written agreement without the
necessity of obtaining a court order.

ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND
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F.

PRETRIAL MOTIONS

1. _ _ _ _ _ days before trial is the last day to file motions to add additional
parties to the lawsuit.
2.
days before trial is the last day to file a motion to amend the
claims between existing parties to the lawsuit, including to add a claim for punitive
damages.
3. All other non-dispositive pre-trial motions (including, but not limited to motions
in limine) must be filed and scheduled for hearing not less than fourteen (14) days
before trial. Exceptions will be granted infrequently, and only when justice so requires.
G.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1. All motions for summary judgment must be filed at least ninety-six (9S) days
before trial.
2. No hearing on any summary judgment will be permitted in the sixty (SO) day
period prior to trial.
H.

TRIAL SETTING

1. This case can be set for a trial to commence on or after - - - - - _ _ . Note that, absent extremely compelling circumstances, no case will be
set for trial more than 510 days from the date of filing the complaint.
2. It is estimated that the trial will take ____ days.
3. This case is to be tried as a:
: court trial
: jury trial
4. Parties preference for trial dates: (Please confer and complete.
attach "unavailable dates").
(a)
(b)
(c)

Do not

Week of Tuesday, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 20_.
Week of Tuesday,
, 20_.
Week of Tuesday,
, 20_.

5. The parties will submit a pretrial conference memorandum pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 1S(d), which shall be filed with the Clerk no later than seven (7) days
before the pre-trial conference. The Memorandum may be filed as a joint
submission or separately.
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND
ORDER RE: MOTION PRA.CTICE
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I.

MEDIATION
1. The parties agree to mediation:Yes_

No

2. If yes:
a. The parties agree to submit to mediation with a mediator mutually
agreed upon.
b. Mediation shall begin _____ days prior to trial.
c. Unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties, the cost of
mediation shall be equally divided between the parties.
The parties reserve the right to amend this stipulation by agreement of all
parties, subject to Court approval; each party reserves the right to seek
amendment hereof by Court order, and to request further status conferences for
such purpose, in accordance with I.R.C.P. 16(a) and 16(b).
Appearances:
Counsel for Petitioner:
Date: _ _ _ _ __
Counsel for Respondent:
________________________________ Date: _______
Counsel for Other Parties:
Date: _______

ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND
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Jolynn Drage, Cieri< District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Case No. CV 2006-0324

)

)
) MEMORANDUM DECISION
) AND ORDER REGARDING
) CLAIMS TAKEN UNDER
) ADVISEMENT

Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the court based upon cross motions for summary
disposition filed by both parties herein. The court heard oral argument on the motions
on April 30, 2010, ruling from the bench on the majority of the issues presented. The
court took several issues under advisement at the time of the argument. Having
carefully reviewed the record, considered oral arguments, and otherwise being fully
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advised, the court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order GRANTING
IN PART and DENYING IN PART the state of Idaho's motion for summary dismissal.
The petitioner's motion for summary disposition is DENIED.
ANALYSIS

An application for post-conviction relief under the UPCP A initiates a proceeding
which is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001). Like
the plaintiff in any other civil proceeding, an applicant must substantiate, by a
preponderance of evidence, the allegations upon which his or her request for postconviction relief is based. Idaho Code § 19-4907; Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d
794, 797 (2000). Unlike a complaint in a civil action, however, an application for postconviction relief must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the
claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.e.P. 8(a)(1). Martinez v. State, 126
Idaho 813, 816,892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1995). Rather, an application for postconviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of
the applicant. I.e. § 19-4903. The application must include affidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not
included. Id. Further, the post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations
showing each essential element of the claim, and admissible evidence must be proffered
to support those factual allegations. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901
(Ct. App. 1994).
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Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c) authorizes summary disposition of an application
for post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.e. § 194906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.e.P. 56. Judd v. State,
_

Idaho - - ' - - ' 218 P.3d 1,3 (Ct. App. 2009). I.e. § 19-4906(c) provides:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of
the application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with
any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the

trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Cooper

v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the
application are insufficient to support relief when they: (1) are clearly disproved by the
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law. Id.
I/[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a
jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the
conflict between those inferences." Ridgley v. State, __ Idaho ---' ---' 227 P.3d 925,
929 (2010) (quoting Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519,650 P.2d 657, 661
(1982». "When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be
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drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." Id. (quoting Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119
Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991)).
A.

The Steven Pankey Claims.

a. Ms. Johnson's Claims Regarding Mr. Pankey's Allegations are Time-Barred.
The limitations period for post-conviction actions in non-capital cases is one year
from the expiration of the time for appeal in the criminal case or from the determination
of the appeal, whichever is later. I.e. § 19-4902. Leer v. State, __ Idaho - - ' - - ' 218
P.3d 1173, 1175 (Ct. App. 2009). The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that there is no
"discovery exception" in section 19-4902. See Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191, 30
P.3d 967,969 (2001). The courts have crafted very limited exceptions to this rule in
recent years, e.g., Judd v. State, __ Idaho - - ' - - - I 218 P.3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2009)
("[T]he failure to discover facts ... may in some circumstances delay commencement of
a limitation period."); Kriebel v. State,

---I

Idaho - - - I - - - I 219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct.

App. 2009) (equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing a post-conviction
relief petition has been recognized in very limited situations. The limits are generally
incumbent upon when the petitioner knows or should know the relevant facts). See

Judd, 218 P.3d at 5, quoting Allen v. State, 118 Wash.2d 753, 826 P.2d 200, 203 (1992),
noting that "[t]he key consideration under the discovery rule is the factual, not the legat
basis for the cause of action. The action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should
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know the relevant facts, whether or not the plaintiff also knows that these facts are
enough to establish a legal cause of action."
Judgment was entered in this case, on June 30, 2005 and Johnson originally failed
to timely appeaL Judge Wood granted post conviction relief to her, allowing Johnson to
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Based upon the relief granted by Judge Wood 1,
this court concludes that the statute of limitations pursuant to section 19-4902 would
accrue one year after the issuance of the remittitur on Johnson's appeal. The remittitur
was issued on July 18, 2008.
Johnson thereafter filed her First Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief on
March 16, 2009, well-within the one-year limitation; however, the Second Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was not filed 2 until January 12,2010, long after the
one-year time limit. In the Second Amended Petition, Johnson asserted, for the first
time, claims regarding ineffective assistance of her counsel regarding allegations made
by Steven Pankey, Deputy Coroner for Blaine County. She further claimed that
Pankey's information constituted "newly discovered evidence" warranting postconviction relief.

1 Based upon the relief granted, this court will not base the limitations period on the original date of judgment.
Johnson should not be penalized in this case where counsel failed to timely appeal originally.

The court granted Johnson leave to file her Second Amended Petition after a contested hearing; however, the court
did not consider the limitations defense raised by the state at that juncture. This court will not consider the
sufficiency of evidence supporting the claim sought to be added in determining leave to amend because that is more
properly determined at the summary judgment stage. See Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,528,96 PJd
623,629 (2004) (citing Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 210, 61 P.3d 557, 567 (2002)).

2
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If a party subsequently amends the petition to assert a claim arising out of the
II

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." LR.C.P.
15(c). "If, however, the amended pleading sets forth a new cause of action unrelated to
the original transaction or occurrence pled, the amendment does not relate back to the
date of the original pleading." Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho
266,281,824 P.2d 841, 856 (1991) (citing Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First

Nat'l Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900 (1991); Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d
1172 (1984)).
This court concludes that the claims regarding information from Mr. Pankey
avow a "new cause of action unrelated to the original transaction or occurrence pled ...

." Idaho First National Bank, supra. These claims therefore do not relate back to the date
of the original pleading. Moreover, these facts were, or should have been known to
Johnson or her counsel in advance of the running of the statute of limitations on July 18,
2009. Petitioner's Exhibit 34 is a letter to Judge Wood from Mr. Pankey written July 5,
2009. Pankey signed an affidavit (Exhibit 33) drafted by Johnson's counsel in this case
on July 27,2009. These documents support this court's conclusion that this information
was known or should have been known to allow filing in a timely manner. Absent the
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second amended petition being filed by July 18, 2009, these allegations are untimely and
therefore DISMISSED.

b. Ms. Johnson's Claims Regarding Mr. Pankey's Allegations do not Support a
Post-Conviction Claim in any Event.
However, even if these claims were determined to be timely, this court would
dismiss them as Johnson has failed to state a prima facie case that Mr. Pangburn or other
defense counsel was ineffective in relation to Mr. Pankey's allegations.
i. Standard of review for ineffective assistance claims.

In order to survive summary dismissal of a claim alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel, Johnson "must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether
counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether
the deficiency prejudiced the claimant's case." Schoger v. State

----f

Idaho - - ' - - '

226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88, 104 S.Ct.
2052,2064-65 (1984). To establish deficient assistance, the claimant has the burden of
showing that her attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153, 177 P.3d 362,367 (2008). This objective standard
embraces a strong presumption that the claimant's counsel was competent and diligent.

Id. More simply put, "the standard for evaluating attorney performance is objective
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,
306,986 P.2d 323,329 (1999). Additionally, to establish prejudice, the claimant must
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show a reasonable probability that but for her attorney's deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153, 177
P.3d at 367.

zz. The claims regarding Mr. Pankey's information do not establish
deficient performance or prejudice.
In support of this claim, Johnson has submitted Mr. Pankey's affidavit (Exhibit
33). Mr. Pankey avers that he was called to the home of Alan and Diane Johnson in his
capacity as Deputy Coroner and Apprentice Mortician in Blaine County. See id.

~~1,

2.

Mr. Pankey claims that he "overheard a conversation between Jim Thomas, prosecuting
attorney for Blaine County, and Walt Femling, Sheriff of Blaine County," in which
Pankey heard "Walt Femling state, 'Well, I guess I've got to move evidence to make a

case."' Id.

~~

3,4. Mr. Pankey further avers that he contacted "Sarah Johnson's trial

attorney, by telephone, and informed him that [Pankey] had important information
about the case." Id.

~5.

The affidavit is silent regarding what, if any efforts Mr. Pankey made to recontact anyone from the defense regarding the case. Id. Moreover, Mr. Pankey does
not indicate that he ever told anyone on Johnson's trial team the nature of his
"important information." Moreover, Pankey did not take any steps to notify anyone
about these issues until July 2009, four years after the verdict, when Pankey wrote a
letter directly to Judge Wood claiming that civil suits had been filed against Mr. Pankey
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in Blaine County" as a means of coercion against [Pankey] saying anything about
Femling's tampering with evidence in the Sarah Johnson case." (Exhibit 34, ~4).
Other than this brash statement and conclusion, there is nothing in Mr. Pankey's
affidavit to support the claim that the Blaine County Sheriff actually tampered with
evidence at any time. The statement about moving" evidence" leads to nothing more
than conjecture that something shameful was afoot. This court is left to speculate, even
if the statement was made by Sheriff Femling: 1) is the statement innocuous? 2) did Mr.

Pangburn or anyone else on Johnson's trial team know the factual details, or were they
merely told about generic "important information" as referenced in Pankey's affidavit?
3) if Johnson's lawyers did know about the allegation, was the statement relevant, or
admissible? and 4) would this statement, if admitted to the jury, show a reasonable
probability that, but for Johnson's attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different?
This court concludes that it is not in a position to guess as to these facts or
conclusions. The petitioner is required to establish facts showing each essential element
of her claim, and a showing of admissible evidence must support those factual
allegations. Roman v. State, supra. Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that
the failure to re-contact Mr. Pankey was objectively unreasonable. Johnson has
therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that counsel was ineffective in
relation to Mr. Pankey.
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Moreover, Johnson has likewise failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that she was prejudiced by the alleged lack of communication between counsel and Mr.
Pankey. Johnson's allegation of prejudice is: "If Trial Counsel had investigated and
followed up on said phone call he would have learned that it was alleged that the Sheriff
and the Prosecuting Attorney had tampered with evidence and would have produced
testimony of Mr. Pankey at trial, thereby creating reasonable doubt." (Petition, p.20, ~22
(emphasis added)). Thus, the allegation is not that further investigation would have
revealed any actual evidence that Sheriff Femling tampered with any evidence, but
counsel would have only discovered Mr. Pankey's allegations that Sheriff Femling had
done so and would have "produced testimony of Mr. Pankey at triaL"
This court cannot conclude that: 1) had Pangburn called Pankey back, Pangburn
would have chosen to put Pankey on the stand to elicit testimony about this one
statement; and 2) the jury's verdict would have been different if the jury had been made
aware of such statement. This sort of bare assertion and speculation is insufficient to
show prejudice. The actual testimony that Mr. Pankey would have provided according
to his affidavit was that Sheriff Femling stated, "Well, I guess I've got to move evidence
to make a case." Such testimony would not have produced an acquittal because it can
be viewed as a perfectly innocuous statement; there are no facts to support the claims
that evidence tampering actually occurred.
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c. These Claims do not Amount to Newly Discovered Evidence.
Johnson also asserts she is entitled to a new trial based upon the discovery of Mr.
Pankey's allegation that he heard Sheriff Femling say, "Well, I guess I've got to move
evidence to make a case." (Petition, p.25, ~30.)
Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if the petitioner
demonstrates: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant
at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching;
(3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was not
due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139,
144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978
(1976».
The court concludes that Johnson has failed to establish any of these four factors
supporting her newly discovered evidence claim as to Mr. Pankey's allegations. First,
there is no allegation that Mr. Pankey'S assertions are newly discovered and were
unknown to the defense at trial. On the contrary, Mr. Pankey's affidavit states that he
called one of Johnson'S attorneys to reveal his allegations during or before the triaL (Ex.
33, p.2, ~ 5.)
Second, the evidence is not material because there is no evidence that anyone
associated with the investigation actually altered any evidence. Moreover, the
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statement that the Sheriff would have to "move" evidence can be viewed as nonexculpatory and even innocuous.
Third, as the court has already held, the evidence would not likely produce an
acquittal because the Sheriff's alleged statement does not actually tend to exonerate
Johnson. The assertions being made by Mr. Pankey four years after the trial concluded
do not merit the inferential consideration necessary to establish this required element of
proof for a new trial.
Finally, the evidence was made known to the defense and therefore discoverable
through reasonable diligence. Since Mr. Pankey's affidavit establishes that the defense
was aware of this information, Johnson cannot now claim that she was unaware of such
information until after trial. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 146, 191 P.3d at
224 (in order to be newly discovered evidence, the evidence itself, not just importance
or materiality of that evidence, must be unknown and unavailable prior to trial); State v.

Weise, 75 Idaho 404,410,273 P.2d 97, 100 (1954) (evidence which defendant was aware
of prior to trial but chose not to present is not newly discovered); State v. Morrison, 52
Idaho 99, 11 P.2d 619,622 (1932) (evidence discovered during trial is not newly
discovered) .
As such, Johnson's claim that the Pankey information is newly discovered is
without merit, and is therefore DISMISSED.
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B.

Failure to Utilize Readily Available Psychological Evidence.

Johnson asserts that her defense attorneys performed below the accepted
standard, and that she was prejudiced thereby, due to their failure to attempt to
introduce expert psychiatric opinion testimony to inform the jury that a double
patricide-matricide is an incredibly rare phenomenon and even "rarer still with a girl of
tender years, such as the Petitioner, who has not been physically and/or sexually
abused, is not schizophrenic and/or intoxicated .... " (Second Amended Petition, pp.20-

Mr. Pangburn has previously testified about these claims as follows:
Q. Do you recall talking about, with anybody, the fact that young girls don't kill
their parents very often?
A. I discussed that with everybody from Mark Rader to my wife to Nancy Grace
onCNN.

Q. And in what context were you thinking about that?
A. Well, I never verified this, but my understanding was that there may have
never been an instance like this in this country since the allegations related to
Lizzie Borden of killing her parents, and she was aquitted. So it was a big
deal.

*

*

*

Q. What, if anything, did you consider doing about the fact that [parricide is]
rare?

A. Busted our ass defending her in court is one thing, and deal with the many
items of unfair evidence that the state got in and tried to get in
misrepresenting the life of a 16-year-old girl and her inclination or ability to
kill her parents.
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Q. Did you ever consider pursuing the rarity of young girls murdering their
parents as a component of your defense?

A. I'm sure that we talked about how that element of a defense could be
included in the case, and also that the difficulties that we would undoubtedly
face with the presiding trial judge in trying to go that direction. But right
now I can't recall actually presenting anything along those lines.

Q. Do you ever remember having information from someone by the name of Dr.
Worst in that - on that issue?
A. Oh, well, Dr. Worst, if I am recalling correctly, was - examined Sarah after
she was convicted.
Q. Was that in anticipation of sentencing?

A. It was.
Let me back up. I said I don't recall. I argued that issue based on the
evidence that did come in that Sarah would not -loved her parents and
wouldn't kill them, and there was no evidence despite what they may have
seen to show that she would have. But presenting expert testimony along the
lines of, wel- bringing an expert in who would say that young gals, teenage
girls, just don't kill their parents, I'm sure that we did not do that.
Q. Do you think it takes an expert to know that's true?
A. No, I don't. That's why I argued it based on the evidence that we did have
come in.
Deposition of Robert Pangburn, p. 45:1- p. 47:14.
The same two-prong standard set forth above regarding ineffective assistance
claims applies to this claim. To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of
showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Cooke v. State 2010 WL 610467, 11-12 (Idaho App. 2010) (citing Aragon
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v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)); Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 162,
139 P.3d 762, 764 (Ct. App. 2006). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of
the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Suits, 143
Idaho at 162, 139 P.3d at 764. Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific
facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v.

State, 125 Idaho 644,649,873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994).
The decision of what witnesses to callI/is an area where [the court] will not
second guess counsel without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Payne, 146
Idaho 548,563, 199 P.3d 123, 138 (2008) (quoting State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 234,628
P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981)). See also Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34,38, 121 P.3d 965, 969 (Ct.
App. 2005) (JIlt is generally agreed that the decision of what evidence should be
introduced at trial is considered strategic or tactical.") (citing American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-5.2).
Here, Johnson has provided no evidence which suggests that the failure to call
Dr. Worst resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance or other shortcomings.
Indeed, Dr. Worst's affidavit does not establish that the issue was even discussed with
defense counsel before or during the guilt phase. Thus, this court concludes that such
evidence was not "readily available" to the defense team. Moreover, Pangburn's
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testimony as set forth above establishes that he talked about the rarity of a young girl
killing both her parents with numerous individuals, including Nancy Grace on CNN.
Pangburn's failure to call an expert to establish that fact was purely tactical, as he noted:
A. . .. bringing an expert in who would say that young gals, teenage girls, just
don't kill their parents, I'm sure that we did not do that.

Q. Do you think it takes an expert to know that's true?
A. No, I don't. That's why I argued it based on the evidence that we did have
corne in.
Therefore, the presumption that counsel's performance fell within the acceptable range
of professional assistance leads the court to conclude that failing to introduce expert
testimony did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Beyond that, I/[i]n determining whether an attorney's failure to pursue a [course
of action] in the underlying criminal action constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel,
this [c]ourt may consider whether the [course of action] would have been successful."

Cooke v. State, 2010 WL 610467,11-12 supra, (citing Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709,713,
905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995); Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634,637
(Ct. App. 1993). If this court determines that the offer of Dr. Worst's testimony, if
pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, then generally counsel will not
be found deficient for failing to pursue it and the petitioner could not have been
prejudiced by the lack of pursuit. Cook v. State (citing Sanchez, 127 Idaho at 713,905 P.2d
at 646; Huck, 124 Idaho at 158-59, 857 P.2d at 637-38).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

16 \'-\,r:f\

This court concludes that testimony as proffered in Dr. Worst's affidavit would
not have been admitted in any event. This court determines that such evidence would
not have been admissible because statistical evidence relating to typical perpetrators of
parricide is not relevant to whether Johnson, in particular, murdered her parents. See

State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 33, 909 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting evidence of
II

expert testimony regarding whether a defendant fits an alleged' sexual offender

profile' has been almost universally rejected in other jurisdictions.").
Therefore, the claim that Pangburn was ineffective for failure to introduce expert
testimony regarding the very rare incidence of parricide is DISMISSED.
C.

Appellate Counsel's Failure to Raise and Challenge Sufficiency of
Evidence to Support Aiding and Abetting Instruction.

a. Legal Standards Applicable to Appellate Counsel Claims.
A defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on a
direct appeal as a matter of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.s. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830 (1985).
Johnson's claims that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because
appointed counsel should have raised additional issues on appeal are subject to the
standards set forth in Strickland. Therefore, Johnson must show that appellate counsel's
performance was deficient and caused prejudice in the outcome of the appeal. Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.s. 685, 697-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1851-52 (2002); Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,
297,92 P.3d 542,547 (Ct. App. 2004).
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An indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed
appellate counsel to press all nonfrivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to
pursue. Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 660, 168 P.3d 40, 44 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Jones

v. Barnes, 463 U.s. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983). Rather, the process of winnowing
out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on those more likely to prevail, far from
being the evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy. Id.
(citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.s. 527, 536, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667 (1986)). "Notwithstanding

Barnes, it is still possible to bring a Strickland claim based on counsel's failure to raise a
particular claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent." Smith

v. Robbins, 528 U.s. 259, 288, 120 S.Ct. 746, 765 (2000). "[O]nly when ignored issues are
clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of
counsel be overcome." Id. (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644,646 (7th Cir.1986)).

b. The Evidence is Sufficient to Create an Issue of Fact on this Claim.
The court has reviewed the record in this case and determines that it will wait
until trial to pass upon the merits of this claim. The court recognizes that claims against
appellate counsel are difficult to establish; however, the question of whether there were
sufficient facts in the record to support the aiding and abetting instruction is incumbent
upon the review of the factual record and this court's consideration of the intent/review
by appellate counsel. Such matters are fact-driven and require a trial to judge matters
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of credibility and weight. As such, the court DENIES summary disposition on this
claim.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, the state of Idaho's motion for summary
dismissal is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Johnson's motion for summary
disposition is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

c?/i1.ay of May,

District Judge
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Case No. CV 06-324

Scheduling Conference Hearing
2:07 Christopher Simms for petitioner, Jessica Lorello for the State of Idaho. Court
reviews case with Counsel.
2:09 Court addresses Counsel in regards to order that was emailed to the law clerk some
time ago. Counsels discuss some issues that need clarification.
2:19 Court wants to schedule case for trial. Ms. Lorello is available October 12,2010;

Mr. Simms is not available on that day. Trial will be November 30, 2010 at 9:00 am, for
4 days, Civil Pretrial November 8, 2010 at 10:30 am. Counsel to be present however if
Mr. Simms is not available Court will reset to another date. Court will send out
scheduling order, if Counsel has issues with the scheduling deadlines they may schedule
it up for a hearing or stipulate to the changes. Ms. Lorello has no other issues for today,
neither does Mr. Simms.
2:26 Court in recess.
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Jo/ynn Drag., Olerk DIBtriot
Oourt Sllln, Ooun ,Idaho

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

The Court, having considered the Petitioner's and Respondent's cross
motions for summary disposition, and after conducting a hearing on said motions,
hereby enters the following order:
In Petitioner's Memorandum Response to Respondent's Motion for
Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief ("Response"), the Petitioner conceded the state is entitled to summary
dismissal of the following claims:

(1) "Violation of Petitioner's Right to Due

Process of Law Relating to Judicial Bias" and the. "related claim of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Move for Disqualification for Cause"
(Response, pp.3, 27) as alleged in paragraph 12 of Petitioner's Second
Amended

Petition

for

Post-Conviction

Relief ("Petition");

(2)

"Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Adequately Cross Examine Matt Johnson"
(Response, pp.3, 17, 27) as ,alleged in paragraph 16.a.iv of the Petition; and (3)
"All allegations of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Dealing with Fingerprint
Evidence" (Response, Ipp.3-4, 20, 27) as alleged in paragraph 18 of the Petition
except for the allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to "elicit from the
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Defense Fingerprint Expert his opinion that latent prints found on the tools of
murder were fresh prints" (Response, p.4). Based on Petitioner's concessions,
the state's motion for summary dismissal of the foregoing claims is GRANTED.
In Petitioner's Memorandum Reply to Respondent's Memorandum in
Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Dismissal ("Reply"), she also
conceded the state is entitled to summary dismissal of her claims that (1) trial
counsel were ineffective for failing to lay a proper foundation for psychological
opinion evidence (Petition, p.17,

1f

19); (2) trial counsel were ineffective in

"dealing with the aiding and abetting theory of guilt" (Petition, pp.18-20,

1f 1f 20-

21); and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the district
court's denial of her motion to suppress (Petition, p.22,

1f

25).

(Reply, p.2.)

Based on Petitioner's concessions, the state's motion for summary dismissal of
the foregoing claims is GRANTED.
At argument, Petitioner also conceded the state is entitled to summary
dismissal of her allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Terri
Sanders as a witness as alleged in paragraph 17.a of the Petition because,
although not called by the defense, Ms. Sanders was called as a witness at trial
and was cross-examined by the defense. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, pp.2650-2659.) The
state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that counsel was
ineffective for failing to call Ms. Sanders as a witness is, therefore, GRANTED.
The state's motion for summary dismissal is likewise GRANTED as to
Petitioner's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Stephanie
Hoffman, Rick Olsen, or Linda O'Connor's thirteen-year-old son as witnesses as
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alleged in paragraphs 17b-d of the Petition because Petitioner has failed to raise
a genuine issue of material fact that counsel was deficient for failing to call any of
these witnesses or that she was prejudiced as a result thereof.
With respect to the state's assertion that certain claims should be
dismissed as untimely, the Court DENIES the state's motion as to Claims One

,-r 10)), Two ("Trial Court Lacked

("Petitioner is Innocent" (Petition, p.3,
Jurisdiction" (Petition, pp.3-4,

,-r 11 )), Three ("Violation of Petitioner's Right to Due

Process of Law" (Petition, ppA-6, ,-r,-r 12-13), Six ("Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Failing to Lay a Proper Foundation for Psycological [sic] Opinion
Evidence" (Petition, p.17,

,-r 19», Nine ("Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in

Failure to Utilize Readily Available Psychiatric Evidence" (Petition, pp.20-21,

,-r

23)), and Ten ("Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Due to Violation of Rules
of Professional Conduct" (Petition, p.21,

,-r 24)), but the Court will take under

advisement whether Claim Eight ("Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in
Investigating the Allegation of Deputy Coroner Steven Pankey" (Petition, p.20,

~

22)), and that portion of Claim Twelve asserting a newly discovered evidence
claim based upon the allegations of Mr. Pankey (Petition, pp.24-25,

,-r 30), should

be dismissed based upon the statute of limitation.
The state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim of actual
innocence as alleged in paragraph 10 of the Petition, to the extent it is intended
as an independent claim rather than argument, is GRANTED. An assertion of
actual innocence does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act.
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The state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that the
"Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Try, Convict and Sentence Petitioner" as
alleged in paragraph 11 of the Petition is GRANTED.

The crime with which

Petitioner was charged resulted in an automatic waiver to adult court. As such,
contrary to Petitioner's assertion, no waiver hearing was required in order to
confer jurisdiction on the district court that presided over Petitioner's criminal
case. I.C. § 20-505(5); I.C. § 20-509(1)(a); I.C. § 20-508(1)(b); In re Doe, 147
Idaho 243,248,207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,978
P.2d 214 (1999); State v. Anderson, 108 Idaho 454, 458, 700 P.2d 76, 80 (Ct.
App.1985).
The state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that her due
process and confrontation rights were violated as a result of the district court's
limitation on the cross-examination of Bruno Santos (Petition, p.6,

,-r

13) is

GRANTED because this claim could have been raised on direct appeal and, as
such, it is barred from consideration in post-conviction pursuant to I.C. § 194901 (b). The Court rejects Petitioner's assertion that the Idaho Supreme Court's
opinions in Beam v. State, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), and Hoffman v.
State, 125 Idaho 188, 868 P.2d 516 (1994), compel a contrary conclusion and
the Court specifically finds that both Beam and Hoffman support dismissal of this
claim based on I.C. § 19-4901 (b).
The state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the re-enactment proffered by
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state's witness Rod Englert as alleged in paragraph 15.b of the Petition is
GRANTED.
The state's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that
counsel was ineffective due to alleged violations of the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct "by communicating with the media in a self promotional
manner" (Petition, p.21,

~

21), is GRANTED.

The Court will take under advisement whether summary disposition of
Petitioner's Claim Eight ("Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in Investigating
the Allegation of Deputy Coroner Steven Pankey" (Petition, p.20,

~

22)), Claim

Nine ("Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in Failure to Utilize Readily
~

Available Psychiatric Evidence" (Petition, pp.20-21,

23)), and Claim Eleven

("Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel" for failing to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support an aiding and abetting instruction (Petition,
p.22,

~

26)), is appropriate.

Both the Petitioner's and the Respondent's motions for summary
disposition of the following claims are DENIED, and the Court intends to conduct
an evidentiary hearing on those claims:
(1)

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a continuance
after learning the comforter had not been collected as evidence as
alleged in paragraph 15.a of the Petition;

(2)

Ineffective

assistance

of counsel

for failing

to

adequately

investigate the scientific basis for the coconut experiment as
alleged in paragraph 15.c of the Petition;
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(3)

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present expert
testimony regarding the comforters as alleged in paragraph 15.d of
the Petition;

(4)

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately crossexamine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry
"Walt" Femling, Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo
Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez,
Carlos Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart Robinson
as alleged in paragraph 16 of the Petition.

(5)

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire whether
certain previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh" as alleged in
paragraph 18 of the Petition.

(6)

Newly discovered evidence relating to the recent identification of
Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously unidentified
latent prints as alleged in paragraph 29 of the Petition.

DATED this

f1 O~01
day

0,

Honorable G. Richard Bevan
District Judge
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH JOHNSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV -06-324

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE
OF TRIAL SETTING AND PRETRIAL ORDER

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 and 40, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1.

TRIAL:

This case is set for a COURT TRIAL to begin at 9:00 a.m.,

November 30, 2010, in Courtroom No.1, Theron Ward Judicial Building, 427
Shoshone Street North, Twin Fal/s, Idaho. A total of ~ days have been reserved. On
the first day of trial, counsel shall report to the Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief
final pre-trial conference. Unless otherwise ordered, other than the first and last day of
trial, proceedings will convene at 9:00 a.m. each morning, and adjourn at approximately
2:30 p.m. each afternoon. Two brief recesses will be taken at approximately 10:30 a.m.
and 12:30 p.m.
2.

ALTERNATE JUDGES: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge

assigned to this case intends to utilize the provisions of I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1 )(G). Notice is
also given that if there are multiple parties, any disqualification pursuant to I.R.C.P.
40(d)(1)(A) is subject to a prior determination under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(C). The panel of
alternate judges consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been
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disqualified in this action:

Judges Butler, Brody, Crabtree, Higer, Hurlbutt, Meehl,

Stoker, St. Clair, Wildman and Wood.

3.

PRETRIAL

CONFERENCES:

A Status/ADR conference will

be

conducted pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 at 9:00 a.m., Monday, . The final pre-trial conference
will be conducted pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 at 10:30 a.m., Monday, November 8,2010 at
10:30

TRIAL

am.

COUNSEL

MUST

ATTEND

THE

FINAL

PRE-TRIAL

CONFERENCE IN PERSON; TELEPHONE CONFERENCES ARE NOT ALLOWED
FOR ANY PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE. Counsel for each party is to complete a "Pre-

trial Memorandum" pursuant to Rule 16(d) for the final pre-trial conference.

The

memorandum shall be filed with the Clerk no later than seven (7) days before the pretrial conference.
4.

PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS: All motions to join parties or amend the pleadings

(except motions pertaining to punitive damages under I.C. §6-1604) must be filed and
heard so as not to require the continuance or vacation of the trial date, and in no event
less than ninety (90) days before trial. All motions for summary judgment and motions
to add claims for punitive damages pursuant to I.C. §6-1604 must be filed and served
so as to be heard not later than sixty (60) days before trial. All other non-dispositive
pre-trial motions (including, but not limited to motions in limine) must be filed and
scheduled for hearing not less than fourteen (14) days before trial. Exceptions will be
granted infrequently, and only when justice so requires.
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5.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
a. The party moving for summary judgment shall prepare as separate
documents: (a) motion, (b) legal memorandum containing a written
statement of reasons in support of the motion, and (c) a concise
statement of the material facts. Each statement of a fact shall include
a reference to the particular place in the record which supports that
fact. The legal memorandum shall include a statement, supported by
authority, of the elements of any claim or defense relevant to the
motion.
b. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall prepare as
separate documents: (a) legal memorandum containing a written
statement of reasons in opposition to the motion, and (b) a concise
statement of the facts which are genuine issues of material fact and/or
which are material facts omitted from the moving party's statement of
facts. Each statement of a fact shall include a reference to the
particular place in the record which supports that fact. The legal
memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the
elements of any claim or defense relevant to the motion.
c. The schedule for service of briefs and affidavits set forth in Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 (c) is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
i. The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at
least thirty-five (35) days before the time fixed for the hearing.

ii. If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the
party must do so at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date
of the hearing. The adverse party shall also serve an answering
brief at least 21 days prior to the date of the hearing.
iii. The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief not less
than 14 days before the date of the hearing.

d. The hearing on a motion for summary judgment will be set AFTER the
moving party has submitted the motion, legal memorandum and
statement of facts. The hearing date can then be obtained from the
judge's court clerk. This pertains to all motions for summary judgment,
and motions for partial summary judgment.
e. Each party will be allotted thirty (30) minutes for oral argument.
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6.

SCHEDULING AND HEARINGS. The Court holds its regular civil law and

motion calendar each Monday (or Wednesday following holidays) at 9:00 a.m. Absent
an order shortening time, all motions must be filed and served at least fourteen (14)
days prior to hearing. As a matter of courtesy, counsel are expected to contact the
Court's Deputy Clerk, Sharie Cooper (phone 208-736-4162) to schedule hearings, and
to confirm the availability of opposing counsel for proposed hearing dates.

As an

accommodation to out-of-town counsel and parties, hearings on any pretrial motion
(except motions for summary judgment or hearings at which testimony is to be offered)
may be conducted by telephone conference call pursuant to I,R.C.P. 7(b)(4). Counsel
requesting a hearing by conference call will be responsible for arranging for placement
of the call, and the cost thereof. Arrangements for telephone conference of any status
conference must be pre-arranged by the Wednesday preceding the date of the status
conference.
7.

LEGAL BRIEFING AND MEMORANDUM:

A "judge's copy" of any

memoranda or affidavits will be provided for use by the court. All such documents shall
be clearly marked as "JUDGE'S COPY,"
8.

DISCOVERY AND DISCOVERY DISPUTES: The Court will not entertain

any discovery motion unless accompanied by a written certification signed by counsel,
which confirms that a reasonable effort has been made to voluntarily resolve the dispute
with opposing counsel.

A party's obligation to fully and timely respond to discovery

requests is distinct from any obligation imposed by this order, and no party may rely
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upon the Order or any deadline it imposes as justification for failing to timely respond to
discovery requests or to supplement prior responses.
9.

DISCOVERY CUT ·OFFS:

Absent a stipulation to the contrary, all

discovery shall be propounded and served such that responses are due no later than
thirty (30) days before trial. Any supplemental responses a party is required to make
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(e) or the terms of an earlier discovery request shall also be
served at least thirty (30) days before trial. Any supplementation of discovery required
by the rule shall be made in a timely manner.
10.

WITNESS DISCLOSURES: Each party shall disclose the existence and

identity of intended or potential expert or lay witnesses to the extent required by
interrogatories or other discovery requests propounded by another party. There is no
independent duty to disclose expert or lay witnesses except as required to adequately
respond to discovery requests or supplement prior responses.

If discovery requests

seeking disclosure of expert witnesses are propounded, a plaintiff upon whom such
requests are served shall, in good faith, disclose the existence and identity of potential
or intended expert witnesses at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than one
hundred-twenty (120) days before trial. A defendant upon whom such requests are
served shall, in good faith, identify any potential or intended expert witnesses at the
earliest opportunity, and in no event later than seventy-five (75) days before trial.
Any party upon whom discovery is served who intends or reserves the right to
call any expert witness in rebuttal or surrebuttal shall, in good faith, identify such experts
at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than forty-two (42) days before trial.
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Any party upon whom discovery requests are served seeking disclosure of lay
witnesses shall, in good faith, disclose the identity of all such witnesses at the earliest
opportunity, and in no event later than forty-two (42) days before trial.

Absent a

showing of good cause and a lack of unfair prejudice to any other party, any witness
who has not been timely disclosed will not be permitted to testify at trial.
11.

EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS:

When and to the extent required to

respond to interrogatories, requests for production or other discovery requests
propounded by another party, a party must identify and disclose any documentary,
tangible or other exhibits that party intends or reserves the right to offer at trial. Absent
a showing of good cause and a lack of unfair prejudice to all other parties, any exhibit
which has not been timely disclosed will be excluded.

Without regard to whether

discovery concerning a party's exhibits has been propounded, not less than seven (7)
days prior to trial, each party shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk a completed exhibit list in
the form attached to this order (Exh. 1 attached) together with one complete, duplicate
marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Judge's use during trial; and (8)
deliver to counsel for each other party a copy of the completed exhibit list and duplicate
copy of that party's marked exhibits. The exhibit list and duplicate copies need not
include exhibits which will be offered solely for the purpose of impeachment. Unless
otherwise ordered, the plaintiff shall identify exhibits beginning with number "1," and the
defendant shall utilize exhibits beginning with number "1000."
12. WITNESS LIST. Without regard to whether discovery concerning a party's
witnesses has been propounded, not less than seven (7) days prior to trial, each party
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shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk a completed witness list together with a copy for the
Judge's use during trial; and (B) deliver to Counsel for each other party a copy of the
completed witness list.
13.

AUDIO-VISUAL AND OTHER EQUIPMENT.

Counsel are expected to

notify the Court no later than the pretrial conference of any need for audio-visual or
other special equipment.

The Court provides a portable television and VHS-format

VCR, a small x-ray viewer, easel and podium. Counsel may furnish and utilize any
additional equipment but must make all such equipment available for use by opposing
counsel.

Counsel who furnishes their own equipment should make appropriate

arrangements to set it up in advance so that prolonged delays are not required.
14.

JURY SELECTION AND VOIR DIRE:

Unless otherwise ordered, the

struck jury selection method will be utilized. Absent an order to the contrary, in cases
expected to last less than five (5) trial days, one additional/alternate juror will be chosen.
A list of the names and selected information concerning prospective jurors can be
obtained from Jerry Woolley, Twin Falls County Jury Commissioner, P.O. Box 126, Twin
Falls, Idaho 83303 (phone:

208-736-4136) approximately one week before trial.

In

accordance with I.R.C.P. 47(i)(1), counsel for each party may make a brief (one- to twominute) non-argumentative statement to the entire jury panel before voir dire
examination begins in which counsel introduce themselves and their clients, and briefly
describe the nature of the case. The Court will conduct brief initial voir dire examination
designed to confirm that all summoned jurors are qualified to serve, and cannot be
disqualified for obvious bias.

Thereafter, plaintiff will voir dire the entire jury panel,
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followed by defendant.

In cases involving multiple parties, co-plaintiffs and co-

defendants are encouraged to consolidate and coordinate their voir dire examination.
Challenges for cause may be made at any time while examining a prospective juror, but
in no event later than the conclusion of questioning of the challenged juror. Pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 47U) each party shall have four peremptory challenges, plus one additional
preemptory challenge for each additional/alternate juror to be selected provided that
multiple co-plaintiffs or co-defendants may be required to share a given number of
peremptory challenges as determined at the pre-trial conference. Absent extraordinary
circumstances, the parties will be limited to 75 minutes per side for voir dire, provided,
however, that the Court may, in its discretion, limit or terminate voir dire which. is
excessive, repetitious, unreasonable, or argumentative.

15.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Jury instructions and verdict forms requested by

a party shall be prepared in conformity with I.R.C.P. 51 (a), and shall be filed with the
Clerk (with copies to Chambers) at least seven (7) days before trial. Counsel shall also
include a floppy computer disc containing the instructions for use by the court.
Requested instructions not timely submitted may not be included in the court's
preliminary or final charge. Parties may submit additional or supplemental instructions
to address unforeseen issues or disputes arising during trial. To the extent possible,
proposed instructions and verdict forms shall be printed in 11-point, "Times New
Roman" typeface like that contained in this order.

The Court has prepared "stock"

instructions, copies of which can be obtained upon request. The parties may, but are
not required to submit additional stock instructions.
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16.

JUROR QUESTIONS: In accordance with I.R.C.P. 47(q), it is the Court's

usual practice to permit jurors to submit written questions to be posed to trial witnesses
in accordance with the Rule. Counsel are permitted to review §ll questions before they
are posed to a witness, and register any objection or comment on the record in the
absence of the jury before any juror questions are posed.

After a witness has

responded to any juror questions, counsel are permitted (beginning with the party who
called the witness) to pose follow-up questions provoked by juror questions or witness
responses.
17.

TRIAL BRIEFS:

The Court encourages (but does not require) the

submission of trial briefs which address important substantive or evidentiary issues
each party expects to arise during trial. Any trial briefs shall be prepared, exchanged
between the parties, and lodged with the Clerk (with copies to Chambers) at least ten
(10) days prior to trial.
18.

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: If the trial is to the Court

without a jury, each party shall, within fourteen (14) days before trial, file with the Clerk
(with copies to Chambers) and serve upon all other parties Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law which support that party's position concerning the appropriate
resolution of the case. The parties may submit supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law after the case is completed.
19.

REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING: In setting cases for trial, the

Court has taken into account the needs of the parties and the case, availability and
convenience of counsel, as well as its own personnel, facilities and the interests of

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND
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counsel and parties in other pending cases. A request to vacate or continue an existing
trial setting works inconveniences and hardships on the Court, its staff and other
litigants, and impairs the Court's ability to efficiently manage its docket and calendar.
For these reasons, requests (including stipulations) to vacate or continue a trial will be
granted only in the face of unusual and unforeseen circumstances, and when the
interests of substantial justice to the litigants so require.

Any party requesting or

stipulating to vacate a trial setting must submit a specific written statement concerning

the reasons for the request, and must certify, in writing, that the request or stipulation
has been discussed with the parties represented by counsel, and such parties have no
objection to the request or stipulation. An order granting a request to vacate or continue
a trial setting may be conditioned upon terms (including orders that the requesting party
or attorney reimburse other parties or their attorneys for attorneys fees incurred for
preparation which must be repeated or expenses advanced in anticipation of the trial
setting which cannot be avoided or recovered). An order vacating or continuing a trial
setting shall not serve to alter the deadlines set forth in this order, and unless otherwise
stipulated or ordered, the specific calendar dates associated with any deadlines shall be
adjusted in reference to the new or amended trial date.

20.

JUDICIAL NOTICE: If either party requests the Court to take judicial

notice of any documents not in the post-conviction file, Counsel shall provide, under
separate cover, all such documents for the Court's review.

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND
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21.

SANCTIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE: A failure to comply with this

order or the deadlines it imposes in a timely manner subject a non-compliant party
and/or counsel to an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(i) and/or other
applicable rules, statutes or case precedent.

DATED this 20th day of July, 2010.

-

~~~
-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned certifies that on the 20th day of July, 2010 she caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING
AND INITIAL PRE-TRIAL ORDER to be served upon the following persons in the

following manner:

~~o~r'~
Deputy Clerk

Petitioner's Counsel:
Christopher Simms
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 1861
Hailey, ID 83333

Mailed~

Courthouse Mailbox,--_

Faxed- -

Courthouse Mailbox._ _

Faxed. _ -

Respondent's Counsel:
Jessica Lorello
Deputy Attorney General
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Mailed-X-
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_ _ _ _ _ _, DISTRICT JUDGE
_ _ _ _ _ _, DEPUTY CLERK
_ _ _ _ _ _, COURT REPORTER
CASE:

NO

ExmBITLIST
CASE NO. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

DATE:
VS.

DESCRIPTION

DATE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 1r4:::-;-;--;::;;-=--_ _
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

F' LED.

A.~-::;--,--.

P.rv ..

SEP i 3 2010
SARAH JOHNSON,

)

JoJynn Dra
Court 8!;o:!ni3

)
) Case No. CV-06-324
)
) AMENDED
) SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE
) OF TRIAL SETTING AND PRE) TRIAL ORDER

Petitioner,
vs
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 and 40, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1.

TRIAL:

This case is set for a COURT TRIAL to begin at 9:00 a.m.,

December 7, 2010, in Courtroom No.1, Theron Ward Judicial Building, 427

Shoshone Street North, Twin Falls, Idaho. A total of ~ days have been reserved. On
the first day of trial, counsel shall report to the Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief
final pre-trial conference. Unless otherwise ordered, other than the first and last day of
trial, proceedings will convene at 9:00 a.m. each morning, and adjourn at approximately
2:30 p.m. each afternoon. Two brief recesses will be taken at approximately 10:30 a.m.
and 12:30 p.m.
2.

ALTERNATE JUDGES: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge

assigned to this case intends to utilize the provisions of I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1 )(G). Notice is
also given that if there are multiple parties, any disqualification pursuant to I.R.C.P.
40(d)(1 )(A) is subject to a prior determination under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1 )(C). The panel of
alternate judges consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been

~y\kJ.
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disqualified in this action:

Judges Butler, Brody, Crabtree, Higer, Hurlbutt, Meehl,

Stoker, St. Clair, Wildman and Wood.
3.

PRETRIAL CONFERENCES: The pre-trial conference will be conducted

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 at 10:30 a.m., Monday, November 8,2010 at 10:30 am. TRIAL
COUNSEL MUST ATTEND THE FINAL PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE IN PERSON;
TELEPHONE CONFERENCES ARE
CONFERENCE.

NOT ALLOWED

FOR

ANY

PRE-TRIAL

Counsel for each party is to complete a "Pre-trial Memorandum"

pursuant to Rule 16(d) for the final pre-trial conference. The memorandum shall be filed
with the Clerk no later than seven (7) days before the pre-trial conference.
4.

PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS: All motions to join parties or amend the pleadings

(except motions pertaining to punitive damages under I.C. §6-1604) must be filed and
heard so as not to require the continuance or vacation of the trial date, and in no event
less than ninety (90) days before trial. All motions for summary judgment and motions
to add claims for punitive damages pursuant to I.C. §6-1604 must be filed and served
so as to be heard not later than sixty (60) days before trial. All other non-dispositive
pre-trial motions (including, but not limited to motions in limine) must be filed and
scheduled for hearing not less than fourteen (14) days before trial. Exceptions will be
granted infrequently, and only when justice so requires.

ArolV\M
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5.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
a. The party moving for summary judgment shall prepare as separate
documents: (a) motion, (b) legal memorandum containing a written
statement of reasons in support of the motion, and (c) a concise
statement of the material facts. Each statement of a fact shall include
a reference to the particular place in the record which supports that
fact. The legal memorandum shall include a statement, supported by
authority, of the elements of any claim or defense relevant to the
motion.
b. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall prepare as
separate documents: (a) legal memorandum containing a written
statement of reasons in opposition to the motion, and (b) a concise
statement of the facts which are genuine issues of material fact and/or
which are material facts omitted from the moving party's statement of
facts. Each statement of a fact shall include a reference to the
particular place in the record which supports that fact. The legal
memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the
elements of any claim or defense relevant to the motion.
c. The schedule for service of briefs and affidavits set forth in Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(c) is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
i. The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at
least thirty-five (35) days before the time fixed for the hearing.
ii. If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the
party must do so at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date
of the hearing. The adverse party shall also serve an answering
brief at least 21 days prior to the date of the hearing.
iii. The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief not less
than 14 days before the date of the hearing.
d. The hearing on a motion for summary judgment will be set AFTER the
moving party has submitted the motion, legal memorandum and
statement of facts. The hearing date can then be obtained from the
judge's court clerk. This pertains to all motions for summary judgment,
and motions for partial summary judgment.
e. Each party will be allotted thirty (30) minutes for oral argument.

s~g~G
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6.

SCHEDULING AND HEARINGS. The Court holds its regular civil law and

motion calendar each Monday (or Wednesday following holidays) at 9:00 a.m. Absent
an order shortening time, all motions must be filed and served at least fourteen (14)
days prior to hearing. As a matter of courtesy, counsel are expected to contact the
Court's Deputy Clerk, Sharie Cooper (phone 208-736-4162) to schedule hearings, and
to confirm the availability of opposing counsel for proposed hearing dates.

As an

accommodation to out-of-town counsel and parties, hearings on any pretrial motion
(except motions for summary judgment or hearings at which testimony is to be offered)
may be conducted by telephone conference call pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(4). Counsel
requesting a hearing by conference call will be responsible for arranging for placement
of the call, and the cost thereof. Arrangements for telephone conference of any status
conference must be pre-arranged by the Wednesday preceding the date of the status
conference.

7.

LEGAL BRIEFING AND MEMORANDUM:

A "judge's copy" of any

memoranda or affidavits will be provided for use by the court. All such documents shall
be clearly marked as "JUDGE'S COPY."

8.

DISCOVERY AND DISCOVERY DISPUTES: The Court will not entertain

any discovery motion unless accompanied by a written certification signed by counsel,
which confirms that a reasonable effort has been made to voluntarily resolve the dispute
with opposing counsel.

A party's obligation to fully and timely respond to discovery

requests is distinct from any obligation imposed by this order, and no party may rely

.lJ-
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upon the Order or any deadline it imposes as justification for failing to timely respond to
discovery requests or to supplement prior responses.
9.

DISCOVERY CUT -OFFS:

Absent a stipulation to the contrary, all

discovery shall be propounded and served such that responses are due no later than
thirty (30) days before trial. Any supplemental responses a party is required to make
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(e) or the terms of an earlier discovery request shall also be
served at least thirty (30) days before trial. Any supplementation of discovery required
by the rule shall be made in a timely manner.
10.

WITNESS DISCLOSURES: Each party shall disclose the existence and

identity of intended or potential expert or lay witnesses to the extent required by
interrogatories or other discovery requests propounded by another party. There is no
independent duty to disclose expert or lay witnesses except as required to adequately
respond to discovery requests or supplement prior responses.

If discovery requests

seeking disclosure of expert witnesses are propounded, a plaintiff upon whom such
requests are served shall, in good faith, disclose the existence and identity of potential
or intended expert witnesses at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than one
hundred-twenty (120) days before trial.

A defendant upon whom such requests are

served shall, in good faith, identify any potential or intended expert witnesses at the
earliest opportunity, and in no event later than seventy-five (75) days before trial.
Any party upon whom discovery is served who intends or reserves the right to
call any expert witness in rebuttal or surrebuttal shall, in good faith, identify such experts
at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than forty-two (42) days before trial.

~~
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Any party upon whom discovery requests are served seeking disclosure of lay
witnesses shall, in good faith, disclose the identity of all such witnesses at the earliest
opportunity, and in no event later than forty-two (42) days before trial.

Absent a

showing of good cause and a lack of unfair prejudice to any other party, any witness
who has not been timely disclosed will not be permitted to testify at trial.
11.

EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS:

When and to the extent required to

respond to interrogatories, requests for production or other discovery requests
propounded by another party, a party must identify and disclose any documentary,
tangible or other exhibits that party intends or reserves the right to offer at trial. Absent
a showing of good cause and a lack of unfair prejudice to all other parties, any exhibit
which has not been timely disclosed will be excluded.

Without regard to whether

discovery concerning a party's exhibits has been propounded, not less than seven (7)
days prior to trial, each party shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk a completed exhibit list in
the form attached to this order (Exh. 1 attached) together with one complete, duplicate
marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Judge's use during trial; and (8)
deliver to counsel for each other party a copy of the completed exhibit list and duplicate
copy of that party's marked exhibits. The exhibit list and duplicate copies need not
include exhibits which will be offered solely for the purpose of impeachment. Unless
otherwise ordered, the plaintiff shall identify exhibits beginning with number "1," and the
defendant shall utilize exhibits beginning with number "1000."
12. WITNESS LIST. Without regard to whether discovery concerning a party's
witnesses has been propounded, not less than seven (7) days prior to trial, each party

~LJ-.
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shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk a completed witness list together with a copy for the
Judge's use during trial; and (8) deliver to Counsel for each other party a copy of the
completed witness list.

13.

AUDIO-VISUAL AND OTHER EQUIPMENT.

Counsel are expected to

notify the Court no later than the pretrial conference of any need for audio-visual or
other special equipment.

The Court provides a portable television and VHS-format

VCR, a small x-ray viewer, easel and podium. Counsel may furnish and utilize any
additional equipment but must make all such equipment available for use by opposing
counsel.

Counsel who furnishes their own equipment should make appropriate

arrangements to set it up in advance so that prolonged delays are not required.

14.

TRIAL BRIEFS:

The Court encourages (but does not require) the

submission of trial briefs which address important substantive or evidentiary issues
each party expects to arise during trial. Any trial briefs shall be prepared, exchanged
between the parties, and lodged with the Clerk (with copies to Chambers) at least ten
(10) days prior to trial.

15.

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: If the trial is to the Court

without a jury, each party shall, within fourteen (14) days before trial, file with the Clerk
(with copies to Chambers) and serve upon all other parties Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law which support that party's position concerning the appropriate
resolution of the case. The parties may submit supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law after the case is completed.

~~
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16.

REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING: In setting cases for trial, the

Court has taken into account the needs of the parties and the case, availability and
convenience of counsel, as well as its own personnel, facilities and the interests of
counsel and parties in other pending cases. A request to vacate or continue an existing
trial setting works inconveniences and hardships on the Court, its staff and other
litigants, and impairs the Court's ability to efficiently manage its docket and calendar.
For these reasons, requests (including stipulations) to vacate or continue a trial will be
granted only in the face of unusual and unforeseen circumstances, and when the
interests of substantial justice to the litigants so require.

Any party requesting or

stipulating to vacate a trial setting must submit a specific written statement concerning

the reasons for the request, and must certify, in writing, that the request or stipulation
has been discussed with the parties represented by counsel, and such parties have no
objection to the request or stipulation. An order granting a request to vacate or continue
a trial setting may be conditioned upon terms (including orders that the requesting party
or attorney reimburse other parties or their attorneys for attorneys fees incurred for
preparation which must be repeated or expenses advanced in anticipation of the trial
setting which cannot be avoided or recovered). An order vacating or continuing a trial
setting shall not serve to alter the deadlines set forth in this order, and unless otherwise
stipulated or ordered, the specific calendar dates associated with any deadlines shall be
adjusted in reference to the new or amended trial date.

~~
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17.

JUDICIAL NOTICE: If either party requests the Court to take judicial

notice of any documents not in the post-conviction file, Counsel shall provide, under
separate cover, all such documents for the Court's review.

18.

SANCTIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE: A failure to comply with this

order or the deadlines it imposes in a timely manner subject a non-compliant party
and/or counsel to an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(i) and/or other
applicable rules, statutes or case precedent.

DATED this 8th day of Septemb

District Judge

~JJORDER'
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NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned certifies that on

the~th day of September, 2010 she caused a

true and correct copy of the foregoing SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL

SETTING AND INITIAL PRE-TRIAL ORDER to be served upon the following persons in
the following manner:

~c~
Sharie Cooper
Deputy Clerk

Petitioner's Counsel:
Christopher Simms
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 1861
Hailey, ID 83333

Mailed

Courthouse Mailbox_ _

Faxed _ _

Courthouse Mailbox._ _

Faxed- -

Respondent's Counsel:
Jessica Lorello
Deputy Attorney General
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Mailed--£-
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_ _ _ _ _ _ , DISTRlCT JUDGE
_ _ _ _ _ _ , DEPUTY CLERK
_ _ _ _ _ _, COURT REPORTER
CASE:
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DATE:
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IFILED}M7§tr

L.AWRENCE G. WASDEN
idaho Attorney General

I

I

STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Chief, Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division

lSEP~~

Jo/ynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

JESSICA M. LORELLO ISB #6554
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051
Deputies Attorney General and
Special Prosecuting Attomeys
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 332-3096
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF BLAINE

)
)
)

SARAH JOHNSON
Petitioner,

Case No. CV-06-324

)

vs.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION
TO RECONSIDER

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special
Prosecuting Attomey for Blaine County, and hereby submits this brief in support of the
state's motion to reconsider.

I.
Background
On February 8, 2010, the state filed a motion for summary dismissal and a
memorandum in support seeking dismissal of all claims in the Petitioner's (IiJohnson")
Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Johnson filed a cross motion for
summary disposition that same day. On April 30, 2010, the court conducted a hearing on
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the parties' motions at which it granted, in part, and denied, in part, the state's motion for
summary dismissal, and took the remaining claims under advisement. The Court entered
a Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Claims Taken Under Advisement
("Memorandum Decision") on May 21, 2010, and memorialized its oral ruling from the
summary disposition hearing in "Its Order on Cross Motions for Summary Disposition
("Order), filed July 19, 2010.

For the reasons set forth below, the state now seeks

reconsideration of that portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision in which the Court
concluded the Petitioner ("Johnson") is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her claim that
counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately cross-examine a number of witnesses as
alleged in paragraph 16 of her second amended petitlon (Order, p.6, 114), and that portion
of the Court's Order in which the Court concluded Johnson is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on her ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim (Memorandum Decision,
pp.17-18).

U.
This Court Should Reconsider Its Prior Ruling Denying The State's Motion For
Summary Dismissal Of Johnson's Claims That Trial Counsel Were Ineffective In CrossExamining WItnesses And Her Claim That Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective And
Dismiss Those Claims Without An Evidentiary Hearing

A.

General Legal Standards Applicable To Motions For Reconsideration
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure permit the filing of "raj motion for

reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court . . . at any time before the
entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final
judgment."

I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B),

1'l.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(8) provides a dfstrict court with

authority to reconsider and vacate interlocutory orders so long as final judgment has not
been entered." Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 785, 69 P.3d 1035
(2003). The trial court is permitted to consider new or additional facts presented with
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the motion. Noreen v. Price Development Co. !..imited Partnership, 135 Idaho 816,820,
25 P.3d 129 (Ct. App. 2001).

The district court has considerable discretion in

determining whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration. Jordan v. Beels, 135
Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908 (Ct. App. 2001). "Generally, post-conviction applications
are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Prooedure." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50,
57,106 P.3d 376 (2004).
B.

The Court Should Reconsider Its Order Denying The State's Motion For
Summary Dismissal Of Johnson's Claim That Counsel Were Ineffective In Failing
To Adeguately Cross-Examine A Number Of Witnesses And Conclude That
Johnson Has Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That Would
Entitle Her To An Evidentiary Hearing On This Claim
In her second amended petition, Johnson alleges counsel failed to adequately

cross-examine a number of witnesses, "inolud[ing] but ... not limited to Matt Johnson,
Alan & Julia Dupuis, EMT Sohel! Elf/son, Sherrif [sic] Walt Femling, Detective Steve
Harkin, Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez (aka Juan
Gonzales)[,] Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez and Carlos Ayala, and also include officers Raul
Ornelas, and Stu Robinson."1 (Second Amended Petition

r Petition") , p.9, 1f 16.)

As

noted in the state's original brief in support of summary dismissal, Johnson falls to
allege any specifiC deficiencies or prejudice in relation to Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis,
Schell Eliison, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Beoky Lopez, or Carlos Ayala.

(See

generally Petition, pp.9-13.) With respect to the remaining witnesses Johnson believes
were inadequately cross-examined - Detective Harkin, Officer Ornelas, Sheriff FemJing,
Consuelo Cedeno, Jane Lopez, Bruno Santos, Officer Robinson, and Officer Kirtley -

Johnson has since conceded she is not entitled to relief on her claim that counsel was
ineffective in relation to the cross--€lxamination of Matt Johnson and the Court has
dismissed this claim. (Order, pp.1-2.)
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while Johnson has highlighted deficiencies she perceives in the cross-examination that
was conducted of each of these witnesses, the allegations in this regard are bare and
conclusory with respect to Johnson's burden of establishing a material issue of fact as
to both deficient performance and prejudice. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, _,226
P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984);
Baldwin v. state, 145 Idaho 148, 153, 177 P.3d 363, 367 (2008»). Bare and conclusory
allegations are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman v.
State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110
Idaho 156, 159. 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826,
702 P.2d 860,864 (Ct. App. 1985).
More importantly, Johnson has failed to offer any evidence as to what any of the
witnesses she complains were not properly cross-examined would have said if the
witnesses had been questioned differently. 'To justify an evidentiary hearing in a postconviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent on the applicant to tender written
statements from potential witnesses who are able to give testimony themselves as to
facts within their knowledge." Selfv. State, 145 Idaho 578, 581,181 P.3d 504,507 (Ct.
App. 2007). Johnson has failed to do so.
To the extent Johnson is claiming counsel were ineffective based upon an
accumulation of the alleged deficiencies in their cross-examination, such an assertion is
insufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing.

At a minimum, Johnson must first

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that she suffered some prejudice as a
result of counsels' cross-examination (or lack of cross-examination).

See Boman v.

State, 129 Idaho 520, 927 P.2d 910 (1996) ("While this Court has recognized the
doctrine of cumulative error, a necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a
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finding of error in the first instance.") (Citations omitted.) Johnson has failed to do so if
for no other reason than because she has failed to provide any evidence of how the
testimony of the witnesses would have been different. Nor have counsel, through their
respective depositions, provided any basis for concluding there is a genuine issue of
material fact relating
evidentiary hearing.

to their cross-examination

strategy that needs to be litigated at an

While one of Johnson's trial attorneys, Mark Rader, certainly

appears ready and willing to concede his own deficiencies, as well as the deficiencies
he perceives vis-ii-vis the entire "defense team" (Deposition of Mark Rader taken June
5, 2009, p.25, L.12 - p.28, L,18), neither Mr. Rader nor Johnson's other trial attorney,
Bob Pangburn, have Identified any specific cross-examination they believe should have
been conducted, or any additional information they could have elicited through crossexamination (see generally Deposition of Mark Rader and DeposItions of Bob Pangburn
taken June 5, 2009, and July 24, 2009).
Because Johnson has failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact that
counsel were deficient in their cross-examination strate91 or that she was prejudiced
as a result, cumulatively or otherwise, she is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
her claims that counsel were ineffective in this regard and the state respectfully
requests this Court reconsider its decision denying the state's motion to summarily
dismiss Johnson's claims that trial counsel were ineffective in cross-examination and
dismiss this claim without an evidentiary hearing.

2 ''Trial counsel's decision of which witnesses to call is encompassed in that aspect of
trial counsel's role denominated 'trial tactics' or 'strategic choices.'" Campbell v. State,
130 idaho 546,548,944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1997) (Citation omitted);
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The Court Should Reconsider Its Order Denying The State's Motion For
Summary Dismissal Of Johnson's Claim That Appellate Counsel Were Ineffective
For Failing To "Argue Insufficient Evidence To Support An Aiding And Abetting
JUry Instruction" And Conclude That Johnson Has Failed To Raise A Genuine
Issue Of Material Fact That Would Entitle Her To An Evidentiary Hearing On This
Claim
In Claim Eleven of her Petition, Johnson alleged appellate counsel were

ineffectiVe for failing to "argue insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting
jury instruction. n3 .(Petition, p.22, 1126.) The entirety of Johnson's allegatIons regarding
this claim reads:
Direct Appeal Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution in failing to argue insufficient
evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction. (See Supreme
Court Opinion State v. Johnson, 188 P.3d 912, footnote NO.2) But for
Appellate Counsel's failure to raise this allegation of error it is more likely
than not the Supreme Court would have reversed the District Court error
and remand the matter for [sic] new trial.
(Petition, p.22, 1126 (punctuation and capitalization origina!).)
The state previously moved for summary dismissal of this claim on the grounds
that it is bare and conclusory. In denying the state's motion, the Court concluded:
The court has reviewed the record in this case and determines that

it will wait until trial to pass upon the merits of this claim. The court
recognizes that claims against appellate counsel are difficult to establish;
however, the question of whether there were sufficient facts in the record
to support the aiding and abetting instruction is incumbent upon the review
of the factual record and this court's consideration of the Intent/review by
appellate counsel. Such matters are fact-driven and require a trial to
judge matters of credibility and weight.

Johnson also asserted appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise "an
allegation of error by the trial court in denying the Motion to Suppress Statement
Against Interest made subsequent to retainer of counsel, Doug Nelson, and Nelson's
issuance of a 'oease and desisf questioning letter" (Petition, p.22, 11 25), but she has
since conceded the state was entitled to summary dismissal of that claim, and the Court
dismissed the claim accordingly (Order, p.2).
3

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER ~ 6

SEP, 30, 2010 3:21PM

HO ATTY GENERAL-SPU

NO, 012

p, 11

(Memorandum Decision. pp.18-19.)
Since the Court issued its Memorandum Decision denying the state's motion to
summarily dismiss Johnson's remaining ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claim, Johnson has since provided the state with an affidavit from one of her appellate
attorneys, Jason Pintler, in which Mr. Pintler indicated he would not be available to
testify at the evidentiary hearing originally scheduled to begin November 30, 2010,4 and
averred, in relevant part:

5.

Had we believed that we could have raised a meritorious argument
on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the instruction, we would
have done so in addition to raising the variance and constructive
amendment arguments;

6.

I reviewed the entirety of the trial transcripts including the portions

containing ML Pangburn's objection to the court giving the aid and abet
instruction, and the district court's oral pronouncement of its reasoning of
why the instruction would be given;

7.

[Co-counsel. Sara] Thomas and I discussed both whether to raise
the specific objection raised by Mr. Pangburn, i.e., that there was
insufficient evidence to support giving the instruction, and we also
discussed whether to raise an argument that there was insufficient
evidence to support a ju!)' finding of guilt under an aid and abet theo!)' an argument that can be raised for the first time on appeal;

8.
Although I cannot recall any specific cases that I reviewed, I was
aware of the fact that jury instructions and jury verdicts can be supported
based entirely upon circumstantial evidence, and I was further aware of
the standards that are applied to appellate review of a district court's
decision to give a requested jury instructions [sic] and for appellate review
of whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a jury finding of
guilt;
9.
In order to establish a claim that there was insufficient evidence to
support giving the aid and abet instruction, we would have had to convince
the appellate court that no reasonable view of the evidence would have
supported giving the instruction;

The evidentiary hearing has since been rescheduled to begin December 7, 2010.
(Amended Scheduling Order. Notice of Trial Setting and Pre-Trial Order dated
September 8~ 2010.)
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10.
In order to establish a claim that there was insufficient evidence to
support a jury finding that Sarah Johnson was guilty under and [sicl aid
and abet theory, we would have had to convince the appellate court that
no reasonable view of the evidence presented would support a jury finding
of guilt under an aid and abet theory, in spite of the fact that there is an
appellate presumption that all reasonable inferences would weigh in favor
of sustaining the jury's verdict;

11.

After discussing the applicable standards in light of Judge Wood's
oral statement of why the court felt there was sufficient evidence to
support the instruction, both Ms. Thomas and I, individually and
collectively, agreed that raising such issues would have no merit;
12.
Judge Wood found that a reasonable view of the evidence showed
that Sarah Johnson had access to the apartment where the rifle and
ammunition was kept and knowledge of its presence;
13.
Although there was contradictory eVidence as to whether
apartment was locked, the evidence showed that the apartment was
entered into by force suggesting that, If It was locked, it had to
accessed by a key and Sarah Johnson had access to a key to
apartment;

the
not
be
the

14.
Judge Wood also noted that evidence was presented that
suggested that one of the three oddly placed knives was previously
located in an unobViOUs area that Sarah Johnson, as a resident of the
house, would have known about;
15.
Judge Wood noted that the gloves found with the robe belonged to
Diane Johnson and that she normally kept them in the glove box of her
vehicle, again Sarah Johnson having knowledge of their location;
16.
Judge Wood also noted that the robe that both the State and the
defense acknowledged was in the environment of the shooting, was found
in a garbage can along the route Sarah Johnson took when she ran to the
neighbor's residence;

17. Additionally, Judge Wood found that there was other potentially
incriminating evidence in Sarah Johnson's bedroom and that she was
admittedly on the same floor of the house as her parents when the
murders occurred, although I frankly found this evidence less compelling
than the court did;
In sum, the decision not to raise any sufficiency of the evidence
18.
claim was based upon our determination that such claims were meritless
in light of the district court's oral pronouncement of its reasoning for giving
the aid and abet instruction, in light of the appellate record and transcripts
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supporting the court's conclusions, and in light of the applicable law and
applicable appellate standards.
(Affidavit of Jason Pintler, Direct Appeal Co-Counsel, pp.2-4 (Appendix A).)
Although credibility cannot be assessed via affidavit. the pleadings submitted by
Johnson herself, including Mr. PlntJer's affidavit, demonstrate there is no genuine issue
of material fact necessitating an evidentiary hearing on Johnson's claim that appellate
counsel were ineffective for failing to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim as to the
aid and abet instruction.
In order to establish a prima facie case that appellate counsel was ineffective,
Johnson must allege a genuine issue of material fact that appellate counsel were
deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S, 387 (1985);
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). Even if a defendant
requests that certain issues be raised on appeal, appellate counsel has no constitutional
obligation to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by the defendant.

Jones v.

Barnes, 463 U.S. 746, 751-53 (1983); Aragon v, State, 114 Idaho 758, 766, 760 P.2d
1174,1181 (1988) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-754). Moreover, a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal cannot be predicated upon counsel's failure to raise
meritless issues. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,809 n.2, 839 P.2d 1215, 1223 n.2
(1992); Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 501, 700 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1985). As
explained by the Supreme Court, "Experienced advocates since time beyond memory
have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and
focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Jones at 752.
To the extent Johnson's remaining claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel can be construed as alleging counsels' decision as to what issue to pursue on
appeal was not based upon strategy, but was instead based upon inadequate
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preparation, Ignorance of the law, or some other objective basis for evaluating counsels'
perfonnance, Mr. Pint1er's affidavit dispels any material factual issue that could be
advanced by such an allegation. See Remington vo State, 127 Idaho 443, 447, 901
P.2d 1344, 1348 (Ct. App. 1995) (summary dismissal not appropriate where affidavit
filed by trial counsel did not disprove petitioner's claims or dispel all material factual
issues).

Mr. Pintler's affidavit demonstrates that both he and co-counsel on appeal

researched the relevant legal standards and thoroughly reviewed the record and
ultimately concluded that the sufficiency of the evidence claim Johnson contends they
should have pursued was without merit. A review of the record and the law supports
appellate counsel's assessment as well as the trial judge's conclusion that the
instruction was appropriate based upon the evidence presented. and nothing in
Johnson's Petition establishes otherwise.
In light of the bare and conclusory allegations in Johnson's Petition, Mr. Pintler's
affidavit explaining that counsel made a sound and informed judgment not to pursue a
claim that lacked merit, and in light of the evidence that supported the trial court's
decision to give an aid and abet instruction, which evidence is outlined in Mr. Pintler's
affidavit, the state respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its decision denying
the state's motion for summary dismissal of this claim, and dismiss this claim without an
evidentiary hearing as authorized by I.C. § 19-19-4906(c). (liThe court may grant a
motion by either party for summary disposition of the application when it appears from
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements
of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material
faet and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.")
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its prior decisions denying
the state's motion for summary dismissal of Johnson's claims that trial counsel were
ineffective in cross-examination and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the aid and abet instruotion and
dismiss those claims without an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 30th day of September, 2010,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of September, 2010, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of
Respondent's Motion to Reconsider by the method indicated below:
Blaine County Court Clerk
Fax (208) 788-5527
Honorable G. Richard Bevan
P.O. Box 126
Twin Falls, ID 83303

_X_ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid

Christopher P. Simms

_X_ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Attorney at Law
191 Sun Valley Rd.
Ketchum, ID 83340
Fax (208) 788-2300
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OFFiCS OFTHE ATTORNEY GENERP.L
CRIMINAL DIViSiON

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
SARAH M.

JOHNSON,

)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

)
)
)
)

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

County of Ada

Case No: CV-006-324
AFFIDAVIT OF JASON
PINTLER, DIRECT APPEAL
CO~COUNSEL .

)

Respondent
STATE OF IDAHO

BLAINE

)
:ss
)

COMES NOW, Jason C. Pintler, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, and
swears and affirms under oath and upon his personal knowledge the following:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho, currently
employed by the Office of State Appellate Public Defender, I represented Sarah
Johnson, as co-counsel with Sara Thomas, during Ms. Johnson's direct appeal:

2.

It is my understanding that this matter is set for evidentiary hearing commencing
on November 3D, 2010.

I am unavailable to testify during the scheduled

evidentiary hearing and provide the testimony offered herein under oath, in lieu of
live testimony;
3.

My understanding of Petitioners allegation of Ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel is that

it essentially involves two parts:

1) that we chose to raise

AFFIDAVlT OF JASON C. PINTlER - Page 1
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unwinnable issues, Le., the variance and constructive amendment arguments;

and. 2) that we did so in lieu of raising a claim that there was Insufficient
evidence to support the court's decision to give the aid and abet instruction;

4.

The decision to raise the variance and constructive amendment arguments was
entirely independent from the decision not to raise any claims regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's decision to give the aid and abet
Instruction;

5_

Had we believed that we could have· raised a meritorious argument on the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the instruction, we would have done so In
addition to raising the variance and constructive amendment arguments;

6.

I reviewed the entirety of the trial transcripts Including the portions containing
Mr. Pangburn's objection to the court gMng the aid and abet instruction, and the
district court's oral pronouncement of its reasoning of why the instruction would
be given;

7.

Ms. Thomas and I discussed both whether to raise the specific objection raised
by Mr. Pangburn, Le., that there was insufficient evidence to support giving the
instruction, and we also discussed whether to raise an argument that there was
insufficient evidence to support a jury finding of guilt under an aid and abet theory
- an argument that can be raised for the first time on appeal;

8.

Although I cannot recall any specific cases that I reviewed, I was aware of the

fact that jury instructions and jury verdicts can be supported based entirely upon
circumstantial evidence. and I was further aware of the standards that are
applied to appellate review of a district court's decision to give a requested jury
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instructions and for appellate review of whether sufficient evidence was
presented to support a jury flnding of guilt;
9.

In order to establish a claim that there was Insufficient evidence to support giving
the aid and abet instruction, we would have had to convince the appellate court
that no reasonable view of the evidence would have supported giving the
instruction;

10.

In order to establish a claim that there was insufficient evidence to support

a jury

finding that Sarah Johnson was guilty under and aid and abet theory, we would
have had to convince the appellate court that no reasonable view of the evidence
presented would support a jury finding of guilt under an aid and abet theory, in
spite of the fact that there is an appellate presumption that all reasonable
inferences would weigh in favor of sustaining the jury's verdict;

11.

After discussing the applicable standards in fight of Judge Wood's oral statement
of why the court felt there was sufficient evidence to support the instruction, both
Ms. Thomas and I, individually and collectively, agreed that raising such issues
would have no merit;

12.

Judge Wood found that

a reasonable view of the evidence showed that Sarah

Johnson had access to the apartment where the rifle and ammunition was kept
and knowledge of its presence;

13.

Although there was contradictory evidence as to whether the apartment was
locked, the evidence showed that the apartment was not entered into by force
suggesting that, if it was locked, it had to be accessed by
Johnson had access to a key to the apartment;
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Judge Wood also noted that evidence was presented that suggested that one of
the three oddly placed knives was previously located in an unobvious area that
Sarah Johnson, as a resident of the house, would have known about;

15.

Judge Wood noted that the gloves found with the robe belonged to Diane
Johnson and that she normally kept them in the glove box of her vehicle, again
Sarah Johnson having knowledge of their location;

16.

Judge Wood also noted that the robe that both the State and the defense
acknowledged- was in the environment of the shooting, was found in a garbage
can along the route Sarah Johnson took when she ran to the neighbor's
residence;

17.

Additionally. Judge Wood found that there was other potentially incriminating
evidence found in Sarah Johnson's bedroom and that she was admittedly on the
same floor of the house as her parents when the murders occurred, although I
frankly found this evidence less compelling than the court did;

18.

In sum, the decision not to raise any sufficiency of the evidence claims was
based upon our determination that such claims were meritless in light of the
district court's oral pronouncement of its reasoning for giving the aid and abet
instruction, in light of the appellate record and transcripts supporting the court's
conclusions, and in light of the applicable law and applicable appellate standards;
and
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Further your affiant sayeth naught.
Dated this 18th day of August, 2010.

JASON C. PINTLER
Diputy State Appellate Public Defender
STATE OF IDAHO

)

:ss
County of Ada

)

SuaSCRI8ED AND SWORN to before m~ on this 18 day of August. 2010.
th

c:::=~~
NOTARY PUBLlCFORfoAHO

Residing in Boise, Idaho
Commission Expires 2/1212016
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 18th day of August, 2010, served a true
and correct copy of the forgoing AFFIDAVIT OF JASON C. PINTLER by the method
indicated below:

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0010
Hand deliver to Attorney GeneralIs mailbox at Supreme Court

c:=~~
EVAN A. SMITH
---Administrative Assistant
JCP/eas
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Idaho Attorney General
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Chief, Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
JESSICA M. LORELLO ISB #6554
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051
Deputies Attorney General and
Special Prosecuting Attorneys
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 332-3096
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH JOHNSON
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV·06·324
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

------------~----------------

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby moves, pursuant to I.R.C.P.
11 (a)(2)(B), for partial reconsideration of the Court's Order on Cross Motions for
Summary Disposition ("Order"), entered July 19, 2010. The state specifically requests
reconsideration of that portion of the Order concluding Johnson is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on her claim that counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately
cross-examine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry "Walt" Fleming,
Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuela Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Lis Ramirez,
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Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez., Carlos Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart
Robinson, as alleged In paragraph 16 of Johnson's second amended petition. (Order,

p.6, 1f 4.)
The state also seeks partial reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum
Decision and Order Regarding Claims Taken Under Advisement ("Memorandum
Decision"), entered May 21 2010. Specifically, the state requests reconsideration of
j

the Court's determination that Johnson is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her claim
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise as an issue on appeal the
sufficiency of the evidence to support an aiding and abetting instruction. (Memorandum
Decision, pp.17-18.) The basis of the state's motion is contained in the Memorandum in
Support of Respondent's Motion to Reconsider filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this 30th day of September, 2010,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of September, 2010, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Respondent's Motion to Reconsider by
the method indicated below:
Blaine County Court Clerk
Fax (208) 788-5527
Honorable G. Richard Bevan
P.O. Box 126
Twin Falls, 10 83303

_X_ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid

Christopher P. Simms
Attomey at Law
191 Sun Valley Rd.

_X_ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
_ Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mall
Facsimile

Ketchum, 10 83340
Fax (208) 788-2300

r;;g~=~

--

osean Newman, Legal Secretary
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
PH 208 622 7878
FAX 208 622 7921

.NOV (11 2010
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court BI8Jne County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV -06-324

PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

I.R.C.P. 16 (d)

__________~R=e=s+p=o=nd=e=n=t~,------------)

COMES NOW Petitioner, through counsel and pursuant to order of this Court in
compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(d) files this Pre-Trial Memorandum,
and therefore states;
1.

Pending before this COUli is Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-

Conviction Relief from a Judgment of Conviction Upon Jury Verdict of Guilt on two
counts Murder First Degree with Firearm Enhancement for which Petitioner was
sentenced to determinate Life in the Penitentiary, plus fifteen, two terms.
2.

On or about September 9, 2010, this Honorable Court entered an Amended Pre-

Trial Order, setting the matter for trial beginning on December 7, 20 10, setting a pre-trial
conference on November 8, 2010, and ordering the parties to submit a Pre-Trial
Memorandum no later November 1,2010. This memorandum is intended to comply with
the Court's order and I.R.C.P. Rule 16 Cd).
,
PETITIONER'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

3.

The issues to be tried have been narrowed and are clearly presented by the Court's

Order On Cross Motions for Summary Disposition entered on July 19, 2010 and
Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Claims Taken Under Advisement, dated

May 20, 2010. Those claims to be decided by this court at trial, and for which relief is
requested, are as follows:
a. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a continuance or
adequately preparing to cross examine state's expert, after learning the
comforter had not been collected as evidence as alleged in paragraph 15.a
of the Petition;
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately investigate the
scientific basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on crucial blood
splatter opinion evidence, as alleged in paragraph 15. c of the Petition;
c. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present expert testimony,
and failing to adequately investigate the scientific basis for a gun shot /
sheet experiment, bearing on crucial blood splatter opinion evidence, as
alleged in paragraph 15.d of the Petition;
d. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately cross-examine
Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry "Walt" Femling,
Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuna,
Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Officer Raul
Ornelas, and Detective Stuart Robinson as alleged in paragraph 16 of the
Petition.

PETITIONER'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

2

e. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present evidence of an
audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross Kirtley, which
recording clearly proved the theory that police focused on Petitioner Sarah
Johnson, to the exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories,
because she was the easiest target.
f.

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire whether certain
previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh" as alleged in paragraph
18 of the Petition.

g. Ineffective assistance of counsel' stemming from an overall lack of
diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, chronic
tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, including trial, all of
which together resulted, cumulatively and individually, a manifestly unfair
trial and unjust verdict.
h. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise and argue
insufficient evidence to support submission of an aiding and abetting jury
instruction.
1.

Newly discovered evidence relating to the recent identification of
Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously unidentified latent
prints as alleged in paragraph 29 of the Petition.

4.

Each of the aforementioned claims presents an issue of fact, except that relating to

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which presents a mixed issue. No pure issues
oflaw are presented for the Court's determination.

PETITIONER'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

3

5.

Defendant has in its posseSSlOn all documents, tangible things and exhibits

intended to be introduced at the trial of this cause. (Exhibit List attached and made a part
hereof) Counsel has initiated consultation with opposing counsel regarding stipulated
admission of documents and things calculated to avoid unnecessary proof as to
authentication. )
6.

A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which Petitioner intends to call

to testify at trial is attached hereto and made a part hereof.
7.

Issues to be addressed at Pre-Trial Conference include the transport of Petitioner

from the Pocetello Women's Correctional Center to Twin Falls for purposes of
appearance at trial; possible amendment to the time schedule for trial to suit the
convenience of witnesses and counsel, all of whom will be traveling from outside of
Twin Falls County; and admission of evidence to avoid unnecessary proof as to
authentication.
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _(_ day of __OV_o_I/_ _ _ _ _ 2010,
a true

and

correct

copy

of the

foregoing

PETITIONER'S

PRE-TRIAL

MEMORANDUM was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special
Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO
Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100,
Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan,
Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

- - - - US Mail

----

Hand Deliver

~a

facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
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FI LED ~.~.
Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
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[NOV Oi 2010 "] ""
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
COurt Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No: CV -006-324
PETITIONER'S TRIAL
EXHIBIT LIST

________~R~e=s~p=o=nd=e=n~t____________)
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Trial Exhibit List, and therefore recites
as follows;
Exhibit Number & Description
1. Transcript from Grand Jury Proceedings
2. Transcript of Trial Proceedings
3. Affidavit of Patrick Dunn, Investigator for Defense
4. Patrick Dunn, Deposition Transcript
5. Affidavit of Mark Rader
6. Mark Rader Deposition Transcript
7. Suspended Status of Attorney Bobby Eugene Pangburn (Idaho Bar Association)
8. Disciplinary Order Idaho Supreme Court Bobby E. Pangburn
9. Bobby E. Pangburn, Deposition Transcript
PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST
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10. CNN Transcripts of Nancy Grace Television Programs with Bobby Pangburn
11. Resume of Robert J. Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert
12. Robeli Kerchusky, Deposition Transcript
13. Latent Fingerprint Cards (w/o Bates Stamp)
14. Transcript ofInterview with Mel Speegle 10/9/2003
15. Transcript ofInterview with Consuelo Cedeno & Jane Lopez 9112/2003
16. Blaine County Sheriff's Report of Interview with Bruno Santos 9/2/2003
17. Transcript of Interview with Bruno Santos 9/3/2003
18. Supreme Court ofIdaho Opinion: State vs. Johnson, 188 P.3d 912
19. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Latent Section Case Notes 11125/03
20. External and Internal Chain of Custody form last date 11/25/03
21. ISP Forensic Services Rpt- Bates Nos. 0022-PCt thru 0028PC
22. Blaine County Sheriff's Report 2/3/2009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher
Kevin Hill Bates Nos. 0003PC thru 0020PC
23. Photograph of Diagram of Glen Aspen Drive
24. Photograph of Murder Weapon at Scene
25. Photograph of Trash Can Johnson Residence
26. Photograph of Removed Rifle Scope on Guest Bed Johnson Residence
27. Photograph of Winchester Super X Rifle Cartridges
28. Supplemental Report Blaine County Sheriff's Office Interview with Dell Speegle
9/3/2003
29. ISP Report Fingerprints Bates Nos. 0025PC-0028PC
30. ISP Repoli Bates Nos.00108PC - 00114PC
31. ISP Report Bates Nos.OO 115PC-00122PC
PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST
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32. ISP Report Bates Nos.00133PC-00139PC
33. Blaine County Sheriff's Supplemental Report 1112/2009 Regarding Christopher Kevin
Hill Missing Statement
34. ISP Forensic Services Notes Regarding Hill Investigation Bates Nos. 0064-65PC (?)
35. AudiolVideo Recording oflnterview with Mel Speegle 2110/2009
36. Audio/Video Recording of Interview with Christopher Kevin Hill 2112/2009
37. Blaine County Sheriff's Supplemental Report 4/28/2009 regardingMajor Case Prints for
Christopher Kevin Hill Bates Nos. 0094PC-0096PC
38. Blaine County Sheriff's Supplemental Report 10117/2009 Regarding Hill Fingerprinting
Bates Nos. -124PC-00125PC
39. ISP Report dated 10115/09 Bates Nos. 00126PC-00132PC
40. National Academy of Science Journal Article Badly Fragmented Forensic Science
Systems Needs Overhaul: Evidence To Support Reliability Of Many Techniques Is Lacking
41. Laboratory Report Forensic Identification Orchard Cellmark Company 5/13/2004
42. Cellmark Chain of Custody Bates No.1 0078
43. Cellmark Lab Report Bates Nos. 10170-10174
44. Blaine County PA letter dated October 12,2004 to Bob Pangburn
45. Report of Ed Fuller dated December 7, 2004 Bates Nos. 9969-9972
46. Defense Request to Inspect Evidence Bates Nos. 9977-9978
47. RepOIi of Cindy Hall dated 12-08-04 Bates Nos. 9999-10000
48. ISP Report dated 12-30-04 Bates Nos. 10032-33
49. Bruno Santos Interview Transcript September 3,2003
50. Police Report of Carlos Ayala Interview
51. Bruno Santos - Nikki Settle Transcript of Taped Telephone Call
52. Rod Englert Consultation Rpt May 12,2004 Bates Nos. 6749-6763
PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST
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In addition to those exhibits specifically referenced herein, Petitioner reserves the right to
offer exhibits previously submitted to this court in support of her First and Second Amended
Petition, Motion for Summary Disposition and Memorandum Response to Respondent's Motion
for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Second Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, and
all documents produced by the State pursuant to Discovery Order of this Court.
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ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
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DATED
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

_1_ day

of

jl/tJ(J[,

I'np[..

~

2010, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST was delivered to
the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello;
Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue
South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard
Bevan, Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

- - - US Mail

Hand Deliver

~

facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

5

FILED ~.~. ~

,,)
SF' j

~

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

NOV 0'" 2D10
-!..~n t::Jrage, Clerk District
vvurt BlaJrie County, Idaho

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)
)
Petitioner
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
________~R==es~p=o=nd=e=n~t____________)

p-

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV -006-324
PETITIONER'S TRIAL
WITNESS LIST

COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Trial Witness List, and states the
following persons may be called to testify during trial on behalf of Petitioner:
1.

Bobby Pangburn, Trial Counsel
3042 S. Whitepost Way
Eagle, ID 83646
208861 1886

2.

Mark Rader, Trial Co-Counsel
381 W. Idaho Avenue
Ontario, OR 97914
541 8892351

3.

Patrick Dunn, Defense Investigator
4695 AITowhead Way
Boise, ID 83709
2083622727

4.

Jason Pintler, Appellate Counsel
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703
2083342712
PETITIONER'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST

5.

Sarah Thomas, Appellate Counsel
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703
2083342712

6.

Robel1 Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert
1235 N. Echohawk Way
Eagle, ID 83616
2089394914

7.

Officer Ross Kirtley
700 W. Jefferson St. #228
Boise, ID 83720
208 854 3013

8.

Det. Steve Harkins
480 East Avenue N.
PO Box 2315
Ketchum, ID 83340

RNEY AT LAW
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ISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

PETITIONER'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST

DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2010,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST
was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys,
Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

- - - US Mail
- - - Hand

Deliver

_ _/v_Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

PETITIONER'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL D[STRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FbR THE COUNTY OF
)
)
)
)
):
);

Plaintiffls),
VS.

.~~

REQUEST TO OBTAIN APPROVAL
TO VIDEO RECORD. BROADCAST
OR PHOTOGRAPH A COURT
PROCEEDING

)

DefendantC s).

)

--------------------------~):
I hereby request approval to:
~ideo

record

[ ] broadcast

: [ ] photograph the following court proceeding:

Case No.:
Date:

Time:
Location:
Presiding Judge:

I have read the Rule 45 of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules regarding cameras in the courtroom,
and will comply in all respects with the provisions of that rule. and will also make certain that all other
persons from my organization participating in video or audio recording or broadcasting or
photographing of the court proceedings have read Rule 45 of the Idaho Court Administra.tive R1,lles and
will comply in all respects with the provisions: of that rule.

£ CH4RL.JC.

PrintJ'Tame

~

/A~~

Signatl.lre

krws:

~¥~

News OrganiZation Represented

rc>/k,,1 2

Phone Number

1tI

Date

t<.BQUESi TO OSTAI'N APPROVAL TO VIDEO RECORD. BROADCAST
OR PHO"rOCilV,PH A. COURT l'ROCEED!NO
.

04.06.09
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nIE COURT, ha.ving c.otlsidered the above Request for Approval under Rule 45 of the Idaho
Court Administrative Rules, hereby orders that pcrmisliion to "ideo record the above hearing Is:

~NTED

[
under the following restrictions in addition to those $et forth in Rule 4S of the tdaho
CoW't A.dministrative Rules:

[ ] DENIED.

,

,
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THE COURT. havini considered the above Request for Approval under RuLe 45 of the Idaho
Court Administrative Ruies, hereby orders that pf!nnission to broadcast the above hearing is:
[ ] GRANTED under the following restriotions i.n addition to those set forth in Rule 45 of the Idaho
Court Adtninistrativ~ Rules!

[ ] DENIED,
.¥., •• " •• '.f ••••••••• , ••••••

t ••••••••• _w~
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t • • • • • • • • • • • , •••• lt'~ •• ,~ •• ~ •••••••••• , •• , • •••• t •••• • •••••

THE COURT, havjl'lg considered the above Request for Approval under Rule 4S of the Idaho
Court Administrative Rules, hereby orders tbat permission to pbotograph tho above: heM'mg ls:

r ] GRANTED. under the following restrictions in addition to those set forth in Rule 45 of the Idaho
Court Administrative R.ules.

.

[ ] DENIED.
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Idaho Attorney General
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Chief, Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division

Jotynn Drage, Clerk District
COurlBlaine Coun ,J..~_ho_

....

JESSICA M. LORELLO ISB #6554
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISS #4051
Deputies Attorney General and
Special Prosecuting Attorneys

P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 332-3096
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH JOHNSON
Petitioner,
VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-06-324
RESPONDENT'S
MEMORANDUM

PRE-TRIAL

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby submits this pre-trial memorandum
pursuant to I.RC.P. 16(d) and this Court's Amended Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial
Setting and Pre-Trial Order.
Following proceedings on the parties' cross-motions for summary dismissal, the
remaining claims in Petitioner's ("Johnson") Second Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief ("Petition"), which are currently set for an evidentiary hearing are:

RESPONDENT'S PRE-TRlAL MEMORANDUM - 1
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Claim 4(a) -
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Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for a

continuance after discovering the comforter on the bed where Diane Johnson was
murdered was not collected as evidence. (Petition, pp.7-8, 11' 15.a.)
Claim 4(0) -Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately investigate
the scientific basis for the proffered coconut experiment. (Petition, p.8, 11' 15.0.)
Claim 4(d) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to provide expert
testimony as to comforters." (Petition, p.9, 11 15.d,)
Claim 4(e) - Ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the crossexamination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Walt Femling, Steve Harkin,
Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane lopez, Becky
Lopez, Car/os Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13, 1116.)
Claim 4(f) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present evidence of an
audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police ufocused" on Johnson "to the
exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, because [Johnson] Was the
easiest target." (Petition, p.13, 11 16.c.)
Claim 11 - Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for "failing to argue
insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction." (Petition, p.2Z,
1126.)
Claim 12 -

Newly discovered evidence based upon the identification of

fingerprints belonging to Christopher Hill. (Petition, pp.22-24,

mr 27-29.)

The state responds to the requirements of Rule 16(d) as follows:
Rule 16(d)(1); On September 30,2010, the state filed a motion to reconsider the
Court's decision denying the state's motion for summary dismissal of Claim 4(e) and
Claim 11. The state's motion for reconsideration is pending and is set for hearing on

RESPONDEAT'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 2
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November 8,2010, in conjunction with the pre-trial conference. Aside from this Court's
resolution of the cross-motions for summary disposition and the pending ruling on the
state's motion for reconsideration, the state does not believe there is potential for further
simplification of the issues.
Rule 16{d)(2): There is no necessity or desirability to amend the pleadings at this
time.
Rule 16(d)(3): The parties are currently discussing the possibility of stipulating to
certain exhibits in order to avoid unnecessary proof.
Rule 16(d)(4): The state does not intend to call any expert witnesses per sa. To
the extent the state calls witnesses, those witnesses will be limited to trial counsel.
appellate counsel, and individuals who testified at the underlying criminal tria/.
Bule 16(d)(5): Because this case will not be tried to a jury, there is no need for a
preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings.
Rule 16(d)(6): With the exception for the state's motion for reconsideration, the
state is unaware of any matters that may aid in the disposition of this action.
st

DATED this 1 day of November, 2010.

JES leA M. LORELLO
e uty Attomey General
Special Prosecuting Attorney

RESPONDENT'S PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of November, 2010, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of
Respondent's Pre-Trial Memorandum by the method indicated below:
Blaine County Court Clerk
Fax (208) 788-5527

L.Facsimile

Honorable G. Richard Bevan
Fax (208) 736-4155

L. Facsimile

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law
191 Sun Valley Rd.
Ketchum, ID 83340
Fax (208) 788-2300

_

_
_

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

~Facsimile

{ilk!!::
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 7882300

NOV 03 201

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No: CV -006-324
ADDENDUM TO
PETITIONER'S TRIAL
EXHIBIT LIST

________~R~es~p~o~nd~e~n=t____________)
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Addendum to Petitioner's Trial Exhibit
List, and therefore recites as follows;
l.

In addition to those exhibits listed specifically and generally in Petitioner's Trial Exhibit

List Petitioner intends to offer portions of an audio tape recorded at the scene of the crime on the
day of the event by Officer Ross Kirtley. Specific reference to this exhibit was inadvertently
omitted from Petitioner's Trial Exhibit List, but has been discussed with counsel for the State.

1/ 2.. Ii)
CHRISTOPHERP. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

ADDENDUM TO PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

DATED

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

2

day of __
IVo_V
______ 2010, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing ADDENDUM TO PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST
was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn:
Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010;
The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201
Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable
G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 833030]26.

- - - US Mail

- - - Hand

Deliver

/ v i a facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

---

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS

ADDENDUM TO PETITIONER'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

NOV 05 2010

. ._·'_r_

J9fynn OraBel Cierk District
COurt Blains Count}\ Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
ResI1ondent~

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2006-0324
MOTION FOR ORDER
TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER
TO TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL
I.C. 19-4907 (a)
ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED

COMES NOW Petitioner by and through her attorney, CHRISTOPHER P.
SIMMS, and files this, her MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO
TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL and in support thereof states as follows:
1.

Petitioner is in the custody of the Pocatello Women's Correctional Center, located

in Pocatello, Idaho, serving life sentences, upon conviction of Murder, First Degree, with
Fireann Enhancement, The Fifth District Court for the State of Idaho, County of Blaine,
Case No. CR-2003-1820.
2.

Pending before this Court is Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-

Conviction Relief, set for evidentiary hearing commencing December 7, 2010.
3.

The evidentiary hearing is scheduled for four (4) days, to be conducted in the

Theron Ward Judicial Building, located in Twin Falls, Idaho.
4.

Petitioner's presence is required for the evidentiary hearing.

MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL

1

WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Court enter an Order to Transport
Petitioner to the Twin Falls County Jail before the commencement of the evidentiary
hearing on November 30,2010, at 9:00 a.m.

TORNEY AT LAW

ristopher P. Simms
Attorney for Petitioner

MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL

Dated

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26 th day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO TWIN
FALLS COUNTY JAIL was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special
Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello Facsimile number 208.854.8074, PO Box
83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 and The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney Facsimile number 208.788.5554, 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey,
Idaho 83333:

- - - US Mail

_ _ _ Hand Delivery

/

- - - Via facsimile 208.854.8074 & 208.788.5554

MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER TO TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
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.l9iYnn Drage, Clerk District
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)
)
Petitioner
)
)
)
vs.
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
__________=R=es~p=o=n=de=n=t____________)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV -006-324
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Memorandum Response to
Motion to Reconsider, and in support thereof states as follows;

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.

On or about October 4, 2010 counsel for Petitioner received Respondent's Motion

to Reconsider, and Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Reconsider
addressed to this Court's orders disposing of the parties' motions for summary
disposition.
2.

This Court on or about September 9,2010 entered an Amended Scheduling Order,

Notice 0.( Trial Setting and Pre- Trial Order, which order required motions for summary
judgment to be field and served so as to be heard not later than sixty (60) days before
trial.

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERA TION

3.

Counsel for Petitioner has not received Notice of Hearing, as contemplated by the

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Counsel first received notice that Respondent intended to

address the Motion jar Reconsideration at the time set for Pre-Trial Conference during a
telephone conversation with opposing counsel on Friday October 29, 2010, at which time
Attorney for Petitioner informed opposing counsel that Notice of Hearing had never been
served.
4.

By the tenns of this Court's Pre-Trial Order, Respondent's Motion to Reconsider

was filed too late to be considered, and further a response is not due because the motion
has not been properly noticed.

SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE
INADEQUA TE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
5.

The first issue raised by Respondent's Motion to Reconsider, that no genuine

issue of material fact is raised by Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
due to inadequate cross-examination of witnesses, is mere re-recitation of the losing
arguments made in support of the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. This Court,
based on the evidence submitted in support of the allegations, and the argument made by
counsel, declined to grant summary disposition, because an issue of credibility of
witnesses was presented. A determination of the merits of these claims must await the
Court's judgment as to the credibility of trial counsel after live testimony.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPEALLA TE COUNSEL
6.

The Affidavit of Jason Pintler, Appellate Counsel for Petitioner, is now before the

Court. In summary, Mr. Pintler swears he, together with co-counsel, made a strategic
decision not to argue insuffIciency of the evidence to support the proffered aiding and

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERA TION
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abetting jury instruction. The veracity of Mr. Pintler's testimony is not in question. At
issue is the nature and quality of the legal research conducted prior to Mr. Pintler making
the decision not to pursue this issue on appeal. In other words, whether Mr. Pintler
properly apprised himself of the law, as applied to the facts of his case, before he
determined the strongest issues to present on appeal.
In paragraph 8 of Mr. Pintler affidavit, he states he cannot recall any specific
cases reviewed. Mr. Pintler thereafter makes a general sweeping statement of law, upon
which he based his conclusion, "I was further aware of the standards that are applied to
appellate review of a district court's decision to give a requested jury instructions
(sic) ... " Without citation Mr. Pintler states, "In order to establish a claim that there was
insufficient evidence to support giving the aid and abet instruction, we would have had to
convince the appellate court that no reasonable view of the evidence would have
supported giving the instruction;" This statement is not an accurate reflection of the law
in the State ofIdaho.
In State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 920 P.2d 391 the Supreme Court of Idaho
reversed the trial court and remanded the case finding insufficient evidence to support a
jury instruction of necessity. The Howley Court cited State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87,
831 P.2d 555 (1992), for the proper standard in determining whether sufficient evidence
is present to support a jury instruction. The Court" ... adopted a four paIi aI1alysis to
determine whether a requested jury instruction was properly denied: (1) identify the
specific elements necessary for the requested instruction; (2) define the statutory
elements, or as in this case, the common law elements of the requested instruction; (3)
consider the evidence presented to determine whether such evidence supports the

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERA TION
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requested instruction; and (4) if the requested instruction is not supported by the
evidence, the court must reject the requested instruction. Eastman, 122 Idaho at 89-90,
831 P.2d at 557-58." The Court in State v. Mitchell, 195 P.3d 737, 742 (ID 2008),
stated,

In order to be convicted under I.C. § 18-204 for aiding and abetting the
commission of a crime, a person must act in such a way as to facilitate,
promote, encourage, solicit, or incite the actions of the crime. Aragon, 107
Idaho at 364, 690 P.2d at 299; State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 132, 594
P.2d 639, 642 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Humphreys,
134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000); Howard v. Felton, 85 Idaho 286, 297,
379 P.2d 414, 421 (1963); Horejs, 143 Idaho at 263, 141 P.3d at 1132.
However, mere knowledge of a crime or assent or acquiescence in its
commission does not create accomplice liability through aiding and
abetting. State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 347, 787 P.2d 1152, 1155
(1990), overruled on other grounds by Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d
652. Aiding and abetting contemplates a sharing by the aider and abettor
of the criminal intent of the perpetrator. Howard, 85 Idaho at 297, 379
P.2d at 421; State v. Hickman, 119 Idaho 366, 367,806 P.2d 959,960 (Ct.
App. 1991). Thus, the aider and abettor must have the requisite intent and
have acted in some manner to bring about the intended result. State v.
Gonzalez, 134 Idaho 907, 909,12 P.3d 382,384 (CL App. 2000).
Under the four pari test, the elements of aiding and abetting are known and include a
requirement that the person charged facilitate, promote, encourage, solicit or incite the
actions of the crime.

Furthermore, mere knowledge of the crime or assent or

acquiescence is not enough. In the present case, at most, the evidence at trial may lead to
a reasonable inference that Petitioner had some knowledge of the crime. However, there
is simply no evidence in the record of facilitation, promotion, encouragement, solicitation
or incitement by Petitioner. Not one scintilla. Therefore, Appellate Counsel's conduct
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. If the issue of sufficiency of the
evidence to support the aiding and abetting instruction were argued on appeal, there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different.
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERA TION
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The Court in State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d 1152 (Idaho 1990), made
clear the need for affirmative evidence of aiding and abetting, "However, 'aiding and
abetting' requires some proof that the accused either participated in or assisted,
encouraged, solicited,< or counseled the crime. State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d
1152 (Idaho 1990), citing "United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.1938); Johnson
v. United States, 195 F.2d 673 (8th Cir.1952); State v. Gladstone, 78 Wash.2d 306, 474
P.2d 274, 42 A.L.R.3d 1061 (1970). Mere knowledge of a crime and assent to or
acquiescence in its commission does not give rise to accomplice liability. State v. Brooks,
103 Idaho 892,655 P.2d 99 (Ct.App.1983); State v. Sensenig, 95 Idaho 218, 506 P.2d
115 (1973); State v. Schrag, 21 Or.App. 655, 536 P.2d 461 (1975); Monison v. State, 518
P.2d 1279 (Okl.Cr.1974). Failure to disclose the occunence of a crime to authorities is
not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118, 23
S.Ct. 42,47 L.Ed. 100 (1902); State v. Grant, 26 Idaho 189, 140 P. 959 (1914)."
The State of Washington has reached the same result, based on the same
reasoning. In State v. Gladstone, 78 Wn.2d 306, 474 P.2d 274 (Wash. 1970) a jury
found defendant guilty of aiding and abetting in the unlawful sale of marijuana.
Defendant appealed, arguing insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction under
an aiding and abetting theory of guilt.

The Court agreed, citing lack of affirmative

evidence of directly or indirectly counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing
or otherwise procuring another to commit a crime. Id at 307.
In Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1952), the question for
determination was whether there was substantial evidence to supp0l1 a jury verdict of
aiding and abetting in the crime charged. Johnson, at 675. The court stated "Generally
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speaking, to find one guilty as a principal on the ground that he was an aider and abetter,
it must be proven that he shared in the criminal intent of the principal and there must be a
community of unlawful purpose at the time the act is committed. As the term 'aiding and
abetting' implies, it assumes some participation in the criminal act in furtherance of the
common design, either before or at the time the criminal act is committed. It implies
some conduct of an affirmative nature and mere negative acquiescence is not sufficient."
Id, citing, Morei v. United States, 6 Cir., 127 F.2d 827; United States v. Dellaro, 2 Cir.,
99 F.2d 781. The essence of the Court's holding is that circumstantial evidence is not
enough to support conviction.
The Johnson v. United States Court concluded, "The defendant was, of course,
presumed to be innocent and the evidence from which it could possibly be gathered that
he was an aider and abetter in the commission of the crime is entirely circumstantial."
"Proof of circumstances which, while consistent with guilt, are not inconsistent with
innocence, will not support a conviction'. (also citing: Wesson v. United States, 8 Cir.,

172 F.2d 931; Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 8 Cir., 178 F.2d 363; Read v. United
States, 8 Cir., 42 F.2d 636. In Wesson v. United States, the COUl1 reversed a conviction
based upon circumstantial evidence and stated, "Inferences must be based upon proven
facts or facts of which judicial notice must be taken and one inference cannot be
based upon another inference. To sustain a finding of fact the circumstances proven
must lead to the conclusion with reasonable certainty and must be of such probative
force as to create the basis for a legal inference and not mere suspicion.
Circumstantial evidence, even in a civil case, is not sufficient to establish a
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conclusion where the circumstances are merely consistent with such conclusion or
where they give equal support to inconsistent conclusions." Johnson at 676.

CONCLUSION
Clearly, Mr. Pintler had not apprised himself of the above cited cases, nor the
general statement of law recited therein. The facts and evidence summarized by Judge
Wood, and repeated by Mr. Pintler, are but circumstantial, equally supporting a
conclusion inconsistent with guilt. Therefore, as a matter of law, Petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be granted.

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, ATTORNEY AT LAW

/1. 5,/0
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

DATED
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of November 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was delivered to the Office of Attorney
General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number
208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine
County Prosecuting Attomey; Facsimile number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue
South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G.
Richard Bevan, Facsimile number 208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho,
83303-0126.

- - - US

---

Mail

Hand Deliver

/ v i a facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

G. RICHARD BEVAN
District Judge
VIRGINIA BAILEY
Court Reporter
SHARIE COOPER
Deputy Clerk
SARAH JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

November 8. 2010
Date

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

10:30 a.m.
Time

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. CV 06-324

------------------------------)
Pretrial Conference and Motion for Reconsideration
10:32 Christopher Simms for petitioner, Jessica Lorello for the State of Idaho. Court

reviews case with Counsel. Mr. Simms informs the Court never received the notice of
hearing for the motion for reconsideration. Court will hear the motion to reconsider at
this time; however Counsel will have post motion time for briefing.
10:36 Ms. Lorello gives argument on motion to reconsider.
10:41 Mr. Simms gives argument, ineffective assistance of Counsel.
10:44 Court takes this issue under advisement as of Wednesday the

17th

of November

and Mr. Simms has until Monday the 15 th to file a response to this Court house and to
Blaine County as well. As to the issue of cross examination of witnesses, Court stands by
its prior ruling. Ms. Lorello to prepare an order.
10:45 Pretrial conference, Mr. Simms gives the Court an update, has an audio/visual

recording, see Administration for equipment to play audio/visual. Order to Transport has

COURT MINUTES - 1

been signed by the Court. The Court has one issue to clear up in regards to Security for
the defendant or if we have to have Blaine County send Security here. Schedule for the
trial is set to begin each day at 9:00 am. The Court will change the time to 10:00 am start
time each day with recess between 4:30 and 5:00 pm every day. Mr. Simms has trial
transcript and will offer it again during this trial. The Court will accept the CDs for the
transcript, no objection from the State. Any evidence which can be offered digitally is
welcomed. Findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, briefs etc. are accepted electronically
for the Judges copies.
10:57 Ms. Lorello comments in regards to pretrial issues. The trial exhibit list, there are

some the State will not stipulate to. The Court would like a motion in limine filed
previous to trial. Conflicts in regards to the two pretrial memorandums filed. Mr. Simms
gives comments in regards to the cumulative argument. The Court will consider in
regards to the cumulative argument. Scheduling order, findings of fact and conclusions of
law, Court would like findings of fact for a better understanding of the issues. Counsel
will be given time post trial for briefing if they desire. Court treats post convictions just
as though they were a trial. Mr. Simms moves the Court to exclude witnesses. Court
grants motion.
11:03 COUli in recess in this matter.

COURT MINUTES - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND POR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
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SARAH M. JOHNSON,

)
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Vi.

STATE OF IDAROy

Respondent.

Case No! CV..2006~0324
ORDER TO TRANSPORT
. PBITIONER TO TWIN FALLS
COUNTY JAIL

)

The Court, having considered

Petitioner~s

MOTION TO ORDER

PEmONER TRANSPORTED TO TWIN FALLS COUNTY JAIL, filed herein and

good cause a.ppearing therefore, HEREBY ORDERS Petitioner Transported to'Twin '

Falls County Jail, from the Pocatello

Women~s'

Correctional Filcility,

pri~r

to

December 7, 2010.

Oll.

O. Riohard Bevan, District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV 2006-00324
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER

--------------------------------)
INTRODUCTION
Currently pending is the Respondent's motion to reconsider the partial denial of its
motion for summary dismissal. This memorandum is in support of that

motion,

FACTS AND PROCSDURAL HISTORY
During the underlying trial, trial counsel for Johnson objected to the giving of an
aiding and abetting instruction, in part claiming that the evidence was insufficient to justify
such an instruction. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6029, L. 18 - p. 6031 f L. 20 (a copy of the portion
of the trial transcript cited in this memorandum is attached as an appendix to this
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memorandum).) The district court overruled this objection, ''finding [that] the evidence
here clearly supports an aiding and abetting instruction." (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6034, L. 25p. 6035, L. 1.) The court noted that, although the state had focused on Johnson as the
shooter, the defense had inte~ected evidence and the theory that there was a different
shooter. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6035, L 6 - p. 6037, L. 12.) The evidence that another
shooter could not have acoomplished the murders without Johnson's help and assistance
included, as found by the trial court:

1.

Both Mel Speegle's residence on the Johnson property and the presence of

the rifle used as the murder weapon therein were not common knowledge. that both had
been accessed without forced entry, and Sarah Johnson was one of the few people with
both knowledge and access to both. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6037, L. 13 - p. 6038, L 11.)

2.

Knives placed

at the murder scene had come from two different places in

the house, including one that was not obvious, indicating complete familiarity with where
the knives were in the house. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6038, Ls. 12-22.)

3.

One of the gloves used by the killer, the leather one, had come

from inside

Diane Johnson's suburban, whiie the matching one was found in Sarah Johnson's
bedroom. (Trial Tr., p. 6038, L. 23 - p. 6039, L. 8.)

4.

Two cartridges matching those used in the murders were also found in

Sarah Johnson's bedroom, and the presence of Diane Johnson's brain matter on them
indicated they were there before the murders took place. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6039, Ls. 9-

13.)
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Diane Johnson's brain matter found in Sarah Johnson's bedroom also

indicated that both her bedroom door and the bedroom door of the victims had been open

at the time of the murders. (Tria! Tr., vol. IX, p. 6039. Ls. 9-16.)
6.

Sarah Johnson admitted being in her bedroom or just outside the victims'

bedroom at the time of the murders but the physical evidence indicated that both doors to
the bedrooms were open at the time of the murders. and she had blood on the sales of her
socks, alt of which put her at least in close proximity to the murders. (Trial Tr., vol. IX, p.

6039, Ls. 17-23.)

7.

The bathrobe that all the evidence and experts indicated was present during

the murders, worn by someone, was Sarah Johnson's. had been In her bathroom adjacent

to her bedroom prior to the murders, and was found in a trash can on the path that
Johnson had taken immediately after the murders, Indicating that either Johnson placed
the robe in the trash or that she was with or would have seen the person who did so. (Trial
Tr., vol. IX, p. 6039, L. 23 - p. 6041, L. 5.)
The trial judge concluded:
So I would have to find that all of that evidence clearly supports a fair
inference or ftnding by this jury. because this case is circumstantial, that if
Sarah Johnson didn't do it, she certainly assisted or facilitated by knowledge
of where these various items were In the house and so forth. So I think it's
clearly supported by the evidence.
(Trial Tr., vol. IX, p. 6041, Ls. 6-12.)
On appeal, counsel for Johnson challenged the giving of the aiding and abetting
instruction on the grounds that the instruction created a variance with the charging
document and that giving it violated her right to due process. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho
970, 972-77, 188 P.3d 912, 914-19 (2008). Counsel did not, however, raise as an issue
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on appeal the question of whether the district court erred in concluding the evidence
justified the giving of the aiding and abetting instruction. Id.
Johnson claims in post conviction that her appellate counsel was ineffective for
"failing to argue insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting instruction."
(Second Amended Petition, p. 22.

11 26.)

The state moved for summary dismissal of this

claim because it is unsupported by any evidence. This Court denied this part of the state's
motion.
Thereafter Johnson filed the "Affidavit of Jason Pintler, Direct Appeal Co-Counsel"
(hereinafter "Affidavit"). In the Affidavit Pintler stated that he had reviewed the relevant
part of the appellate record (Affidavit. p. 2,

1f

6), considered raising the issue of

insufficiency of the evidence to support the instruction (Affidavit, p. 2,

1f 7),

concluded that

the law allows the giving of such instructions where the evidence of aiding and abetting is
circumstantial (Affidavit, p. 2-3,

1f

8), and concluded that the issue was insuffioiently

meritorious to have a reasonable chance of success on appeal (Affidavit, pp. 34,

mr 9-18

(setting forth Judge Wood's bases for the ruling that were not subject to reasonable
challenge on appeal)). Pending Is the state's motion for reconsideration of whether this
claim should be summarily dismissed in light of the Affidavit.

ARGUMENT
Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) authorizes a district court to summarily dismiss a postconviction petition upon motion by a party if it appears there is "no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary
disposition is appropriate when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of
material fact which. jf resolved in the appllcanfs favor, would entitle the applicant to the
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requested relief. Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App.
1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct App. 1995). If a
petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an essential element on which he bears
the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 592,
861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993).
It is well-settled that in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
petitioner must provide admissible evidence that his counsel's perfonnance was deficient
and that the alleged deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687-88 (1984); Richman v. State, 138 Idaho 190, 192, 59 P.3d 995, 997 (Ct. App.
2002) ("To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel.claim, the defendant must show
that the attorney's performance was defiCient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by
the deficiency." (citations omitted»). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must
demonstrate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634,718 P.2d 283,286 (1986» and overcome the "strong
presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance," Davis v. State. 116 Idaho 401, 406. 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct.
App. 1989). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that,
but for trial counsel's deficient performance) the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Aragon v, State, 114 Idaho 758, 761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger
v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685, 978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999); Roman v. State, 125
Idaho 644,649,873 P.2d 898,903 (Ct. App. 1994).
The foregoing standards apply to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276,971
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P.2d 727, 730 (1998). The relevant inquiry on the prejudice prong is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, Johnson would have prevailed on
appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000).
Here the only evidence presented disproves Johnson's claim of the ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel on both prongs of the test. First, the Affidavit establishes
that appellate counsel knew and reasonably applied existing law after a review of the
appellate record, and therefore that their performance was not objectively deficient.
Second, the Affidavit establishes that if the issue of whether the aiding and abetting
ins1ruction had been raised. Johnson would not have prevailed on appeal because the
district court did not abuse its discretion by giving it.
A district court may properly refuse a requested instruction on a legal theory that is
not supported by the evidence. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881,736 P.2d 1327, 1335
(1987); State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660,669-70,726 P.2d 772, 781-82 (Ct. App. 1986)
(self-defense instruction not supported by evidence). Whether a reasonable view of the
evidence supports an instruction is a matter within the trial court's discretion. State v.
Bush, 131 Idaho 22,32, 951 P.2d 1249 (1997); State v. Howle'l, 128 Idaho 874, 878, 920
P.2d 391, 395 (1996). Here, as articulated above, the trial judge found the aiding and
abetting instruction very well supported by the evidence. The Affidavit establishes that
appellate counsel property reviewed the record and rejected the issue of whether the court
abused its discretion in giving the instruction based on the applicable legal standard.
(Affid avit. )
Summary dismissal of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is warranted
because the evidence before this Court shows that appellate counsel could not have
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Thus, it was not deficient

performance to elect not to raise the issue and there is no prejudice because Johnson
would not have prevailed had it been raised.
Johnson claims that appellate counsel's objective shortcoming was ignorance of
the law. (Petitioner's Memorandum Response to Respondent's Motion to Reconsider, p.
(hereinafter "Memorandum.")

3

SpecIfically. Johnson claims that appellate counsel's

conclusion that "'we would have had to convince the appellate court that no reasonable
view of the evidence would have supported giving the instruction'" misapprehended the
applicable legal standard. (Memorandum, p. 3 (as in Memorandum) (purportedly quoting
Affidavit').) Review of the applicable law shows no misapprehension.
Idaho law is well-established: I'A proposed instruction is not correct and pertinent If

it is: an erroneous statement of the law, adequately covered by other instructions, or not

supported by a reasonable view of the trial evidence." State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 957,
231 P.3d 1047, 1054 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Elison, 135 Idaho
546,552,21 P.3d 483,489 (2001»). "Whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports
an instruction to the jury is a question committed to the discretion of the trial court, and
such a determination is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Eby,
136 Idaho 534, 539-40, 37 P.3d 625, 630-31 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Bowers, 131
Idaho 639, 640, 962 P.2d 1023, 1024 (1998»). On its face the standard articulated by
appellate counsel is a correct statement of the law.
Johnson argues that there is no evidence of her "facilitation,
encouragement,

solicitation

or incitement" of the murders,

"[n]ot one

promotion,
scintilla."

(Memorandum, p. 4.) Johnson does not mention, however, the evidence relied upon by
1

Johnson misquoted the Affidavit (Comoare AffidaVit, p. 3.1110.)
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the trial judge. Instead, Johnson, relying on federal cases decided in 1952 or earlier,
apparently contends that because the evidence was circumstantial it was automatically
inadequate to support an aiding and abetting theory as a matter of law. (Memorandum,
pp.6-7.) Johnson apparently argues that appellate counsel should have argued that the
trial court erred because there was not a "scintilla" of direct evidence of her aiding and
abetting, and that circumstantial evidence is, as a matter of law, insufficient to prove her
guilt on that theory. This argument, however, is without basis in the law.
The law Johnson relies on - that circumstantial evidence is insufficient if an
inference of innocence is possible - has been rejected by both the Idaho Supreme Court
and the Supreme Court of the United States. Holland v. United States. 348 U.S. 121, 13840 (1954) (rejecting standard by which circumstantial evidence would have to exclude
every theory consistent with evidence before jury could convict); State v. Humphern, 134
Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000) (rejecting continuing legal viability of Holder
instruction that circumstantial evidence was entitled to less weight than direct evidence).
Johnson's reliance on cases implicitly overruled by Hal/and, and a legal standard rejected
in Humpherys, is misplaced and does not show either an objective shortcoming by
appellate counselor that she would have prevailed on this issue had it been raised on
appeal.
The Affidavit establishes that appellate counsel considered whether to raise the
issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in finding the aiding and abetting
instruction supported by the evidence. In post-convictlon Johnson apparently contends
that appellate counsel's performance was deficient for not raising an argument based on
federal case law overruled over 50 years ago and
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the Idaho Supreme Court. This contention fails to show either deficient performance or
that she would have prevailed on appeal.

The record does more than establish that

Johnson has failed to present evidence to support this claim; the only evidence in the
record shows that this claim is without merit. Accordingly, the state requests that Court to
reconsider its order denying the state's motion for summary dismissal and dismiss
Johnson's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

DATED this 12th day of November, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of November, 2010, I caused

to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration to:
Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, 10 83340
Fax (208) 788-2300

_X_ U.S, Mail Postage Prepaid
_ Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
_X_ Facsimile

Hon. Richard G. Bevan
Fax (208) 736-4155

J.._ Facsimile

Blaine County Court Clerk
Fax (208) 788·5527

~X_Facsimile

Frances NiX, Legal Secretary
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u,. last we'lI just take out
. .:;entence. So
I'll have my clerk modify that and provide it to you,
3 all right?

I'.!!
II

,I

MR. PANGBURN:
Okay.
Tl-fE COURT:
Okay, so that -

g

let me

6 cheek my little list here. I think, then. of the ones

\ . ~ ~:~~:~;:~:;:~~~ :~:~:t~~~:~:Ck

9 in. I can't find my sheet, so when I find it, we"
10 get back to it.
All right. state's position on the
11
instructions, then, as I have offered. And the
verdict form. I want to make sure that we talk abOut
14 the verdict fonn, as well.
'5
MR. WHATCOli:
Your Honor, looking through
1 16 the instructions that you have in thls packet that you
17 gave us this moming, taking out that last sentence on
, 18 Number 29, we have no objection to the form and the
1$ substance ottl'lese instructions.
20
The only thing that we were planning on
21 objecting to was the defense's offered instruction. I
22 know that that isn't in here. If the court wants to
23 hear us on that issue, we'll be prepared to argue

I
I ~~

24- that
THE COURT:

2.G
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16

11
18
19
~o

21
22
23
24
25

6028
minute. Okay, I want to be absolutely dear in the
2 record that it is 'the state that is requesting the
3 accessory, aiding and abetting instruction.
4
MR. WHATCOTT:
That's correct, Your Honor.
S
THE COURT:
And you want that?
6
MR. WHATCOTT:
That's correct
7
TJiE COURT:
Okay. And that you
8 indicated yesterday that while not requested, you had
9 no objection in our informal meeting ~
1

10

11
12
13
14
16
16
17
18
19

~o
t1

t2
3

I just want to place this on the record to

make sure that j'm not mishearing something.
The state did not object to the - or was
inclined to want the second degree murder as a lesser
included offense.
MR. WHATCOn:
We don't object to those
instructions.
THE COURT:
Defense.
'~'NGBURN:
First of all, Your Honor.
:we do object to Instruction, proposed instruction
''Ntiinber 30_
THE COURT:
Let me get to it Okay.
MR. PANGBURN:
And the basis for that

4

objection is that THE COURT:

5

311.

Just a minute. That's ICJI
6029

MR.

Correct.
Just so ifs in the record,

THE COURT:
all right
Yes. The basis of out
MR. PANGBURN:
objection there, Your Honor, is based Oil the evidence
presented in this case. There is fhere has been no indication, Whatsoever,
none that I have seen, that any evidence was offered"
regarding an allegation that Miss Johnson assisted,
facilitated, promoted, encouraged, counseled,
solicited, invited, helped or hired another.
There'S absolutely no evidence on any of
those points. Not just not on all of them, but not 011
any of them. This is a case where, you know,
there's - in my mind, there's kind of two - two
types of defenses you can boil things down to.
And' ()f course, there's more than those.
You go through the tracfdional dog analysis, "My dog
doesn't bite, I don't have a dog," that sort of thing.
But I'd like to focus on two,
In thiS case, it's really there's no
dispute that k~lings occurred. So It's not like a
case of theft, for example, where "not only am I not
guilty, nothing occurred. I had an absolute right to
those things." That is not that kind of ease.
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This Is a case where killings occurred.
Our defense has always been that Miss Johnson did not
do it. The logical and only inference, in that two
people are dead, is that If she did not do it, someone
else did. And I contend that that is not enough I mean tttat's really all we have. If she
did not do it. someone else had to. Or someone - or
some other people had to. But there's been no
connection be1.\veen Miss Johnson and th~ other people
that we contended - person or persons who committed
this crime.
And that's what this instruction requires.
Not only anticipates, but requires a connection
between Miss Johnson and those other people.
And our argument - or I would contend,
and unless I missed something here, there's been no
evidence of any kind of connection offered there.
And so I would argue that to the extent
that this instruction is given, it is certainly more
confuSing than it is helpful to the jury.
MR. WHATCOIT:
Your Honor, we obviously
filed a pretty extensive brief on this, and so I think
that the law is quite clear that this is something
that is provided for in·these types of cases.
If I understand Mr. Pangburn's objection
6031
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2 fa:ts of this ease do not support

2

and
instruetion.
Certainly, under our theory of the case,
we have alleged that the defendant was the shooter,
was the sole actor In this crime; and that is what we
are proceeding on. Thelr defense, obviouslY, has been
that someone else is the shooter.
The question, when you're providing an
instruction such as !his on aiding and abetting, is
whether a reasonable View of the eVidence would
support that.
It's our position that even under their
theory that someone else was the shooter, a reasonable
view of the evidence would support that the defendant
aided and abetted that unknown shooter. And we
believe that is baSed upon the circumstantial evidence
that has been presented here In the trial.
I have cited $ nUmber of different
examples in our brief; but I think that when you look
at the aeee$S, the knowledge and the opportunity
regarding the evidence in this case, and the
instruments of the crime, a reasonable view of the
evidence under the defense theQry would be that the
defendant did aid and abet.
6032
r think the case law Is quite clear that
in this circumstance. such an Instruction is

3
4
S

warranted.
MR. PANGBURN:
Your Honor. in essence,
what the state is arguing for is <it third position.

6

They have their case. We have ours. And maybe
there's a third position here,
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~etting

Certa;nly~~~t

one that they have

supported, because,t!:Ieir,contention throughout this
case has been that Miss Johnson was the shooter:. Ours
has"heen that she was not There's no connectiOn,
there's no evidence of any kind of connection.
There's no evidence at all of Because it states here, nlntentionally
aids, assists, facilitates, promotes," There's no
connection with a separate person.
It's almost like one hand clapping,
standing in the room and assisting - standing, being
alone in a room, and assisting someone else. You
cannot do it without a second person, and the
connection between those.
Thafs our concern, is that there has been
no evidence, whatsoever, making a connection between
Miss Johnson and someone else.
In fact, I think the evidence is quite
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he state has repeatedly ,
asserted that
was no other person,
THE COURT:
First. the cases like State
wrsus Butcher in Idaho. I think It's 137 Idaho; the
Wheeler case that we previously talked about; Ayers,
A-y-e-r-s, r think It's In 70 Idaho; is the law that
this court relies on. Plus we have done some research
and found, I think, nine or ten federal cases,
including Some ninth circuit matters.
I agree that the Information - or the
indictment does not charge this in the aJtemative.
Although, it's our - my research concludes that it's
not a variance; and the defendanfs had notice of this
at least since January 20, when the state filed its
jury instructions, that the state was seeking an
aiding and abetting instruction. So there is notice.
'But going to, then, the question of
whether Or not the law supports this instruction - or
the evidence supports this instruction, I want to be
real clear that there's a difference between, you
know, my personal opinion and whether or not I think
it's a good idea to have this in here from the state's
perspective versus whether or not, because they
requested it, the evidence supports It
And my finding Is the evidence here
6034

1 clearly supports an aiding and abetting instruction.
2 And since you have objected to It, J'II tell you some
3 of the reasons why, wHhout even trying to be - make
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any sort of an exhaustive list My understanding of
theAnd It really (:ames into play when the
defense put on its defense, is What really cast the
light to me on this aiding and abetting matter.
Because frankly, When I first got it from the state, I
was wondering, you know, what's going to support this.
Well. the evidence in tI'Iis case Is there's
one neighbor, and I did not write down the names, but
heard the speeding car that morning.
Then you have the neighbor that put up the
placard that shows she lives across the street, heard
the car idle, another car come down. so forth.
Then you have Rocky Mink and company.
their theory, their third hypothesis that it was
someone other - Well, the first hypothesis was
murder/suicide. Second hypothesis was Sarah Johnson
was the shooter. The third hypothesis was It was
somebody other than Sarah Johnson and Alan Johnson who
was the shooter, right? O~ay,
So we have this evidence thafs been
injected in here that clearly there's the opportunity
6035
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commission of the offenses.
The third hypothesis proposed by the

4

defense, that It's someone other than Sarah or Alan Well, let me back up a minute.
The second hypothesis that it could not be
Sarah. this no blood, no gUilt, has always been
curious to me, because the theory of that Is that we
have this head and we have the gun. Then we have the
shooter, and one analysis is there's the pink robe.
Well. I have had the - gone back and
Jooked at the notes, and my understanding of the
gunshot residue person is there's gunshot residue on
both gloves; the leather glove and the rubber glove
found wrapped in the pink bathrobe that was located in
the trash can. There's no blood on them.
There's no blood on - of Diane Johnson's
on the gun. as i rec:aR. Everybody agrees that this
.264 was used in the murders. So someone has got it
wrong here.
I mean somebody's hypothesis isn't
carrying water here, because everybody agrees this
robe was in the environment. Everybody agrees this
gun was used. Two and two isn't adding up here to me,
but that's as to the second hypothesis.
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The third hypothesiS. though, the one that
really we're talking about with this aiding and

3 abetting,

my understanding was Bruno Santos' DNA was

4 found on the bottom sheet in Sarah's bedroom, correct?
MR. THOMAS:
Yes.
5
6
THE COURT:
Okay, so a fair inference
7 from that is Bruno Santos at some point was in that
8 house. My understanding of the defendant's position
9 with respect to the third hypothesis, though, is
10 really not pointing the finger at Bruno Santos. It's
11 pointing the finger at somebody other than Bruno
12 Santos, one of his gang member friends.
13
Well, when you stop and look at this
14 exhibit, Exhibit 5 that has the layout of the property
15 and so forth, there is on the second floor, located in
16 Mel Speegle's apartment, essentially for a/l practical
17 purposes hidden - but if hidden is too strong of a
18 word, certainly covered, obscured - is this 264
1~ rifte and the shells.
20
Access to the guest house is limited; and
21 It was locked, and fuere's no eVidence of forced
22 entry.
23
Sarah Johnson, by the testimony provided,

24 including through Jim Vavold, as I recall, was that
ZS she was over there in that house at least Sunday
6037

14/19

1 preceding
...Iers; and if I recall, maybe' Monday .
2 But without revieWing the notes, I won't state that
3 But I recall definitely on Sunday.
4
So there's access over Ulere. She also
S cleaned the apartment for Mel Speegle and. a jury
6 could infer, had knowledge of what was there.
And it's undisputed in this case, as I
7
8 understand it, that that is where the gun that was
9 used, the rifle in the commi~ion of the murders came
10 from. And it's where the ammunition came from. Okay,
11 so thafs one piece of evidence.
12
I believe it was Matt Johnson testified
13 with respect to the three knives, the two I&ft at the
14 foot of the master bedroom and one left on the guest
15 bedroom, one of those knives, as' recall, came
16 from - two were in a kitchen block or butcher blook
17 in the kitchen visible to anybody.
18
The third knife was, In essence, concealed
1.9 by or hidden by, I think it was, a bread box or
20 microwave or something. The fair inference being
21 somebody had to know where that knife was to get it.
22. Totally different location from where the gun was.
23
The two leather gloves, the matched set,
24 were ordinarily kept in Diane Johnson's Suburban.
25 They're not shooting gloves. That someone here

6036
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1 testified that Diane Johnson always wore a Ben Allen,
I think it is, shooting glove of a particular
3 construction; and that these leather gloves are not
4 the ones she shot with.
5
The leather glove found out in the trash
6 can has gunshot residue on it. The match to it.
7 presumably the match, is found in Sarah Johnson's
2
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room.
LIkewise, two live .264 cartridges are
found in Sarah johnson's room with some of the
mother's tissue on them, meaning, the fair inference,
they had to be there before the shots W&re fired - or
the shot was tired that killed the mother.
All of the experts, all of the witnesses
we heard here testified that both doors had to be
open.
Sarah Johnson admits being present in the
house. We're not talking about different floors.
We're talking the same f,I00f, both doors open. The
jury saw this house. We saw the house. I mean it's
not very far. The close proximity.
Sarah Johnson has blood 011 the soles of
her socks. And then, of course, the trash -- the robe
and the gloves are found in the trash can immediately
after the event, and the robe has - that's assigned
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1
Obviously, we
Who's wearing it,
2
but her robe, which the witnesses all described
3
hanging In the guest bedroom. very near her - or
4
guest bathroom and her bathroom, very near to her
5
bedroom, That's where its ordinary place of keeping
6
was, and irs found to have the residue on it - or
.,
the blood stain on it of both parents.
8
And all people say, that testified with
9
knowledge of that kind of scienoo, testified that that
10
pink robe had to be In the shooting environment ofthe
11
death of both parents, which oocurred in two different
12
roome.
13
14
And then lastly, for these purposes at
least, you knOw, we don't know - I don't know Who was
15
wearing the pink robe. Obviously, I wasn't there.
16
But Sarah Johnson's traced tlerway out of
17
the house, down the driveway where the trash can was
18
parked to go over to the Richards', which is where the
19
robe was found.
20
21
$0 you know, if she wasn't wearing it and
somebody else was, then presumably they both went down 22
the same path and placed the robe there.
23
I don't know. I'm just- It's the way
24
the evidence seems to me. If the robe was present
25
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with both shootings and ends up 'in the trash can along
the same path she took, either she put it there, is
one inference: or somebody else that was in the house
put it there, and it's along the same path that she
took. That's all I'm saying about that
So I would have to find that all of that
eVidence clearly supports a fair inference or finding
by this jury I because this case is circumstantial,
that if Sarah Johnson didn't do it, she certainly
3$$isted or facilitated by knowledge of where these
various items were in the house and so forth. So I
think it's olearty supported by the evidence.
MF{. PANGBURN:
Your Honor. tf I may,
there's one thing_ You had indicated that there was
no blood foul'\d of Mom's on the gun. That's not a true
statement. Or that there was no blood - I think
what you said is that there was no blood on that gun.
I think a more accurate description is
that there was no blood found, particularly because
apparently no one looked; certainly didn't conduct the
type of investigation, exactly in light of the state's
last rebuttal witness that would indicate that it was
nkely very small, potentially even toward

microscopic.
So to that extent, there was no evidence,
6041
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blood and there was a determination
that it was not there.
The other thing is I think the evidence is
at least contradictory as to whether or not the guest
house was looked. And assuming that the evidenoe is
contradictory I think someone said, 'Well, it's locked;"
but then it really came out that there was stuff maybe
stacked in front of the door.
If the guest house is not locked, our
contention is that you can boil this case down even even to a more - (would think an easier analogy
here, or an analogy.
A can of beans in the grocery store Is
missing. Miss Johnson has access to that grocery
store. Someone else has access to that grocery store.
And purportedly, you can carry this analogy to any of
the Items that you discussed, whether it was the robe
or the gloves Or whatever.
If the doors were unlocked In the house,
whioh everybody has contended they were, it's really
like merely because someone else had access to those
things, as did she, does not - you know, my
contention is that there's not the necessary nexus.

6042
THE COURT:
Well, I understand your
contention. And with all due respect, 1'!lIet you
argue that to the jury. I'll let you explain to the
jury how Sarah Johnson represents that she was in her
bed asleep, or in her room, and someone came in and
put the bullets, the extra .264 bullets In there, and
the extra glove In there and so forth.
That's fair argument You can argue that
all you want to the jury.
The question Is whether or not - and the
sale question is whether or not there's evidence to
support this requested instrUction. And I will make
the finding that, based on what I have represented.
that there's evidence to support that
Whether ifs iii good idea to give it from
the state's perspective may be a different question.
That's not my deal here, okay. I want to be real
clear about that State's requested it, 1'/1 give it.
It is supported by the evidence.
Okay, next
MF{. PANGBURN:
Okay, our second objection.
second of really three, relates to a number of
different instructions. 33, 36 .THE COURT:
Just a minute, just a
minute. 337
6043
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3et is its evidentiary value is
1
eVioence
2 unknown. And I went through the factual matters on
indicating that where someu ling is destroyed in bad
3 Friday with Cindy Hall- 1believe that's her name faith, you can assume it was adverse to that party.
Your Honor, we still believe this is the
4 the DNA person, after she got down there. Stu
S Robinson. And I read those portions back, and so
same analysis as on Friday. We believe the court was
6 1'/1 - I have considered it, I'll stay with State
correct in its ruling on Friday. We'd ask that you do
7 versus Dopp that I quoted on Friday and relied on on
not change that ruUng.
8 Friday. and \'11 again deny the request.
Your Honor. obviously, it
MR. PANGBURN:
Other matters.
9
was intentional. Thafs never been an issue. The
MR. RADER:
Your Honor, as the court
10
real issue is whether or not it was done with bad
11 knows, I filed an objection to faith. We would ask the court to look: at the - the
THE COURT:
Let me get to one thing
12
evidence of this case, look at the actions of the
13 while we have our jury commissioner here. Marji
parties; particular1y that the destruction of the
14 Shepherd Is here. She has checked - She came to me
evidence occurred after a thorough evaluation of
Miss Johnson, and the destruction was done by
15 and told me she had checked some items that some
investigator.; who have held themselves out to be very
16 jurors had brought, reading material.
I know she's got other work do this
experienced and, in fact, who were very experienced.
17
18 morning, so I want to get her to make her statement
I think the parties, or even the court on
19 You can ask her any questions, and lefs get this done
Friday - or the prosecution or the court pointed to
Cindy Hall as one of the people who was part of that
20 so she can get about her work.
MS. SHEPHERD:
Okay, Your Honor, the
decision. But Miss Hall testified that her decision
21
as to whether or not to throw that comforter away was
22 jurors did bring some items in to take for
based not on whether or not it would have exculpatory
23 sequestration. Some of them were painting projects.
24 paint brushes, bottles of paint And I would ask the
value for the defense; but instead. she based her
deciSion solely On an identification use for that.
25 court to please approve those so they could take
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Whether or not It would be helpful to
identify to OIane Johnson, one of the victims in this
case; and she said, because it was so obvious from the
scene, that she didn't feel, for that purpose, it was
worth collecting. However, she did not testify, nor
do I think she was qualified to testify regarding the
blood spatter effects. She was there to She was put on as - primarily as a DNA
exPert for the state, and I don't believe she
tesiified at all regarding blood spatter. And that
was the reason for the collection of the comforter,
was its blood spatter evidentiary use.
THE COURT:
Well, my ruling on Friday
was what we have here is a failure to collect
evidence, which evidence's evidentiary value was
unknown at the time. So I'll adopt the same ruling I
made last Friday.
1have thought about It all weekend. And
I'll also state that after hearing this entire case,
"m left with the strong feeling that the party that
rea lly wishes they had that comforter is the state.
In other words, what I'm saying is I
cannot make a finding that there's a bad faith conduct
on the part of the state to destroy evidence that's
otherwise exculpatory to the defendant.
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THE COURT:
3
MR. THOMAS:
4
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Any objection?
No objection.
MR. PANGBURN:
No, Your Honor.
MS. SHEPHERD:
There were also some
magazines about massage therapy. I would ask that the
court to please approve that
MR. PANGBURN:
No objection.
MR.. THOMAS:
No objection.
MS. SHEPHERD:
I think that Is just about
all, except for the sewing items, sewing machine and
needle, thread, things like that; and pieces of

13 fabric.
14
MR. PANGBURN:
No objection to that, Your
15 Honor.
16
MR.·THOMAS:
No objection.
17
MS. SHEPHERD:
Thank you, Your HonOL
18
THE COURT:
Ihanks.
19
Sorry, go ahead.
20
MR. RADER:
~'Our Honor, as the court
21 knows, I filed an objection to your findings regarding
22 the fact - findings of fact in support of jury
23 Instruction number 30, Which you said you were going
24 . to give last Friday.
25
I'm not gOing to go into any further
6068
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It Clear on
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the record that it is in.
In tl'rat light. I had a chance, finally, to
read the Idaho Statesman's article today.
Let's take one thing at a
THE COURT:
time. Let's talk about this filing. I just got it
about ten minutes ago. It's ten pages 1011g. I rushed
through it as fast as I COUld.
A copy was given to the state. Doesn't
even have the court's nling stamp on it J'II
Instruct the cieri< to put a filing stamp all It
It's captioned "Defendant's Objections to
the Court's Findings of Fact In Support of Jury
Instruction Number 30." Comment by theYour Honor, I read through
MR. WHATCOTT:
It rea! briefly. Basically, it's just argument on the
factual issues, and the conclusions that the court
drew trom it. It doesn't provide any new case law or
anything that I believe would provide a basis for
changing the ruling On Friday.
So as far as the factual arguments, those
are issues for the jury. So, Your Honor, we don't
believe there's been any basis for changing that
rUling.
MR. RADER:
They're not just issues for

1

The list of

I went tnrougn is, by no ",eans,

~Vidence that I could find that
2
support
the
defendant's
involvement in the orime.
3
For Instance. one of the things that I did
4
5 not list Is, if the Jury chooses to believe it, is the
6 statement that Malinda Gonzales testified to, in words
'1 or substance, that the knives were placed there to
8 throw the police officers off in their investigation;

the jury. They're issues that you relied on in making
1
your finding that Instruction number 30 should be
2
3 given, Your Honor.
3
4
Those are the bases of our argument, that
4
5 you're wrong about those decisions. I don't want to
5
6 be so blunt about it. but that's what basically we are
6
7 arguing in the paper.
7
8
THE COURT:
It wouldn't be the first
8
9 time.
s
10
MR. RADER:
And it wouldn't be the
10
11 . first time I told a judge that.
11
12
You know, our conclusion basically is 12
13 or our argument is basically substantial parts of your
13
14 conclusions do not match the evidence that was
14
~ 15 ·-·provided during trial; and, therefore, are not
15
..
16 approprlate for inclusion in making that decision.
16
17
Essentially, we're arguing that there is
17
18 no evidenoe to support the conclusion that
18
19 Sarah Johnson aided and abetted anybody. There has to 19
[ 20 be some evidence of some action on her part. and there
20
. ~1 'is none. That's the basis of the argument,
21
22 Your Honor; and I don't need to go any further than
22
23 that
23
24
THE COURT:
I tried to make it clear on
24
25 Friday, and I'll try to make it clear again today.
25

and that was reported to have been made by the
defendant.
You take the position that I see in your
writing that you take each little. individual item.
and try to attack each indMdualltem.
What I'm trying to suggest to you and put
in this record is when one takes the totality of a/l
of the circumstances, the likelihood of some outsider
with no connection, Whatsoever, to this case, that
could go in the amount of time involVed, and go around
and find all of these selected pieces of evidence that
have been admitted In this trial; and bring them all
to one place, and use in one form or another, appeared
to have been used in one form or another In the
commission of this clime, you know, the zeros that
this DNA person put up hel'$, there probably isn't
enough room to put that many zeros up there, the
6071
likelihood of some just absolute total stranger being
able to do that
The evidence is real strong, in my view.
that there's some involvement by the defendant here.
The other thing. and I said It on Friday
and I'll say it here again, Is that everybody agrees
that both of these doors were open, the parents'
bedroom door and her bedroom door. She was there,
within 25 feet of where Diane Johnson was shot
I mean it's not like being on one level of
a house and somebody in another. And I have gone
through the evidence found in the room, the location
of where the evidence 'NaS.
I don't make it as a finding of fact that
that in fact exists. Thers the jUry's job. I want
to be real clear about that AU 1'm making is a
finding of what evidence supports the giving of the
instruction.
It is up to the jury to decide. They may
disbelieve all of it I don't know. That's the
proper subject of argument I'm just making those
statements. I have noted it. I'll have it filed.
[ want to make one other comment with
respect to your filing, and that is I read your filing
to be in two parts.
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2 supports giving the Instruction. • lie other is a
3 misappncation of the law, that It's improper - ""If'
meaning Instruction number 30, the accessory
instruction - because it wasn't pled.
And ~ think that State versus Butcher that
I previously relied on, and those other cases, Butcher
in particular makes it absolutely olear that it
9 doesn't have to be pled to be giVen.
10;'
In fact, my recollection of Butcher. if
t1 it's the right case, the state once charged it and
then withdrew It; and the defense argued that they
were totally misled, because It had been abandoned by
the state. So ( have noted it, and MR. RADER:
Your Honor, I would pOint
out, for the record, in the last few years we have
seen several laws that have been overturned by the
Supreme Court because of what was once good law and
now considered to be bad.

1

2
3
4

5
6

7

~, locked that night

9

10

11
12
13
14
15

16.
17

18

Evidence brought up on things such as
Crawford v. Washington and Blakely v. Washington, and

19
20
21

Apprendi case, and the whole line of cases resulting
in that It's my job as the defense attorney, and
Mr. Pangburn's Job, to put this in front of tne court
so that these matters can be reserved for the future;

22
23
24
25

6073
and we're doing that here today.
THE COURT:
Sure, I understand.
MR RADER:
Secondly, want to say that
I agree you have to look at the totality; but the
totality of the issues you have to look at should be
limited to those items that are specifically - for
, which there is specii'ic evidence in the transcript
And my argument again, baSically, is some
of the items that you have chosen to rely on as a
totality of the evidence are not In the transcript,

are nqt supported by it
THE COURT:

Tell me one.

MR. RADER:
The one that comes to mind
is the one involving the locked - the fact the guest
house was lOCked. There's no evidence on the record
that this guest house was locked this night
The witness by the name of Dupuis has
testified that when he came out in his back yard, the
door was open, the lights were on.

Officer Harkins testified that when he
went out to the guest house after he got to the scene.
he walked in, without unlocking the door.
Mel Speegle testified he had no idea
Whether that door was locl<ed.
And Matt Johnson testified that he didn't
6074

P. 19/ 19----,

check the d
iimply movea Items out aT me way,
put them up
e door so that he could get his car
in the garage. There is no testimony that tnat door
was locked.
There wa5 testimony, however, that the
guest house was often locked or regularty locked; but
there's no testimony supporting the tact that it was

THE COURT:
WeU, then, J'" correct it
to say the guest house was ordinarily locked, and
Sarah Johnson had keys to the guest house.
But that doesn't change anything. The
idea here is how would somebody off the street know
that Mel Speegle had this gun hidden in his bedroom.
covered with clothes, that there's ammunition there.
How would somebody know that Mrs. Johnson
kept a pair of leather gloves in the Suburban.
That we have this knife hidden behind the
bread box with some part of the handle exposed.
The idea of putting the shells in
Sarah Johnson's room, presumed mate to the glove and
so on. You ean argue about this for a long time.
But I can tell you that in my view, the
evidence is strong. And the instruction is clear that
it can't be just an Idle knowledge of it.

6075
1
Instruction 30 Is approved by the Supreme
2 Court. It tells the level of involvement that has to
3 be there. And the evidence is there, in my view, to
4 give the instruction.
5
Other matteI'S.
6
MR. RADER:
The last issue, Your Honor,
1 is the article that was In the Idaho Statesman. I
8 finally have a copy of It I read it. I thinK this
9 is the entire article that I read. It is not as
10 serious as I had been led to believe, I think.
11

However, It may - I think it's worth the

12

court's - the court's time to ask the jury, maybe as

13
14

a whole, if they read this paper today. If some have,
then I think we need to address the issue deeper.
THE COURT:
State.
MR. IHOMAS:
Your Honor, this court has

is

16
11 admonished the jury not to read anything. When I look
18 at what they're talking about, the court said "could
19 have assisted." Basically, it was part of your
20 finding; so I don't think this court ever extended an
21 opinion Of guilt.
22
And I think to do - to bring the jury in
23 and ask them would highlight it We could have done
:u that after each day's testimony, so we'd object to
25 bringing them in.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)
)
)
Petitioner
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
________~R=e=sp~o=n=d=en=t~__________)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV-006-324
PETITIONER'S AMENDED
TRIAL WITNESS LIST

COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Amended Trial Witness List,
and states the following persons may be called to testify during trial on behalf of
Petitioner:
1.

Bobby Pangburn, Trial Counsel
3042 S. Whitepost Way
Eagle, ID 83646
208861 1886

2.

Mark Rader, Trial Co-Counsel
381 W. Idaho Avenue
Ontario, OR 97914
541 8892351

3.

Patrick Dunn, Defense Investigator
4695 Arrowhead Way
Boise, ID 83709
2083622727

PETITIONER'S AMENDED TRIAL WITNESS LIST

1

4.

Robert Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert
1235 N. Echohawk Way
Eagle, ID 83616
208 9394914

5.

Officer Ross Kirtley
700 W. Jefferson St. #228
Boise, ID 83720
208 8543013

6.

Det. Steve Harkins
480 East Avenue N.
PO Box 2315
Ketchum, ID 83340

9.

Sheriff Jerry "Walt" Femling
Blaine County Sheriffs Department
1650 Aviation Drive
Hailey, Idaho 83333

10.

Stuart M. Robinson
Retired Idaho State Police
(208) 420-8930
Physical Address Unknown
E-Mail: srinvestigations@cableone.net
www.srinvestigations.net

11.

Officer Raul Ornelas
Hailey Police Department
115 Main Street South, Ste. H
Hailey, Idaho 83333

12.

Maria Eguren
Idaho State Police Headquarters - Forensic Labratory
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, Idaho 83642
(208) 884-7000

13.

Kjell Elisson
Fire Administration Offices
40 East Pearl Avenue
Jackson, Wyoming
Phone: (307) 733-4732
Fax: (307) 739-9856

PETITIONER'S AMENDED TRIAL WITNESS LIST

14.

Consuelo Cedeno
PO Box 1562
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Physical Address Unknown
208.481.0104

15.

Jane Lopez
PO Box 3371
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Physical Address Unknown
208.721.0477

16.

Bruno Antonio Santos
c/o Blaine County Detention Facility
1650 Aviation Drive
Hailey, Idaho 83333

17.

Glenda Osuno
Physical Address Unknown

18.

Luis Ramirez
Physical Address Unknown

19.

Carlos Ayala
Physical Address Unknown

20.

Becky Lopez
Physical Address Unknown

21.

Alan Dupuis
1166 Riverview Drive
Bellevue, Idaho 83313

22.

Julia Dupuis
1166 Riverview Drive
Bellevue, Idaho 83313

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

PETITIONER'S AMENDED TRIAL WITNESS LIST

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15 th day of November 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S AMENDED TRIAL WITNESS LIST
was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys,
Attn: Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

- - - US Mail
- - - Hand Deliver
__
/_Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

PETITIONER'S AMENDED TRIAL WITNESS LIST

F~ED ~':';q'~'~
Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

, NOV 1 5 2010
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)
)
Petitioner
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
__________R==es=p=o=nd=e=n=t____________)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV-006-324
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

COMES NOW PETITIONER and files this, her Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition To Respondent's Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Response to Motion to
Reconsider, and in support thereof states as follows;

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 8, 2010, the parties appeared before the Court and presented
argument in support of, and in opposition to Respondent's Motion to Reconsider
concerning the Court's ruling on Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition.
Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, among other claims,
asserts ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue insufficient
evidence to support submitting an aiding and abetting a jury instruction. The Court, at
Petitioner's request, allowed additional citation and argument, to be filed by November
15,2010.
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

ARGUMENT
Petitioner submits that in order to be convicted for aiding and abetting the
commission of a crime, affirmative evidence must be presented that a person acted to
facilitate, promote, encourage, solicit or incite the actions of a crime; mere knowledge of
a crime, or assent or acquiescence is not enough. Stated in the alternative, the aider and
abetter must have the requisite intent and have acted in some manner to bring about the
intended result; proof of which must support a reasonable inference of guilt. Respondent,
is mischaracterizing, or has misconstrued, Petitioner's argument.
"(t)he law Johnson relies on
of innocence is possible

Respondent, states,

that circumstantial evidence is insufficient if an inference

has been rejected by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the

Supreme Court of the United States." (Pg 8, Respondent's Memorandum in support of
Motion to Reconsider)
Without a question, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed State v. Holder, 100 Idaho
129, 594 P.2d 639 (J 979) with its opinion in State v. Humphreys, l34 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d
652 (Idaho 2000) The ruling in Holder required, in cases of purely circumstantial
evidence, an additional instruction advising the jury that circumstantial evidence must be
irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of a defendant's innocence in order to support a
finding of guilty.

The Humphreys opinion eliminated the need for an additional

instruction, and confirmed a single standard of proof in all criminal cases, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Humphreys case did not, and does not eliminate the need for
affirmative evidence of facilitation, promotion, encouragement, incitement of the crime,
and shared criminal intent with a principle.

PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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In State v. Mitchell, 195 P.3d 737, at 742, (ID 2008) the Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed the above statement of law. The Mitchell Court cited State v. Randles, 117
Idaho 344, for the proposition that mere knowledge of the crime, or assent or
acquiescence in the commission of a crime is inadequate to prove accomplice liability by
aiding and abetting. Mitchell at 742. In Randles, the defendant was charged with and
convicted of manufacture and possession with intent to deliver marijuana. The evidence
showed the home, shared by Randles with another, contained a paper bag holding seven
sandwich bags containing approximately one ounce of marijuana apiece, a finger scale
atop a box of clear sandwich bags, six paper bags and a glass jar containing loose
marijuana leaves, two drying trays containing marijuana, a tray containing loose
marijuana, marijuana cigarette butts, rolling papers, a paper bag containing marijuana
stems, a film canister filled with what appeared to be marijuana seeds on a hutch in the
kitchen, and a baggie containing an unspecified quantity of marijuana in a purse in the
kitchen. Twenty, well cared for, immature plants were found outside, in a greenhouse
attached to the residence. Randles at 346.
The State argued that both defendants should be convicted of manufacture, as
neither resident could be ignorant of the activity they were both guilty of the offense as
accomplices for aiding and abetting in the cultivation. The Court noted, it is true that one
who fails to report a felony is guilty as an accessory, but not as an accomplice. Randles
at 347. The Mitchell Court noted Randles was overturned by Humphreys, but on other
grounds.
In the present case, the State urges the court to consider six circumstances as the
evidence supporting accomplice guilt. None of the circumstances can reasonably support

PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

an inference that Sarah Johnson facilitated, promoted, encouraged, solicited, or incited
the murder of her parents. Only speculation can lead to the conclusion that Sarah aided
or abetted another in the crimes.

Even Respondent's recitation of the circumstances

seems even to concede, in conclusion mere presence or knowledge, not facilitation, was
afoot. Such statements as, " ... all of which put her at least in close proximity to the
murders," and " ... or that she was with or would have seen the person who did so," are
not reasonable inferences of aiding and abetting. The Randles Court rejected this type of
speculation on circumstances far more damning than those in the case at bar.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner is entitled to relief on her claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel for failing to raise and argue the issue of error in offering the jury an aiding and
abetting instruction as unsupported by the evidence. Respondent's Motion to Reconsider
must be denied and Petitioner granted a new direct appeal on this issue.

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, ATTORNEY AT LAW

. (S, /..:J
RISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

DATED

PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of November 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER was delivered
to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica
Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010;
The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile number
208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

- - - US

Mail

- - - Hand

Deliver

/

_ _ _ Via facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS

PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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FILED

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
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NOV 22 2010
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)
)
Petitioner
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
________~R=e=s=po=n=d=e=m~__________)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV -006-324
PETITIONER'S FILING
MEMORANDUM

COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files the attached documents in the abovestyled matter:

Subpoena for and Acceptance of Service by Robert J. Kerchusky;

Subpoena for and Acceptance of Service by Patrick T. Dunn; Subpoena and Personal
Return of Service for Sheriff 1. Walt Femling; and Subpoena and Personal Return of
Service for Bruno A. Santos.

I ~ ,/7J
CHRISTOPHERP. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM

DATED

1

tt5'5'1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of November 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM was
delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn:
Jessica Lorello; Facsimile number 208.854.8074; PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile
number 208.788.5554; 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333; and
Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, Facsimile number
208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

- - - US Mail
- - - Hand Deliver

/ v i a facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 2087882300
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA

The State ofIdaho to: ROBERT J. KERCHUSKY
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10, 2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this 21 st day of September, 2010.

SUBPOENA

ourt:

hristopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law
Idaho State Bar No. 7374

SUBPOENA

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 2087882300
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
________-=R=es~p~o=nd=e=n=t,___________)
SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV-2006-0324

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I received and accepted a subpoena, served by mail to the
address listed below, to appear to testify at the evidentiary hearing in Johnson vs. State of Idaho,
case number CV-2006-0324, commencing on the 7th day of December, 2010, at 9:00 a.m, which
evidentiary hearing is to take place at the Twin Falls County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward
Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, Twin FaUs, Idaho 83301

Robert J. Kerchusky
1235 N. Echohawk Way
Eagle, Idaho 83616

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
__________~R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t=,____________)

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

The State of Idaho to: PATRICK T. DUNN
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case; AND
YOU ARE COMMANDED to produce or permit inspection and copying of the following
documents or objects, including electronically stored information, at the place, date and
time specified below: The audio recording of Idaho State Police Officer Ross L. Kirtley
made on September 2,2003.
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.
Dated this 21 st day of September, 2010.

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

By

O~./

of an
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thriStOPher P. Simms
Attorney at Law
Idaho State Bar No. 7374

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No: CV-2006-0324

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE

________~R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t~,___________)

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I received and accepted a subpoena, served by mail to the
address listed below, to appear to testify at the evidentiary hearing in Johnson vs. State of Idaho,
case number CV-2006-0324, commencing on the 7th day of December, 2010, at 9:00 a.m, which
evidentiary hearing is to take place at the Twin Falls County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward
Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North, Twin Falls, Idaho 83301

Patrick T. Dunn
4695 Arrowhead Way
Boise, Idaho 83709

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE
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BLAINE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
1. WALT FEMLING

1650 AVIATION DRlVE
HAILEY, ID 83333

(208) 788-5563

Paper ID:

201001177

SARAH M JOHNSON
PLAINTIFF(S)

-- vs _.

COURT:

BCDC

CASE NO:

2006·00324

STATE OF IDAHO
DEFENDANT(S)

PAPER(S) SERVED:
CRIMINAL SUBPOENA

I, J. WALT FEMLlNG, SHERIFF OF BLAINE COUNTY, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE
DELIVERED TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010, AT 9:24 O'CLOCK A.M., I, KYLE D. GREEN, BEING
DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MAnER UPON

* * * * * FEMLlNG, J. E. "WALT" * * * * *
PERSONALLY AT:

1650 AVIATION DRIVE HAILEY ID

WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BLAINE, STATE OF IDAHO.
DATED THIS 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010.

J. WALT FEMLING
SHERIFF
SHERIFF'S FEES:

0.00

TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE:

0.00

AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED:

0.00

BY
KYLE D. GREEN
SERVING OFFICER

BY
GINGER M. CLEMENT
RETURNING OFFICER

OR\G\Nf\l
CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS
PO BOX 1861
HAILEY,ID 83333-1861

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA

)
__________R==es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,~__________)

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Sheriff Jerry "Walt" Femling
Blaine County Sheriff's Department
1650 Aviation Drive
Hailey, Idaho 83333
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7,2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this f..- 5

SUBPOENA

M

day of November, 2010.

J

ltJLe<b

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

BY:_-L~::::::::~+--.:'~~:::::}.._

Deputy Clerk

SUBPOENA

BLAINE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
1650 AVIATION DRIVE
HAILEY, ID 83333

J. WALT FEMLING
(208) 788-5563

Paper ID:

201001176

SARAH M JOHNSON
PLAINTIFF(S)

•• VS··

COURT:

BCDC

CASE NO:

2006-00324

STATE OF IDAHO
DEFENDANT(S)

PAPER(S) SERVED:
CRIMINAL SUBPOENA

I, J. WALT FEMLlNG, SHERIFF OF BLAINE COUNTY, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE
DELIVERED TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010, AT 9:25 O'CLOCK A.M., I, KYLE D. GREEN, BEING
DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER UPON

* * • * • BRUNO ANTONI SANTOS·DOMINGUEZ * * * * *
PERSONALLY AT:

BLAINE COUNTY JAIL HAILEY 10

WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BLAINE, STATE OF IDAHO.
DATED THIS 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010.
J. WALT FEMLING
SHERIFF
SHERIFF'S FEES:

0.00

TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE:

0.00

AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED:

0.00

BY
KYLE D. GREEN
SERVING OFFICER

BY
GINGER M. CLEMENT
RETURNING OFFICER

CHRISTOPHER P SIMMS
PO BOX 1861
HAILEY, 10 83333-1861

ORIGlNAL
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Sheriff's Office
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IN THE PISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA

________~R==es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,~----------)
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: BRUNO A. SANTOS
c/o Blaine County Detention Facility
1650 Aviation Drive
Hailey, Idaho 83333
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10, 2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls" Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this \ ('

SUBPOENA

day of November, 2010.

1

\'61'\

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:-'----i-~~=.L-=~~-
Deputy Clerk

SUBPOENA

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL

DIST~c:h-'FoIo'=::"::"'-:",,:,,:~==

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
SARAH JOHNSON

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
COurt Blaine County, Idaho

Case No. CV -06-32r-.-...----=~~,;.;;.;:;.;;;:;......

ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The Court, having considered the Respondent's Motion to Reconsider,
filed September 30, 2010, and after conducting a hearing on said motion, hereby
enters the following order.
The Court denies the state's motion to reconsider the denial of its request
for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective in failing
to adequately cross-examine a number of witnesses as alleged in paragraph 16
of the Second Amended Petition.
The Court takes under advisement the state's motion to reconsider the
denial of its request for summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim that appellate
counsel was ineffective as alleged in paragraph 26 of the Second Amended
Petition. The parties shall have until November 15, 2010, to file, to the extent
they deem appropriate, supplemental briefing on whether this claim should be
dismissed.
.,.~

DATED this /f. day of November,

Honorable G. Richard Bevan
District Judge
ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th

I, Sharie Cooper, hereby certify that on the 19 day of November, 2010, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Respondent's Motion to
Reconsider to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:

Christopher Simms
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 3123
Ketchum, 1083340

{X} U. S. Mail
{ } Court Folder

Jessica Lorello
Kenneth Jorgensen
Deputy Attorney Generals
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, 1083720-0010

{X} U. S. Mail
{ } Court Folder

.

eputy Clerk
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
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NOV 22 2010
-!2!!nrtng{)rage, C/9rk District
V<JU
1slne County, Idaho
,.,....",----.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)
)
)
Petitioner,
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
)
)
__________R~es~p=o=nd=e=n=t,____________)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV -2006-0324
MOTION FOR ORDER
TO TRANSPORT WITNESS
FOR PRODUCTION OF
TESTIMONY AT POSTCONVICTION RELIEF HEARING
ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED
LRC.P. 17 & 26

COMES NOW Petitioner by and through her attorney, CHRISTOPHER P.
SIMMS, and files this, her MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT WITNESS FOR
PRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY AT POST-CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING and in
support thereof states as follows:
1.

Pending before this Court is Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-

Conviction Relief, set for evidentiary hearing commencing December 7, 2010.
2.

The evidentiary hearing is scheduled for four (4) days, to be conducted in the

Theron Ward Judicial Building, located in Twin Falls, Idaho.
3.

Petitioner's allegations, include but are not limited to, Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel relating to the cross-examination of several key witnesses during the trial for

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT WITNESS FOR PRODUCTION OF
TESTIMONY AT POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING

Two Counts of First Degree Murder under cause number CR-2003-1820, for which
Petitioner was convicted and is serving a life sentence plus fifteen years.
4.

One key witness is Bruno Antonio Santos, the then boyfriend of Petitioner, who

is currently being held in the Blaine County Detention Facility on pending criminal
charges.
5.

Bruno Santos has been duly served with a Subpoena compelling his attendance at

said hearing.
6.

It is expected that the testimony of Mr. Santos will be required on December 9,

2010.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests this Court enter an Order to Transport Bruno
A. Santos from the Blaine County Detention Facility to the Twin Falls County Jail before

the commencement of the evidentiary hearing on no later than 10:00 a.m. on December 9,
2010.

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney for Petitioner

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT WITNESS FOR PRODUCTION OF
TESTIMONY AT POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING

Dated

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22 nd day of November, 2010, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT
WITNESS FOR PRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY AT POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
HEARING was delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting
Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello Facsimile number 208.854.8074, PO Box 83720, Boise,
Idaho 83720-0010 and The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney Facsimile
number 208.788.5554,201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333:

- - - US Mail

_ _ _ Hand Delivery

/ V i a facsimile 208.854.8074 & 208.788.5554

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO TRANSPORT WITNESS FOR PRODUCTION OF
TESTIMONY AT POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING

FILED ~:~::2~ 1.A~

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

NOV 22 2010
Jo/ynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent. .

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: ~-2006-0324

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF INTERPRETER

LC.R. 28

COMES NOW Petitioner Sarah M. Jonson, through Counsel Christopher P.
Simms, and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 28 move for this Court for an Order
Appointing Interpreter and in support thereof, states as follows:
1.

The witnesses named herein have been served with subpoenas, or will be served

with subpoenas; Bruno A. Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Becky Lopez, Jane Lopez, Luis
Ramirez, Carlos Ayala, and Glena Osuno, all of whom are native Spanish language
speakers, communicate primarily in the Spanish language and understand very little
English language.

2.

This matter is set for hearing on the Court's calendar on at 10:00 a.m., on

December 7, 2010, 2010, however the testimony of the above witnesses is expected to
begin at 10:00 a.m. on December 9,2010.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF INTERPRETER

WHEREFORE, Petitioner hereby requests appointment of an English/Spanish
language interpreter, for the Court to issue a subpoena for the attendance of said
interpreter, for said interpreter to be sworn to accurately and fully interpret the testimony
of the above witnesses given at the hearing to the best of the interpreter's ability before
assuming the duties as an interpreter.

Dated this 22nd day of November 2010.

ey for Defendant

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF INTERPRETER

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22 nd day of November, 2010, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF INTERPRETER was
delivered to the Office of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn:
Jessica Lorello Facsimile number 208.854.8074, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 837200010 and The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney Facsimile number
208.788.5554,201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333:

- - - US Mail

_ _ _ Hand Delivery

/ V i a facsimile 208.854.8074 & 208.78

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF INTERPRETER
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LAWRENCE G. WASOEN
Idaho Attomey General

[ NOV 23 2010

STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Chief, Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division

I

Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
COurt Blaine County, Idaho

JESSICA M. L.ORELLO ISB #6554
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN ISB #4051
Deputies Attorney General and
Special Prosecuting Attomeys
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 332-3096
Facsimile: (208) 854-8074
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH JOHNSON
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CVw06-324
RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED

FINDINGS

OF

FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special
Prosecuting Attorney for Blaine County, and hereby submits the Respondenfs
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to this Court's Amended
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and PreftTrial Order dated September 8,2010.
Following proceedings on the parties' cross-motions for summary dismissal, the
remaining claims in Petitioners ("Johnson") Second Amended Petition for Post~
Conviction Relief ("Petition"), which are currently set for an evidentiary hearing are:

RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-1
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Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for a

continuance after discovering the comforter on the bed where Diane Johnson was
murdered was not collected as evidence. (Petition, pp.7-8, 11 15.s.)
Claim 4(c) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately investigate
the scientific basis forthe proffered coconut experiment. (Petition, p.8,

11 15.c.)

Claim 4(d) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to provide expert
testimony as to comforters." (Petition, p.9,

11 15.d.)

Claim 4(e) - Ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the crossexamination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Walt Femling, Steve Harkin,
Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky
Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13, 11 16.)
Claim 4(f) - Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present evidence of an
audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police "focused" on Johnson "to the
exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, because [Johnson] was the
easiest target." (Petition, p.13,

11 16.c.)

Claim 11 - Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for "failing to argue
insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction." (Petition, p.22,

lr 26.)
Claim 12 -

Newly discovered evidence based upon the identification of

fingerprints belonging to Christopher Hill. (Petition, pp.22-24, 1T1J27-29.)
The state's position on the appropriate resolution of each of these claims is that,
for the reaSOns set forth below, Johnson will not be able to meet her burden, and is not
entitled to relief on any of her claims.

RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 2
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Claim 4(a)
In Claim 4(a), Johnson contends trial counsel were ineffective for failing to move

for a continuance after discovering "that a comforter, that would have contained physical
evidence, had been discarded and not gathered as physical evidence." (Petition, pp.78, 11' a.)

According to Johnson, she was prejudiced by counsels' failure to do so

because it left counsel "inadequately prepared to cross-examine the State's witnesses
about the alleged comforter" and "[s]pecifically, whether a hole on the comforter was a
bullet hole and whether a sheet and or comforter covered the head of Diane Johnson
thereby effecting blood spatter."

(Petition, p.8,

n 15.a.)

Johnson cannot meet her

burden of establishing deficient performance or prejudice to support this allegation.
In order to meet her burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel,
Johnson must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance
was deficient and that she was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U
.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). "Because of the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong presumption that
counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance
- that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243,
1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A petitioner must overcome a strong
presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgmenf' to establish that
counsel's performance was "outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance."

Claiboume v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting,

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

"Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-

RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - J
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guessed or selVe as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel unless that decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective
review." State Vo Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373.941 P2d 337, 344-345 (citing Giles
v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho

254,258,869 P.2d 571,575 (Ct.App. 1994)).
Thus, the first element - deficient performance - "requires a showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the (counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The
second element - prejudice - requires a showing that counsel's deficient perfonnance
actually had an adverse effect on her defense;

i.e., but for counsel's defiCient

performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have
been different. strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Cowger v. state, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978
P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).

Regarding the second element, Johnson has the

burden of showing that her trial counsels' deficient conduct "so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial can"ot be relied on as having
produced a just resutt.)' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844
P.2d 706, 709 (1992).
When a post-conviction petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to file
a motion in her underlying criminal case, the court "may consider the probability of
success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity
constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d
642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995), A petitioner must a/so overcome the presumption that trial
counsel's decision not to file a particular motion was strategiC or tactical. See State v.

RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 4
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Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 816 P.2d 1023 (Ct App. 1991) (trial counsel's choice of
witnesses, his manner of conducting cross-examination, and his lack of objection to
testimony fall within the area of strategic or tactical decisions).
The evidence will show that the failure to request a continuance was objectively
reasonable since additional time would not have changed the circumstances regarding
the comforter or the ability to cross-examine the state's witnesses,

Rather, it was

objectively reasonable for counsel to instead emphasize and capitalize on the state's
failure to collect the evidence. Moreover, the Court should conclude that a request for a
continuance on this basis would not have been granted and that there is no reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if a continuance
had been requested or granted.

S.

Claim 4(c)
In Claim 4(c), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective because, she asserts,

they were "inadequately prepared to present adequate support for [their] proffered
expert testimony regarding the blood splattering evidence;" specifically, their
"experiment using a coconut [to] re-create the alleged crime

[sjc].~

(Petition, p.S,

~

15.c.) Johnson further asserts, as an "example," "Trial Counsel was unable to oonsult
with any experts and property present an experiment that would have met evidentiary
standards and would have been admissible .... " (Id.) Relief should be denied on this
claim because the evidence will show that Johnson cannot meet her burden of
establishing deficient performance or prejudice in relation to these allegations.
The notion that counsel were "unable to consult with any experts" is belied by the
recor<f. Counsel clearly had adequate time to consult with experts and, in fact, did so.
Any request for additional time would have certainly been denied.

In addition, no

RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 5
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additional foundation could have presented in order to render the coconut experiment
admissible.

For these reasons, and because there is no reasonable probability the

result of the proceeding would have been different had a "coconut experiment" been
presented, Johnson cannot prove prejudice. Relief on this claim should therefore be
denied.

C.

Claim 4{d)
In Claim 4(d), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective in "failing to provide

expert testimony as to comforters." (Petition, p.9,

'fJ

1S.d.) More specifically, Johnson

asserts:
Trial Counsel requested the ability to provide evidence of a forensic
experiment showing the effects of a contact gunshot from a high-powered
rifle on a sheet and comforter at the proximity that the State asserted
occurred In this case. The District Court denied Trial Counsel's request
because Trial Counsel could not provide evidence that the comforter used
in the experiment was the same type of comforter that the State
destroyed. Trial Counsel was ineffectiVe in failing to present to the District
Court evidence showing that the type of comforter used in the experiment
would not have made a difference to the relevance of the experiment and
thus Trial Counsel failed to get the experiment into evidence. But for Trial
Counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner
would not have been convicted.
(Petition, p.9,

~

1S.d).

Johnson cannot meet her burden of establishing either deficient performance or
prejudice based upon the absence of any evidence relating to the comforter.

The

efforts undertaken by counsel to "prOVide evidence that the comforter used in the
experiment was the same type of comforter that the State destroyed [sic)" were more
than adequate and it was not objectively unreasonable for them not to have pursued
this avenue further since the comforter was not available, which necessarily impaired
counsels' ability to prove that the comforter used in the experiment was '1he same type."

RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 6
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Johnson also cannot establish any prejudice resulted from failing to produce
"expert testimony" about the comforter. In light of the evidence presented at trial, there
Is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had counsel
made additional efforts to "get the experiment into evidence." Relief should be denied
on this claim.

D.

Claim 4(e)
In Claim 4(e), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective with respect to the cross-

examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Eliison, Walt Femling, Steve Harkin,
Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky
Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13, 11' 16.) The
evidence will show that Johnson cannot meet her burden of establishing counsels'
decisions regarding cross-examination were anything but strategic and tactical and
objectively reasonable. Johnson also cannot meet her burden of proving a reasonable
probability that any cross-examination she now believes should have been conducted
would have resulted in a different outcome. The Court should deny relief on Johnson's
claims that counsels' cross-examination was ineffective.

E.

Claim 4(1)

In Claim 4(t), Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to present
evidence of an audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police "focused" on Johnson
i'to the exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, because [Johnson] was the
easiest target."

(Petition. p.13,

,-r 16.c.)

Johnson cannot demonstrate counsels'

decision not to introduce such evidence was objectively unreasonable or that
introduction of such evidence, assuming it can even be correctly characterized as

RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA W - 7
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Johnson has characterized it, would even remotely undermine confidence in the
outcome of her case. The Court should deny relief on Claim 4(1).

F.

Claim 11
In Claim 11, Johnson alleges appellate counsel were ineffective for ~ailing to

argue insufficient evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction." (Petition,
p.22, 1126.) The state's request to reconsider the Court's order denying

its motion for

summary dismissal of this claim is currently under advisement. To the extent this olaim
proceeds to hearing, Johnson will not be able to meet her burden.
The standards that apply to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims also
apply to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,

i.e., in order to establish

ineffective assistance of appellate oounsel, a petitioner has the burden of proving that
his counsel's representation on appeal was deficient and that the deficiency was
prejudicial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,276,
971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998).

The relevant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable

probability that. but for counsel's errors, Johnson would have prevailed on appeal.
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). Even if a defendant requests that certain
issues be raised on appeal, appeUate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise
every non-frivolous issue requested by the defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,
751-53 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988) (citing
Jones, 463

U.s. at 751-754).

Moreover, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on

appeal cannot be predicated upon counsel's faIlure to raise meritless issues. Matthews
v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 809 n.2, 839 P.2d 1215, 1223 n.2 (1992); Maxfield v. State,
108 Idaho 493,501,700 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct App. 1985). As explained by the Supreme
Court, "Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the
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importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central
issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues."

~

at 752.

The evidence will establish that appellate counsel made an informed and
reasonable decision not to pursue a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support
the aiding and abetting instruction.

A review of the record and the law supports

appellate counsels' assessment as well as the trial judge's conclusion that the
instruction was appropriate based upon the evidence presented.

Johnson will not,

therefore, meet her burden of establishing either deficient performance or prejudice in
relation to her claim that appellate counsel was ineffective; the Court should deny relief
on this claim.

G.

Claim 12
In Claim 12, Johnson alleges there is newly discovered evidence warranting a

new trial. (Petition, pp.2:2-25, 1111 27-30.) Specifically, she alleges that latent fingerprints
on Mel Speegle's rifle scope and an insert on a box of .264 caliber ammunition were
identified as belonging to Christopher Kevin Hill.

Johnson cannot establish the

Identification of Mr. Hill's fingerprints requires a new trial.
In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho Supreme
Court articulated a four-part test a defendant must satisfy in order to be entitled to a new
trial based upon newly discovered evidence. That test requires a defendant to show
that the evidence offered (1) is "newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at
the time of trial"; (2) is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably
produce an acquittal; and (4) could not have been discovered through the exercise of
diligence on the part of the defendant.

.!sL. at 691,

551 P.2d at 978. In announcing this

four-part test, the Court cited Professor Wright's text on Federal Practice and Procedure
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and speoifically noted his oomment, "after a man has had his day in court, and has been
fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second trial."

M:. (Citation omitted).

Consistent with the four-part test in Drapeau and Professor Wright's comment, the
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence known to the defendant at the
time of trial cannot be considered newly discovered. See,~, State v. Weise, 75 Idaho
404,410,273 P.2d 97,100 (1954) (evidencewhioh defendant was aware of prior to trial
but ohose not to present is not newly discovered); State v. Morrison, 52 Idaho 99, 11
P.2d 819,822 (1932) (evidence discovered during trial is not newly discovered): State v.
Lumpkin, 31 Idaho 175, 169 P. 939, 940 (1917) (facts unknown at time of trial could be
considered newly discovered); State v. Cook, 13 Idaho 45, 88 P. 240, 242 (1907)
(concluding evidence that colts Were not stolen but actually belonged to rancher for
which defendants worked was not newly discovered).
The newly discovered evidence in this case is neither material nor likely to
produce an acquittal.

At trial, evidence of fingerprints on the murder weapon, the

scope, the box and elseWhere was presented and dealt with extensively. (Trial Tr., Vol.
VII, p.5045, L.15 - p.5132, L.15; Vol. VIII, p.5S0S, L.1 - p.5843, L.4; p.5846, L16 p.S858, L.17; Vol. V, p.2994, L,10 - p.3077, l,25.) It was established that unidentified
fingerprints were on the scope, gun, some of the shells, and the box containing the
shells. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3077, Ls.1-17.) Thus,

it was established at trial that Johnson

had left no fingerprints on those items; If any of the prints on those items belonged to
the "reaf killer," then the killer was not Johnson and was some unidentified person.
Because evidence that people other than Johnson had at some point handled the
scope and the ammunition box, and had left fingerprints thereon, was well established
at trial, the only evidence that is even arguably newly discovered is the identity of one of
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the previously unidentified persons to handle the scope and the box of ammunition.
Knowing his name, however, is not material to this case or likely to produce an acquittal.
Evidence at trial that someone (who was unknown at that time) other than Johnson had
touched the scope and ammunition box did not create a reasonable doubt as to
Johnson's guilt. The julY had no reasonable doubt that the person who had deposited
those fingerprints was in fact the actual killer, instead of Johnson - otherwise the jury
would have acquitted. Knowing a name

to associate with those prints does not change

that calculus in the slightest.
In addition, both Mel Speegle (the owner of the gun) and Hill gave statements
indicating when, how and where Hill had touched the gun. BeIng able to do so made
the fingerprint evidence of even
was not able

less value to Johnson than it was at trial when the state

to provide any information about how the unknown fingerprints could have

gotten where they were found.
Whether an unknown person who had left fingerprints on the scope and
ammunition box could have been the killer was one of the issues at trial.

The jury

clearly rejected the argument that the prints created reasonable doubt as to Johnson's
guilt. That we now know the source of at least some of those prints in no way indicates
that a jUlY would view the presence of those prints any differently_ Because the jury
necessarily rejected the argument that the "real killer" left the fingerprints, newly
discovered evidence that the prints belong to a friend of the gun owner who helped him
sight the gun in some time before the killing is not material or likely to produce an
acquittal.
Johnson also alleges the newly discovered fingerprint evidence somehow shows
that "Tina Walthall's trial testimony asserting that Ms. Eguren has provided all latent
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print 11ft cards was false" and that if "this truth" had been known it is "reasonably likely"
that she would not have been convicted. (Petition, p.23, 11' 28a.) Johnson, however,
cannot establish Walthall's trial testimony was false and there are 0'0 reasonable
grounds to believe that any evidence regarding what fingerprint cards Ms. Eguren was
provided would have in any way been Important to the verdict.
Because Johnson is not entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered
evidence, the Court should deny relief on Claim 12 as well as all other claims that have
not been prevIously dismissed.
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2010.
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IN AND FOR TIffi COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
________~R=e~sp~o~n=de=n=L___________)
vs.

Case No: CV-2006-0324

ORDER TO TRANSPORT
,BRUNO ANTONIO SANTOS
FOR PRODUCTION
OF TESTIMONY FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF HEARING

The Court, having conside~ed Petitioner's Motion for Order of
, Transport Witness For Production of Testimony at Post-Con,.viction Relief Hearing, .
/

and gOQd cause appearing therefore, HEREBY OJU>ERS Bruno Antonio Santos be
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I"

•

County Detention Facility, prior to the commencement of the scheduled hearing for
Post-CoIiviction Relief no later than 10:00 am., on December 9,2010 for the purpose
of producing testimony, before G. Richard Bevan, District Judge.
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Jolynn Drage. Clark District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)
)
Petitioner
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
__________~R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t~___________)

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV-006-324
PETITIONER'S TRIAL
BRIEF

COMES NOW Petitioner and files this, her TRIAL BRIEF and in support thereof
states as follows;

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief seeking a new trial from a conviction in Blaine County, on or about
April 19, 2006, on two counts of Murder in the First Degree, with firearm enhancement,
in Case No. CR-03-1820. On or about June 30, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced, and is
serving two life terms plus fifteen (15) years, in Pocatello Women's Correctional Center.
Petitioner's trial counsel failed to timely file notice of appeal, and therefore her direct
appeal was initially dismissed as untimely. Relief was granted pursuant to the initial
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, timely filed with this Court on April 19, 2006, in the
form of allowing the direct appeal to proceed. The Idaho Supreme Court, on June 26,
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2008, affirmed Petitioner's Conviction in State v. Johnson, Case No. 33312, which
decision can be found at 188 P.3d 912 (ID 2008).
The unresolved issues contained in Petitioner's Post-Conviction action were
stayed during pendency of the direct appeal. On or about November S, 2008 the parties
stipulated and the Court Ordered Petitioner's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief filed by March 16, 2009. On or about February 13, 2009 it was learned new
evidence had been uncovered, specifically that a match had been identified wherein
formerly unidentified latent prints found on the tools of murder had been positively
connected to one Christopher Kevin Hill. Petitioner's First Amended Petition was timely
filed.
Thereafter, a previously unknown witness came forward with an allegation that
led to a Second Amended Petition. Those allegations, together with a host of Petitioner's
other grounds for relief, have been disposed of through Motion for Summary DismissaL
The allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel relating to failure to raise the
sufficiency of the evidence to support an aiding and abetting jury instruction is submitted
and under advisement as a purely legal issue. The issues now before the Court on issues
of fact and law are those asserted in paragraphs 14, ISa., IS.c., IS.d., 16.a.i., 16.a.ii.,
16.a.iii.,16.v., 16.vi., 16.b., 16.c., 16.d., 18.vi., 18.vii., and 29 of Petitioner's Second
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

The allegations contained in the

referenced paragraphs and claims to be decided by this court at trial, and for which relief
is requested, are summarized as follows:
a. Ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from an overall lack of
diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, chronic
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tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, including trial, all
of which together resulted, cumulatively and individually, a manifestly
unfair trial and unjust verdict as alleged in paragraph 14.;
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a continuance or
adequately preparing to cross examine state's expert, after learning the
comforter had not been collected as evidence as alleged in paragraph
I5.a.;
c. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately investigate
the scientific basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on crucial
blood splatter opinion evidence, as alleged in paragraph I5.c.;
d. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present expert
testimony, and failing to adequately investigate the scientific basis for
a gun shot I sheet experiment, bearing on crucial blood splatter opinion
evidence, as alleged in paragraph I5.d.;
e. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately crossexamine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry
"Walt" Femling, Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo
Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez,
Carlos Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart Robinson as
alleged in paragraph 16.;
f.

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present evidence of
an audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross Kirtley,
which recording clearly proved the theory that police focused on
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Petitioner Sarah 10hnson, to the exclusion of all other possible
suspects and theories, because she was the easiest target as alleged in
paragraph 16.;
g. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire whether certain
previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh" as alleged in
paragraph 18.;
h. Newly discovered evidence relating to the recent identification of
Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously unidentified
latent prints as alleged in paragraph 29.

FACTUAL AND EVIDENTIARY BACKGROUND
(Exhibit References as used in 2 nd Amended Petition)
On the morning of September 2, 2003 Alan and Diane 10hnson were found shot to
death in their horne, where they lived with their sixteen year old daughter, Sarah. (Trial
Transcript pp. 1512-1514, 1593-1605) Almost immediately after the rifle blasts Sarah
ran from the house screaming that someone had shot her parents. (Trial Transcript pp.
1518-20) The first people at the house, initially neighbors and then police, found a
gruesome scene of blood and tissue literally dripping from the walls and ceilings of the
master bedroom and adjoining hallway. (Trial Transcript pp. 1593-1605, 1654-1663)
Mrs. Johnson's body was found in the bed, with her head almost entirely blown off.
(Trial Transcript pp. 1667-1668, 1795) Mr. Johnson's wet, naked body was found by the
side of the bed, with the master bath shower running. (Trial Transcript pp. 1662, 1792)
A .264 caliber rifle was on the floor in the doorway of the master bathroom. (Trial
Transcript pp. 1600 & 1849, Exhibit 36)

PETITIONER'S TRIAL BRIEF

4

A more complete inventory of the crime scene located a pink robe, a pair of
surgical gloves, and five (5) .25 auto rounds in a trash can by the curb. (Trial Transcript
pp. 1673, 1894, 1900-01, 1949-52, Exhibit 37, see also property/evidence location
diagram Exhibit 35) A scope, which had been attached to the .264 caliber rifle, was
found on the bed in the garage apartment. (Trial Transcript pp. 2057, Exhibit 38)
Ammunition for the .264 was found in the closet of the garage apartment.

(Trial

Transcript pp. 2029, Exhibit 39) In Sarah's room, across the hallway from the master
bedroom, were found a leather glove, two (2) live .264 rounds, and a 9mm magazine
wrapped in a red bandana. (Trial Transcript pp. 2038-2040) In the garage attached to the
main house a .22 rifle was found sitting on top of a freezer with a box of .25 auto rounds,
and a spent .264 casing was found on the floor. (Trial Transcript pp. 1730, 2038-49,
5705)
Further investigation revealed that one Mel Speegle was renting the garage
apartment, where he normally stayed from Sunday through Wednesday. The .264 murder
weapon belonged to Mr. Speegle. Speegle moved into the apartment approximately one
year prior to the murders. Speegle told police and testified he moved the .264 rifle into
the apartment; and a few weeks prior to the murders, had held it and generally checked it
out. (Exhibit 40, Exhibit 41, Exhibit 42 & Trial Transcript pp. 2694-2721)
Sarah had been dating one Bruno Santos, an adult illegal immigrant, who had
been threatened with statutory rape prosecution in the weeks prior to the murders. (Trial
Transcript pp. 3358-59, 5433-34) A search of Bruno's home revealed .25 automatic
rounds in the closet of his bedroom. (Exhibit 13) The surgical gloves held DNA from
Sarah Johnson. (Trial Transcript pp. 3096-3110) The robe was spotted with a mixture of
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DNA; Mr. and Mrs. Johnson's, Sarah's and an unknown male.

(Trial Transcript pp.

3436) The blood spots on the robe were from Mr. and Mrs. Johnson and the same
unknown person. (Trial Transcript pp. 3438-3451)

The .264 rifle, ammunition and

ammunition containers, as well as the scope all had unidentified latent fingerprints which
have now been identified as those of one Christopher Kevin Hill. (Exhibit 43, Exhibit 44,
Exhibit 45, Exhibit 46 & Exhibit 47)
Petitioner was convicted of two counts of Murder in the First Degree, with
firearn1 enhancement.

Petitioner is serving a life term in The Pocatello Women's

Correctional Center and has exhausted her right to direct appeal.

Petitioner was

represented at trial by Bobby Eugene Pangburn appointed under a public defender
contract with Blaine County. Mr. Pangburn is suspended from the practice of law in the
State of Idaho, and in the State of Oregon.

PROOF TO BE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL
Enumerated below is a list of witnesses, together with a synopsis of testimony to
be offered by Petitioner at trial. For a preview of documentary and tangible evidence to
be offered by Petitioner at trial see the timely filed Restated Trial Exhibit List.

P ATRICK DUNN:

Petitioner intends to call Patrick Dunn, the defense investigator at

trial, to offer testimony. Mr. Dunn is expected to testify as follows: lead trial counsel,
Bobby Pangburn was chronically unprepared; Pangburn failed to participate in defense
team meetings; Pangburn failed to timely distribute to the defense team discovery
materials received from the State; Pangburn failed to diligently prepare for trial, by lack
of review of prepared witness books containing pre-trial witness statements, lack of
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perseverance, and out of town travel during trial; Pangburn and co-counsel Rader agreed
Rader would handle all expert witnesses, and Pangburn would handle all lay witnesses,
yet at trial, without warning, Pangburn assigned Rader the task of examining lay
witnesses; Pangburn was late to trial and would frantically prepare to examine witnesses;
trial counsel was made aware of an audio recording made by Officer Kirtley that captured
officers' opinion that Sarah 10hnson could not have committed the murder, and Sheriff
Femling directing concentration of the investigation against Sarah 10hnson, but failed to
offer said recording into evidence; trial counsel were aware that Consuelo Cedeno (Bruno
Santos mother) made pre-trial statements contrary to trial testimony that would have
created doubt as to Bruno's alibi, yet trial counsel failed to cross-examine Consuelo
Cedeno; Dunn will testify he investigated and timed an escape route from the crime scene
to Bruno Santos home, and advised trial counsel of his findings regarding same.

MARK RADER:

Petitioner intends to call Mark Rader, trial co-counsel, to offer

testimony at trial. Mr. Rader is expected to testify as follows; Rader is an attorney
licensed to practice law in Oregon and Idaho, who has vast murder trial experience;
Pangburn as lead attorney assigned Rader to handle expert and forensic witnesses, while
Pangburn would handle the lay witnesses; the defense learned approximately one month
prior to trial that the comforter from the master bedroom had not been taken into
evidence; the defense team was very dysfunctional; Pangburn, without advance warning,
handed Rader the responsibility to examine lay witnesses, when Rader had conducted no
advance preparation to examine said witnesses; the defense failed to adequately crossexamine Sheriff Walt Femling; the defense failed to adequately cross-examine Kjell
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Elisison; the defense failed to adequately cross-examine Bruno Santos; Rader was aware
that Officer Stu Robinson falsely testified before the grand jury that no useful latent
fingerprints were found at the scene, but failed to cross-examine him on that point; Rader
should have cross-examined Officer Robinson regarding indications in the records
showing collection into evidence of the comforter and the fact the comforter was later not
available for defense inspection; He failed to do any legal research to determine the
proper foundation for admission of the coconut blood splatter test offered, but rejected as
admissible evidence at trial; the defense knew the exact type of sheet that was on the bed
in the master bedroom; the defense knew the master bedroom crime scene contained a
king size bed, fully made, yet the recreated conditions for the ballistics experiment,
offered into but refused admission into evidence, were not consistent with those at the
crime scene; He was aware of prior inconsistent statements made by Consuela Cedeno,
Bruno Santos mother, but failed to cross examine her regarding such statements.

BOBBY E. PANGBURN: Petitioner intends to call Bobby E. Pangburn, the lead defense
trial lawyer in the underlying criminal prosecution, to offer testimony at trial.

Mr.

Pangburn is expected to testify as follows: He is currently suspended from the practice of
law in both the State of Oregon, and the State of Idaho; He is facing further disciplinary
bar association proceedings; He was appointed to represent Sarah Johnson in the
underlying criminal prosecution pursuant to the Blaine County Public Defender Contract;
It was agreed between he and co-counsel Rader that Pangburn would handle lay

witnesses, while Rader dealt with expert and forensic witnesses; He will disclaim
responsibility for the defense failure to have admitted into evidence the offered blood
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splatter and ballistic tests; He will disclaim responsibility for the defense failure to offer
an audio recording of Sheriff Femling making statements on the morning of the crime, to
the effect, " this is a resort community. We've got to find somebody right now."; He will
admit to changing his mind, without notice, directing Rader to examine witnesses; He
will disclaim responsibility to the decision not to cross-examine Bruno Santos, but state
he disagreed with the decision by Rader; He will admit the defense had evidence that
called into question Bruno Santos alibi, but that evidence was not offered at trial; He will
admit Consuela Cedeno, Bruno's mother, should have been cross-examined regarding
inconsistent statements relating to Bruno's alibi; He will admit he watched himself on
television, and spent time during the trial discussing the case on broadcast television
programming; He will claim to have met with Rader daily and to have visited Sarah more
than 125 times; He will be examined as to his failure to inquire of fingerprint expert
Kerchusky's opinion testimony regarding the freshness of latent fingerprints on the tools
of the murder.

OFFICER ROSS KIRTLEY: Petitioner intends to call Officer Ross Kirtley, ISP trooper
who arrived first at the crime scene, to offer testimony at trial.

Officer Kirtley is

expected to testify as follows; he was the first law enforcement officer at the scene; He
recorded audio of all sound within his personal space for the first several hours of the
investigation at the scene; He recognizes Sheriff Femling's voice that appears on the
audio recording.
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SHERIFF JERRY "WALT" FEMLING: Petitioner intends to call Blaine County Sheriff
Walt Femling, to offer testimony at trial.

Sheriff Femling is expected to testify as

follows; he arrived at the crime scene at approximately 7:00 a.m., at which time he made
contact with Officer Kirtley; He will confirm his voice on the Kirtley recording and
affirm the statements made therein; He will be questioned about his recorded statements
and those of other officers; He will admit the community was critical of his office for
taking so long to make an arrest; He will discuss the State's theory of the case; He will
testify he received information from Randy Parker at ISP Fingerprint Laboratory that new
fingerprint evidence was discovered in February of 2009, matching the known
fingerprints of one Christopher K. Hill to the previously unknown latent prints found on
the tools of murder; He will be cross-examined regarding the follow-up investigation into
Hill.

CHIEF STEVE HARKINS:

Petitioner intends to call Ketchum Police Chief, Steve

Harkins, to offer testimony at trial. Chief Harkin was a Detective with the Blaine County
Sheriff's Department during the investigation and trial of Sarah Johnson. Chief Harkins
will testify regarding his investigation in the case, particularly of Bruno Santos; He will
testify regarding his post-trial investigation of the Christopher Kevin Hill and Mel
Speegle relating to Hill's known inked fingerprints being matched to the previously
unidentified latent prints found on the tools of murder.
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STUART M. ROBINSON: Petitioner intends to call Retired Idaho State Police Officer,
Stuart Robinson, to offer testimony at trial. Mr. Robinson will be cross-examined
regarding his grand jury testimony relating to lack of fingerprints found at the scene.

RAUL ORNELAS: Petitioner intends to call Raul Ornelas, a Hailey City Patrol Officer
at the time of the Johnson investigation and trial to offer testimony at trial. Officer
Ornelas will be cross-examined regarding his observations of foot print evidence.

JULIA DUPUIS: Petitioner intends to call Julia Dupuis, a neighbor of the Johnsons at
the time of the murders, to offer testimony at trial.

Ms. Dupuis will be questioned

regarding what she heard, observed and how she reacted on the morning in question.

MARIA EGUREN: Petitioner intends to call Maria Eguren, a fingerprint technician for
the Idaho State Police Bureau of Criminal Identification, to offer testimony at trial. Ms.
Eguren will be cross-examined regarding her testimony in the underlying criminal trial
and regarding the newly discovered fingerprint evidence.

BRUNO SANTOS: Petitioner intends to call Bruno Santos to offer testimony at trial.
Mr. Santos will be cross-examined regarding his relationship with Petitioner; his criminal
history; and his whereabouts on the morning of the murders.

CONSUELA CEDENO: Petitioner intends to call Consuela Cedeno, Bruno Santos
mother, to offer testimony at trial. Ms. Cedeno will be cross-examined regarding pre-trial
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statements wherein she insisted her son Bruno Santos had not driven the car the morning
of the murders because there was dew on the windshield and that she checked the
mileage on the vehicle to see if Bruno was lying about where he had been, which
statements were·inconsistent with her trial testimony.

JANE LOPEZ: Petitioner intends to call Jane Lopez, Bruno Santos cousin, to offer
testimony at trial.

Ms. Lopez will be cross-examined regarding her trial testimony

bolstering Bruno Santos alibi, which is contradicted by phone records.

ROBERT KERCHUSKY:

Petitioner intends to call Robert Kerchusky, a fingerprint

expert who testified for the defense at the underlying criminal trial, to offer testimony at
triaL Mr. Kerchusky is expected to testify he made Trial Counsel aware of his opinion,
, and the basis therefore, that the latent unidentified prints found on stock of the .264 rifle,
the scope, and the ammunition packaging were a fresh prints; His opinion was based
upon statements and testimony the gun had not been touched, other than by Speegle, in
approximately one (1) year; He will testify Trial Counsel had knowledge of Mel
Speegle's testimony, and had available to him Speegle's pre-trial statements, asserting
the .264 ammunition was obtained ten years prior to the shooting and had not been
opened nor gone through in that length of time; that Speegle had handled the weapon
within the few weeks prior to the murders; He will recount his comparison of the latent to
latent prints whereby he was able to identify as a match one latent print from the scope to
a latent print from the insert from the box of .264 magnum ammo; He will testify this
latent to latent print identification proves the latent prints on the scope were fresh, and he
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informed trial counsel of same, yet trial counsel failed to elicit testimony regarding the
freshness of prints found on the tools of murder.
Kerchusky will testify he has reviewed the ISP Forensic Services fingerprint
results and related police reports; He is expected to provide his expert opinion regarding
the newly discovered fingerprint evidence - previously unidentified prints found on the
stock of the .264 rifle, the scope removed from the .264 rifle prior to the murder, and a
plastic insert from a box of .264 ammunition were in fact the prints of a single person,
Christopher Kevin Hill. More specifically, Kerchusky is expected to conclude with his
opinion that Christopher Hill is the person who removed the scope from the murder
weapon, and is in fact the last person to have touched the murder weapon, the
ammunition and ammunition packaging.

ANALYSIS
The issues to be addressed at trial have been extensively briefed, first in
association with filing of Petitioner's First and Second Amended Petitions, then as part of
the summary disposition process.

The issues have been narrowed, but the general

standards remain the same. It is not expected that any truly "new issues" or evidence will
be presented at trial. The Court will be presented with the above referenced witnesses,
whose credibility, under all of the circumstances, must be judged. It appears beyond
question the trial attorneys' performance was deficient in several respects, leaving the
second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice, within the Court's discretion. At the risk
of redundant reiteration the following discussion again lays out the legal criteria for
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence in the context
of a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL STANDARDS
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show
the attorney's performance was deficient and the defendant was prejudiced by the
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65,
80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984) To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of
showing the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988) To establish prejudice,
the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at
761, 760 P.2d at 1177.

It is often repeated that trial counsel's strategic decisions will not be second
guessed. In the instant case, Petitioner asserts that as to the claimed deficiencies of trial
counsel, none can be attributed to anything other than lack of preparedness. The recent
Idaho Appellate Court decision in Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139 at 747-48, 139 P.3d
741 (2006) included a clear statement of the law in a case with facts analogous to those in
the instant matter.
The benchmark for jUdging a claim of ineffectiveness is "whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just
result." It is well established that we will not attempt to second-guess trial
counsel's strategic decisions unless those decisions are made upon the
basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. State v. Perez, 99 Idaho
181,184-85,579 P.2d 127,130-31(1978); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4,10,
539 P.2d 556, 562 (1975). Inadequate preparation prior to trial may be
sufficient to show deprivation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Tucker, 97 Idaho at 10, 539 P.2d at 562. Strategic choices made
after incomplete investigations are reasonable only so far as reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510,533, 123 S.Ct. 2527,2541, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, 492
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(2003); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2463,
162 L.Ed.2d 360, 372 (2005) (failure to investigate material relied upon by
prosecution was unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396,
120 S.Ct. 1495, 1514, 146 L.Ed.2d 389, 419 (2000) (unreasonable failure
to conduct thorough investigation); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794,
107 S.Ct. 3114,3125,97 L.Ed.2d 638,657 (1987).

In addition to those standards and criteria referenced by the Murphy Court it
should be noted that evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a close
examination of the evidence, both the evidence which was admitted during trial and that
which was not. Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649 at 653,946 P.2d 71 (Idaho App. 1997)
Furthermore, in assessing the potential prejudice the Court will consider in aggregate the
various decisions and omissions of defense counsel that are alleged to have been
unreasonable. The Court should also take into account the totality of the evidence that
was before the jury in the criminal trial. Milburn at 653. The Court cautioned that each
case must be judged according to the significance of the evidence each witness has to
offer. Id at 654.
In State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975) the Supreme Court ofIdaho
reversed and remanded denial of post-conviction relief when Trial Counsel failed to offer
evidence of a tape favorable to Petitioner that should have been known, but for
unpreparedness.

The Court presented a lengthy description of the meaning and

importance of adequate preparation by trial counsel.
Given the complexities of the interaction between the prosecution
function and the rights of the criminal defendant as is evident in this case,
adequate preparation must be considered to be an integral element of the
defense counsel's role in the adversary process. Adequate preparation for
trial often may be a more important element in the effective assistance of
counsel to which a defendant is entitled than the forensic skill exhibited in
the courtroom. The careful investigation of a case and the thoughtful
analysis of the information it yields may disclose evidence of which even
the defendant is unaware and may suggest issues and tactics at trial which
would otherwise not emerge." Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735
PETITIONER'S TRIAL BRIEF
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(3d Cir. 1970). Without adequate preparation, defense counsel cannot
properly discharge his advocate's duty. The ABA Standards furnish a
guideline to the nature and the extent of the duty to investigate:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant
to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty. The investigation should always
include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution
and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless
of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts
constituting guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty." ABA Standards,
"The Defense Function", § 4.1 (1971).
Tucker at 10-11. Trial Counsel for Tucker failed to interview, or otherwise inquire of,
police officers and agents involved in the sting operation resulting in Tuckers arrest. The
Court concluded that the tapes (which were later inadvertently erased and not available
for review) were not discovered because of inadequate pre-trial investigation. Id at 11-12.
In Milburn v. State, 13 0 Idaho 649, 946 P.2d 71 (1997) the Idaho Court of
Appeals reversed summary dismissal of a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief due to Trial
Counsel's failure to adequately investigate and cross-examine witnesses regarding
inconsistent statement and failure to present exculpatory evidence.

The prosecution

relied on a three (3) prong theory of proof, (1) ballistics; (2) Defendant was last person
seen with victim and (3) Defendant made admission. The Court held that the right to a
diligent and conscientious advocate was violated when Trial Counsel failed; to present
evidence that the Defendant was not the last person seen with the victim before his death;
failed to impeach witness, who testified that Defendant admitted killing, with inconsistent
prior statements; and to present evidence of another's admission to the crime. The Court
reasoned it was not reasonable for defense counsel to fail to present an alternative theory
of the case implicating another individual in the murder. Milburn at 656.

PETITlONER'S TRIAL BRIEF
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The general statement of law relating to deference to informed strategic decision
of trial counsel, and the notable exception, applicable here, was recited by the Milburn
Court. " ... a court ordinarily will not second-guess informed strategic and tactical choices
made by trial counsel. However, when counsel's trial strategy decisions are made upon
the basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation, the defendant may well have been denied the competent
assistance of counsel.

Moreover, even errors in strategy can be so grave that they

represent circumstances in which an issue of ineffective assistance exists" Milburn at
658.
NEWL Y DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Newly discovered evidence will warrant a new trial only if it satisfies a
four-part test, showing that: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the
defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or
impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the
evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Hayes,
144 Idaho 574, 165 P.3d 288 (Idaho App. 2007) citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,
691,551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976); State v. Ames, 112 Idaho 144, 146,730 P.2d 1064, 1066
(Ct. App. 1986).
In Hayes, the defendant was convicted of lewd conduct with a minor child, the
trial attorney being unable to locate a key witness. Subsequent to trial the witness was
found, who provided an alibi for the defendant. The Court of Appeals held the found
witnesses testimony to be "material" and "newly discovered evidence," not presented due
to no lack of diligence on the part of the defense. The Court found the newly discovered
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evidence would probably produce an acquittal. State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 165 P.3d
288 (Idaho App. 2007) It is important to note the Haves Court made this final
determination after an analysis of the record as a whole, not merely the newly discovered
evidence.

CONCLUSION
At the conclusion of the evidence, after having considered the testimony of the
witnesses and proof submitted, this Court will unavoidably conclude trial counsel in the
underlying criminal case were unprepared, leading to objective deficiencies in
. presentation of the defense case, all concluding with an unjust result. Likewise, upon a
considered review of the circumstances surrounding the new evidence confirming the
person who last handled the tools of murder, the court will be left with the only possible
conclusion; Sarah Johnson would probably have been acquitted if the evidence were
presented to the jury.

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
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COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through counsel acting as Special Prosecuting
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Trial Transcript, State ofIdaho'll. Sarah
Marie Johnson., Blaine County Case No.
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No. 33312
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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)
)
Petitioner
)
)
vs.
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SARAH M. JOHNSON,

Case No: CV -006-324
PETITIONER'S FILING
MEMORANDUM

COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files the attached documents in the abovestyled matter:

Subpoena and Personal Return of Service for Officer Raul Ornelas;

Subpoena and Personal Return of Service for Chief of Police Steve Harkins; Subpoena
and Personal Return of Service for Retired ISP Officer Stuart Robinson; and Subpoena
and Personal Return of Service for Maria Eguren, ISP Forensic Lab Technician.
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83720-0010; The Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney; Facsimile
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208.736.4155, PO Box 126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126.

- - - US Mail
- - - Hand Deliver

~a

facsimile 208.854.8074; 208.788.5554; & 208.788.4155

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS

PETITIONER'S FILING MEMORANDUM

2

BLAINE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
1650 AVIATION DRIVE
HAILEY, ID 83333

1 WALT FEMLING
(208) 788-5563

Paper ID:

201001179

SARAH M JOHNSON
PLAINTIFF(S)

-- VS --

COURT:

BCDC

CASE NO:

2006-00324

STATE OF IDAHO
DEFENDANT(S)

PAPER(S) SERVED:
CRIMINAL SUBPOENA

I, J. WALT FEMLlNG, SHERIFF OF BLAINE COUNTY, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE
DELIVERED TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010, AT 10:06 O'CLOCK A.M., I, KYLE D. GREEN, BEING
DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER UPON
··*·*ORNELAS,RAUL*****
PERSONALLY AT:

HAILEY POLICE DEPT HAILEY ID

WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BLAINE, STATE OF IDAHO.
DATED THIS 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010.

J. WALT FEMLING
SHERIFF
SHERIFF'S FEES:

0.00

TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE:

0.00

AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED:

0.00

BY
KYLE D. GREEN
SERVING OFFICER

BY
GINGER M. CLEMENT
RETURNING OFFICER
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HAILEY, 10 83333-1861

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Officer Raul Ornelas
Hailey Police Department
115 Main Street South, Ste. H
Hailey, Idaho 83333
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this

SUBPOENA

Is=

day of November, 2010.

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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Deputy Clerk
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STATE OF IDAHO
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PAPER(S) SERVED:
CRIMINAL SUBPOENA

I, J. WALT FEMLlNG, SHERIFF OF BLAINE COUNTY, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE
DELIVERED TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 17TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010, AT 2:00 O'CLOCK P.M., I, KYLE D. GREEN, BEING
DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS I N THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER UPON

* * * * • HARKINS, STEVE * * * * *
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WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BLAINE, STATE OF IDAHO.
DATED THIS 17TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2010.
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0.00
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RETURNING OFFICER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
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)
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)
)
__________=R=es~p=o=n=de=n=t,~__________ )

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Police Chief Steve Harkins
Ketchum Police Department
480 East Avenue North
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this I)'

SUBPOENA

day of November, 2010.
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STATE OF IDAHO
PLAINTIFF
DEFENDANT
I, SHERIFF TOM CARTER, Sheriff of the County of Twin Falls, State
of Idaho, hereby certify that I received the attached SUBPOENA
on the 17 day of November, 2010 1 and I further certify that in
accordance with I.R.C.P. 4 and 5, I served a copy of the SUBPOENA,
on STUART ROBINSON, he/she being the WITNESS named in said document{s
on Thursday, the 18 day

of November, 2010, at 11:29 a.m. at

the following address: BURGER STOP, TWIN FALLS 1 ID 83301; by
delivering a copy of the above named document to him/her personally;
to which was attached:
ORIG

DATED this 19 day of November, 2010.
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
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Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA

________~R==es~p=o=nd~e~n~t,~__________)
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: Stuart M. Robinson
712 2nd Avenue North
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7, 2010 - December 10, 2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the plac.e and time specifIed above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this

SUBPOENA
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day of November, 2010.

CLERK OF THE ISTRlCT ,e9tm.T

.

~~y~

BY:-,-----------lI.L!-+

Deputy Clerk

SUBPOENA

11/23/2010

SARAH M JOHNSON
-VSSTATE OF IDAHO
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I CERTIFY THAT I SERVED A COPY OF THE SUBPOENA TO
MARIA EGUREN-ISP FORENSIC LAB TECHNICIAN
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MARIA EGUREN
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MERIDIAN, ID 83642
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2006-0324

SUBPOENA
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i~CSO

CIt..lIL '10HOUi 7Ailil1:5C

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: MARIA EGUREN
Idaho State Police - Forensic Laboratory Technician
700S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, Idaho 83642
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date and time specified below to
testify in the above case;
PLACE DATE AND TIME: December 7,2010 - December 10,2010 at the Twin Falls
County Courthouse, Theron W. Ward Judicial Building, 427 Shoshone Street North,
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 for the purposes of producing testimony in the evidentiary
hearing.
You are further notified that if you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or
to produce or permit copying or inspection as specified above that you may be held in
contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover from you the sum of $100
and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to comply with this
subpoena.

Dated this

15

day of November, 2010.

SUBPOENA

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

NOV 30 2010
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County Id!!~._..

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH M. JOHNSON,

)
)
Petitioner
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
________-=R=e=sp=o=n=de=n~t___________)

Case No: CV-006-324
PETITIONER'S RESTATED
TRIAL WITNESS LIST

COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Restated Trial Witness List, and
states the following persons may be called, in the order listed herein, if feasible to testify
on behalf of Petitioner during trial:
1.

Patrick Dunn, Defense Investigator
4695 Arrowhead Way
Boise, ID 83709
2083622727

2.

Mark Rader, Trial Co-Counsel
381 W. Idaho Avenue
Ontario, OR 97914
541 8892351

3.

Bobby Pangburn, Trial Counsel
3042 S. Whitepost Way
Eagle, ID 83646
208 861 1886

4.

Officer Ross Kirtley
700 W. Jefferson St. #228
Boise, ID 83720
208 8543013
PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL WITNESS LIST

5.

Sheriff Jerry "Walt" Femling
Blaine County Sheriffs Department
1650 Aviation Drive
Hailey, Idaho 83333

6.

Det. Steve Harkins
480 East Avenue N.
PO Box 2315
Ketchum, ID 83340

7.

Stuart M. Robinson
Retired Idaho State Police
712 2 nd Avenue North
Twin Falls, Idaho
(208) 420-8930

8.

Officer Raul Ornelas
Hailey Police Department
115 Main Street South, Ste. H
Hailey, Idaho 83333

9.

Julia Dupuis
4522 West Beacon Light Road
Eagle, Idaho 83616

10.

Maria Eguren
Idaho State Police Headquarters - Forensic Laboratory
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, Idaho 83642
(208) 884-7000

11.

Jane Lopez
PO Box 3371
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Physical Address Unknown
208.721.0477

12.

Consuelo Cedeno
PO Box 1562
820 Silver Star Driv
Hailey, Idaho 83333
208.481.0104

13.

Bruno Antonio Santos
c/o Blaine County Detention Facility

PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL WITNESS LIST
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1650 Aviation Drive
Hailey, Idaho 83333

14.

Robert Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert
1235 N. Echohawk Way
Eagle, ID 83616
2089394914

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, ATTORNEY AT LAW

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL WITNESS LIST

DATED

3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of November 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL WITNESS LIST
was delivered by US Mail Postage Pre-paid to the Office of Attorney General &
Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0010 and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, PO Box 126,
Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126; and by Hand Delivery to The Office of the Blaine
County Prosecuting Attorney, 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho
83333.

PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL WITNESS LIST
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
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[NOV 3 0 2010

I

F..-

JO/ynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SARAH M. JOHNSON,
Petitioner
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV -006-324
PETITIONER'S RESTATED
TRlAL EXHIBIT LIST

________~R~e~s~p~on~d~e~n=t------------)
COMES NOW PETITIONER, and files this, her Restated Trial Exhibit List, and therefore
recites as follows;
Exhibit Number & Description
1. Transcript from Grand Jury Proceedings
2. Transcript of Trial Proceedings
3. Affidavit of Patrick Dunn, Investigator for Defense .
4. Photograph of Diagram of Glen Aspen Drive
5. Photograph of Murder Weapon at Scene
6. Photograph of Trash Can Johnson Residence
7. Photograph of Removed Rifle Scope on Guest Bed Johnson Residence
8. Photograph of Winchester Super X Rifle Cartridges
9. Phone Records of Consuela Cedeno
PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRlAL EXHIBIT LIST
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10. Jane Lopez Phone Record
11. Bruno Santos Application for Travel Document
12. Recording ofInitial Crime Scene Response
13. Transcript of Police Interview of Consuela Cedeno and Jane Lopez
14. Affidavit of Mark Rader
15. Disciplinary Order Idaho Supreme Court Bobby E. Pangburn
16. Suspended Status of Attorney Bobby Eugene Pangburn (Idaho Bar Association)
17. Bobby E. Pangburn, Deposition Transcript
18. Orchid Cellmark Laboratory Report Bates Nos 10017-10021
19. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 2/272009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher
Kevin Hill Bates Nos. 0003PC thru 0020PC
20. ISP Forensic Services Rpt - Bates Nos. 0021-PCt thru 0028PC
21. ISP Forensic Services Rpt - Bates Nos. 0029-PCt thru 0092PC
22. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 2/272009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher
Kevin Hill, with lab report Bates Nos. 00094 PC thru 001 06PC
23. ISP Forensic Services Rpt- Bates Nos. 00108-PC thru 00123PC
24. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 2/272009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher
Kevin Hill, Bates Nos. 000124PC thru 00125PC
25. ISP Forensic Services Rpt - Bates Nos. 00126-PC thru 00132PC
26. ISP Forensic Services Rpt- Bates Nos. 00133-PC thru 00139PC
27. Blaine County Sheriffs Report 11/022009 Identification of Fingerprints of Christopher
Kevin Hill, with suspect written alibi statement Bates Nos. 00014.oPC thru 00141C
28. ISP Forensic Services Rpt - Bates Nos. unknown Dates 1.27.09 - 2.11.09
29. AudioNideo Recording of Interview with Mel Speegle 2/10/2009
30. AudioNideo Recording ofInterview with Christopher Kevin Hill 211212009
PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST
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31. Written Statement of Julia Dupuis Bates No. 000201
32. ISP Chain of Custody form last date 11/25/03 Bates No. 005988
33. ISP Forensic Services Latent Section Case Notes 11/25/03 Bates No. 004550
34. Transcript of Interview with Bruno Santos 9/3/2003 Bates Nos. 002861-002922
35. Blaine County Sheriffs Report ofInterview with Bruno Santos 9/2/2003
36. Bruno Santos - Nikki Settle Transcript of Taped Telephone Call
37. Police Report of Carlos Ayala Interview Bates No. 003087
38. Resume of Robert J. Kerchusky, Fingerprint Expert
39. Latent Fingerprint Cards (w/o Bates Stamp)
40. Qwest Telephone Records

AT LAW

//
T PHERP. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST

~U./(}
DATED

3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of November 2010, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST together with the
physical exhibits referenced therein was delivered by US Mail Postage Pre-paid to the Office
of Attorney General & Special Prosecuting Attorneys, Attn: Jessica Lorello, PO Box 83720,
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 and Chambers Copy for the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, PO Box
126, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83303-0126; and by Hand Delivery to The Office of the Blaine
County Prosecuting Attorney, 201 Second Avenue South, Ste. 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333.

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS

PETITIONER'S RESTATED TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIfTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BL>\INE
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DEC - 1 2010
)
)

JoJynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine County, Idaho

)
)
)

REQUEST TO OBTAIN APPROV AL
TO VIDEO RECORD, BROADCAST
OR PHOTOGRAPH A COURT

)

PROCEEDING

)
)

Defendant.

I hereby reqtlest approval to:
] video record

] bl'oadcast

[ vrPho~ograph
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the following court proceeding:
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I have read Rule 4S of the Idaho Court Aaministrative Rules permitting cameras in the courtroom, and
will comply in an respects with the provisions of that rule, and will also make ce.rtain that all other
persons from l11y organi~ation participating in video or audio recording or broadcasting or photographing
afthe court proceedings have read Rule 45 of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules and will comply in
all respects with the provisions of that rule.
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